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Abstract 
Despite the undeniable significance of the `race and crime' stream in. criminology, 
knowledge held by minority ethnic groups on these matters is still much 
overlooked. It is this gap in the literature that this thesis begins to fill, based on 
both fieldwork and documentary research. The case-study through which the 
importance of minority ethnic views is investigated is a Bradford Pakistani one. 
The neglect by academic criminological accounts of a systematic analysis of 
minorities' views, and their cultural specificities, may be imputed in part to the 
fear of pathologisation. On the other hand, many media accounts seem to look at 
alleged `dysfunctionalities' of certain groups. After September 11th 2001 and July 
7th 2005, Muslim communities seem particularly susceptible to negative 
stereotyping. The research looks at `cultural agency', avoiding ill-fitted 
generalisation and stereotypes based on an imposed essentialisation of the 
Bradford Pakistani community. 
This thesis analyses Bradford Pakistanis' perceptions of crime and its production, 
construction, sanctioning and prevention, through an `emic' approach. Thus, emic 
units are discovered by the analyst in the specific reality of a study and the social 
actors, rather than created by her/him a priori, or by imposing universal 
categories created for other settings. 
Through collecting perceptions around crime ethnographically, the research 
revealed that Bradford Pakistanis' perceptions of crime and control are a 
combination of the formal and informal, or British and `traditional' Pakistani, that 
are no longer separable in the diasporic context. The emic of cultural agency can 
be said to legitimise the term community criminology, but not in the sense that 
Bradford Pakistanis possess exclusive and monolithic criminological discourses, 
labelling, preventive strategies and rehabilitation practices. Rather, they engage 
with mainstream criminological and policy discourses in a way that might well be 
considered a kind of reflection representative of the position of their diaspora: 
community for them does not only include their traditional structures but all the 
intracommunal and intercommunal relations that are meaningful to them, both as 
resources and constraints. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Between spring and summer 2001 a series of violent disorders in Northern England 
created an atmosphere of mistrust against Muslims but in particular South Asian 
Muslim communities (see 4.6 and 4.7). This was only a preliminary exercise to the 
chaotic aftermath of the attack on the Twin Towers that September and completed 
the `crisis of trust' between Europe and Muslims (Grillo 2004: 863). 
Three main topics seemed to concern British public opinion as far as British 
Muslims were concerned: their rights and responsibilities within Multiculturalism, 
`terror' and crime. Having been researching and making friends with British 
Pakistanis for five years at the time of the beginning of the doctorate, I was drawn 
to investigate the shift in their general perceptions from the "law-abiding to the 
screwed up" generation (Kamran, interview with author). 
1.1 Aims of the thesis 
The thesis builds on an understanding of the recent history'. The research on which 
the thesis is based developed while the British government and most of the rest of 
the Western states were discussing global issues of the Islamic presence `within'. I 
believe this had a great impact on the fieldwork not only as far as access is 
concerned, but also in terms of the questions posed and the answers collected. I 
believe a great amount of reflexivity engaged not only the present anthropologist 
1 Part III of the thesis draws mostly on data collected through doctoral fieldwork between 
September 2004 and July 2005. Part II relies quite extensively on a previous Bradford based 
fieldwork that provided the author with basic knowledge of the setting (see Bolognani 2002 and 
2007, forthcoming). Quotes where only the name of the interviewee appears are the ones coming 
from doctoral fieldwork, while quotes form undergraduate fieldwork are marked by reference to 
Bolognani 2002. 
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(as it should), but also the research participants and the practitioners involved. 
Discourses using sentences such as `isolate the bad apples that are amongst you' 
may have triggered in many individuals a deep intimate discussion about whom 
`we' and `you' were. Constant debates in the media about what Islam is and what 
makes a loyal citizen have echoed in many conversations and interviews included 
as data in the present work. If we take for granted Wallman's formulation (1986) 
that ethnicity is something that stays "cool in the belly" until a particular encounter 
awakens it, it could be said that ethnicity (or culture, or religion, or cultural capital, 
as some may prefer to refer to) was wide awake by the time this research started. 
The research therefore had four main aims: 
To investigate the salience of a study of minority ethnic perceptions 
about crime as their views seem to have been mainly neglected (see 
Part I). 
To follow a set of methodological approaches that would allow the 
researcher to prioritise local grassroots' views rather than deductive 
theoretical accounts (see Part II). 
To analyse how practical concerns, cultural and religious beliefs and 
moral dilemmas may play a part in the construction of the idea of 
crime (Part III) 
To explore possibilities of the presence of a distinct `community 
criminology' (see Part III). 
The main intent behind the present research, therefore, has been to give 
voice to the members of the Bradford Pakistani communities who in reality are 
much more diverse than the `mainstream' British audiences may appreciate. This is 
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based on a specific set of approaches which leads to a particular kind of fieldwork 
that will be discussed in depth in chapter Six. 
The underlying aim of the research as it unfolded related crime and 
deviance in this context to much more general topics discussed at a national level, 
including whether British Pakistanis are really insular, separate, angry, antagonistic 
and `other'. This thesis therefore focuses on issues about criminality but is 
grounded in diasporic studies and problems of citizenship and Multiculturalism. 
The main research question may be summarised in a concern to explore 
how far Bradford Pakistanis today might have rather distinctive outlooks and 
particular ways of living that may be regarded as generating their own community 
criminology, rather than one likely to be shared by the rest of British society. 
Behind this question there is by no means a thought that there is a unified Bradford 
Pakistani community that is homogenous in its way of life, and the researcher 
placed herself in a dual dimension such as insider/outsider. Indian anthropologist 
Andre Beteille addressed the 2006 ASA conference inviting his colleagues to reject 
dichotomies such as insider/outsider or we/other: within each group there is a wide 
range of points of view. It is in this belief that the present thesis is grounded: there 
are no homogenous communities, but there are common experiences that lead 
groups of people to be cohesive and find similar solutions to certain problems. In 
particular, in diaspora, members of such groups continuously negotiate different 
influences in order to find the most adequate solutions to their problems. 
1.2 Chapters and coverage 
3 
This thesis opens with a critical review of the race2 and crime debate as it has 
developed in Europe and North America3. Chapter Two analyses how, since the 
abuse of Lombroso's biological statements during the Second World War, many 
criminologists have avoided discussing any relationship between race and crime 
that could not be justified by structural constraints. In the UK this has created a 
fertile and politically committed field that fights against criminalisation of certain 
ethnic groups and investigates discrimination by the criminal justice system. At the 
same time, however, the fear of constructing a pathologisation of certain groups 
has created the taboo of the study of any link between race and crime (Phillips and 
Bowling 2003). It will be argued that criminology seems to be discussing now 
what ethnic studies debated in the 1990s with, for example, the well-known 
dialogue between Benson (1996) and Werbner (1996). However, unlike in ethnic 
studies, the fear of pathologisation has grown so much that we lack satisfying 
accounts of minority ethnic groups' perspectives on crime. On the other hand, 
mainstream media and certain political movements manage to fill this gap in their 
own way, capitalising on the construction of an ethnic problem as far as crime is 
concerned. Scholars like Alexander, nevertheless, seem to prompt academics to 
abandon any kind of cultural reference as it is likely to construct a racialised folk- 
devil (Alexander 2000). 
Chapter Three will compare Alexander's (2000) and Tatum's (2002) 
approaches to the study of race and crime (reviewed in Chapter Two) with material 
on Pakistani diaspora. This chapter will explore the need for criminological studies 
2 Although the term race is controversial and some authors prefer the use of `race', I have made a 
conscious decision not to use inverted commas as in the field of ethnicity there are too many 
controversial concepts to qualify them all. 
3 There is a great amount of publications about race and crime that have recently appeared in 
academic journals. I have only systematically considered the literature published until 1S` January 
2006 and made a selection on the basis of its relevance to the themes here discussed. 
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take into account the cultures of the study populations without essentialising them, 
and applying adequate methodology. 
Chapter Four describes the methodology followed during the research for 
this thesis. The emic approach, or the standpoint that reads any pattern of 
behaviour through the framework of a coherent whole of the studied culture, 
informed the fieldwork. In addition to this very anthropological foundation, this 
research was based on classic ethnographic methods such as participant 
observation and in-depth interviews. Here it will be argued that these methods have 
been the only possible ones to guarantee access in a period when distrust in 
research and fear of interference from secret services started characterising the 
field. 
Chapter Five sets the historical context of the Bradford Pakistani 
community. It will highlight how the initial settlement in the 1960s has 
significantly engaged with the territory so that it has transformed Bradford's 
skyline as much as local Multicultural politics. A critical review of different forms 
of peaceful and violent protest, resistance and resilience to discrimination and 
exploitation will trace the genealogy of many discourses that will emerge in the 
data chapters in Part III of the thesis. 
Chapter Six will look at the definition of community of Bradford 
Pakistanis. Although in the conclusions of this thesis the possibility of `community 
criminology' will be discussed, it is important to clarify that this does not mean 
that the author believes in a homogenous group of people. On the other hand, as 
pointed out in 6.4, there are elements of `ethnic capital' (or `ethnic resources and 
networks', see 6.2.1) that are used in different ways as resources and symbols by 
the descendants of the 1960s migration. By ethnic resources and networks we 
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mean the traditional inherited cultural framework, the organisation of social 
networks, the self-ascription process, the negotiation within the locality and 
dynamics of identity processes that are shared by a group of people. Whether this 
is a resource or an obstacle for Bradford Pakistanis will also be discussed in the 
chapter. 
Chapter Seven is the first of the data chapters. Here the main 
preoccupations amongst Bradford Pakistanis as far as crime is concerned will be 
illustrated. Drugs will emerge as the `mother of all evils' as they are perceived as 
the major cause of the increasingly fragile balance of families. Contrary to most of 
the studies produced in the Bradford context (see for example Singh 2002: 168; 
Jan-Khan 2003: 33), structural variables in terms of aetiology of crime, appear in 
chapter Eight as only secondary. 
Chapter Eight represents emic views, consistently with the whole approach 
of the thesis. A major question for the data analysis that shows the potential 
disagreement between etic and emic lenses is: why objective general disadvantage 
found so little room and such discussion in the respondents' narratives? In 
comparison with political material produced especially in 1980s, the data collected 
during this research seemed to show a loss in the use of the language of structural 
resistance and made more room for cultural discourses. 
Chapter Nine will focus on the cultural and social attributions of blame that 
seem to generate a variety of discourses far better articulated by informants than 
the structural ones. It is in chapter Nine that the different sources of moral 
discourses, identities and the process of negotiation between different narratives 
will start emerging. This analysis could not be completed without noting the moral 
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panic surrounding the community and influencing processes of reflection and 
action. 
Chapter Ten then will focus on young men and the moral panic that they 
seem to generate not only amongst `mainstream' British society, but also within 
their community. At the same time, typologies about their behaviour that have been 
produced by academic writers will be compared with the emic views collected 
during the research. 
Chapter Eleven will reflect the evaluation of all those practices that may be 
called informal sanctions. Here popular strategies of both prevention and 
rehabilitation will be discussed in the light of the evaluation given by research 
participants. It will emerge that they are not considered effective unless they are 
combined with more formal provisions. 
In Chapter Twelve, views about many local institutions, from mosques to 
the police force, will be analysed. 
The conclusion will discuss how the emit of cultural agency can be said to 
legitimise the term `community criminology', but not in the sense that Bradford 
Pakistanis possess exclusive criminological discourses, labelling, preventive 
strategies and rehabilitation practices. Rather, they engage with mainstream 
criminological and policy discourses in a way that might well be considered a kind 
of reflection representative of the position of their diaspora: the community for 
them does not only include their traditional structures but all the intra-communal 
and inter-communal relations that are meaningful to them, both as resources and 
constraints. 
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Part I 
Ethnicity, crime and the Pakistani diaspora 
8 
Chapter Two 
The race, ethnicity and crime debate 
The link between race and crime can be said to have been a recurrent feature of 
criminological studies. Social scientists in different times have wondered whether 
there is a special connection between one's belonging to a group and their 
involvement in deviant behaviour (Russell 1992: 669; Gabbidon and Taylor Greene 
2005: 50). 
By referring to the race and crime debate here we want to delineate an area 
in which victims and perpetrators' perceived group background is considered to be 
significant in the study of the dynamics of crime and its prosecution. 
The first two parts of this chapter will discuss the early days of the study of 
race and crime in the light of both biological and cultural studies. 
The third section will look at how in the 1980s many British criminologists 
started looking at the debate mainly from the point of view of fair treatment of 
minorities in the criminal justice system. It will be argued that by focusing policy 
on urgent needs -made more cogent by events such as the Brixton riots- 
dealing 
with cultural specificities of ethnic minorities slowly became a taboo (cf. also 
Russell 1992 and Phillips and Bowling 2002). Priority was given instead to studies 
that focussed on discrimination both in policing and sentencing. Here it will be 
argued that the fear of essentialising minority ethnic groups in relation to crime by 
including cultural analysis made room for mostly structural accounts in which the 
agents' point of view was neglected (Phillips and Bowling 2003). By reviewing a 
selection of works that represent different perspectives on the subject (Alexander 
2000, Tatum 2000 and Pryce 1979/1986) and debates about ethnicity studies in 
general (Benson 1996 and Werbner 1996) it will be theorised why filling this gap 
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by incorporating (cultural) knowledge by minority ethnic groups is an important 
step both for criminological and diaspora studies. 
2.1. The origins of interest in race and crime 
One of the first scholars who made a clear and systematic analysis of the link 
between race and crime was the Italian anthropologist of crime Lombroso 
(Gabbidon and Taylor Greene 2005: 50; Gibson 2002: 99; Phillips and Bowling 
2002: 580). 
Lombroso's positivistic theory is interesting as a key study as it presented 
certain human physical features as indicators of a predisposition to crime. 
According to racial paradigms, therefore, certain physical features would 
automatically be the signs of a predisposition to deviance (Gabbidon and Taylor 
Greene 2005: 50). These biological accounts, however, were also supported by 
`ethnical' elements (ibid. ) such as the belief that African or Oriental influences had 
impacted on brigands' criminal behaviour in Southern Italy. Although Lombroso 
was mainly interested in the study of race, as his essay `White man and coloured 
man' (1871, cit. in Gibson 2002) shows, in his writings there was also room for 
speculations on social environment and its impact on the criminal mind (Gibson 
2002: 98). These nuances were overlooked when Lombroso's work was exported to 
the Anglo-Saxon world (ibid: 249; Gabbidon and Taylor Greene 2005: 58). 
Lombroso's theories were used to support social Darwinism (Gibson 2002: 98) and 
therefore after the Second World War were widely dismissed as racist and 
ideologically dangerous. Some assumptions about eugenics were still visible in 
some studies of deviance, but overt reference to Lombroso was avoided (Wootton 
1959: 45). In 1985, however, in America, Wilson and Herrnstein published a book 
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that appeared to revive some of Lombroso's attitudes towards the anthropological 
study of criminals. Crime as Human Nature argues that some biological differences 
must be taken into account when studying crime in different ethnic groups 
(Gabbidon and Taylor Greene 2005: 59). For example, it is argued that a general 
higher muscularity amongst black men could be one of the factors that lead to a 
higher number of offences if compared to white men's. Although Wilson and 
Herrnstein openly refer to Lombroso (1985: 75) and look at the aetiology of crime 
also in terms of genetics (ibid: 90) and factors such as IQ, it would be unfair to 
summarise their work only in these terms. In Crime as Human Nature factors such 
as inadequate socialisation (ibid: 470), subcultural deviance (ibid. ), ecology (ibid: 
289), attachment (ibid.: 218) and deprivation (ibid.: 467) appear as some of the 
causes of crime. It is interesting, however, to see that some of Lombroso's 
positivistic approaches to the study of crime survive today. Overall, although some 
of the biological theories may survive (see for example theories about women 
committing crime at certain stages of their menstrual cycle, d'Orban 1991), 
nowadays the positivistic approach seems to be mostly accompanied by other 
sociological or psychological explanations, especially, as in the case of Winston and 
Herrnstein, when biology is connected to race. Biological or positivistic 
criminology was widely dismissed after the Second World War because of its 
connection with eugenics (ibid: 250). The study of the link between groups as 
cultural units (rather than biological) and their relation to crime, may at first sight 
appear less contentious. However, this can result problematic, as shown by the 
critique of the anthropologist Malinowski. 
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2.2. Crime and Culture 
One of Malinowski's studies published in 1926 dealt with the question of crime and 
its link to different groups from a specific point of view: the socio-cultural. In 
Crime and Custom in Savage Society, Malinowski described norms and their 
violation in the Trobriand Islands. In this work, adherence to norms and labelling 
processes were seen as strictly connected to what he called the `civic law' of the 
islands (ibid: 38). The possibility of committing a crime was not seen either as the 
product of biological predetermination or structural compulsion. Rather, the 
capability of an individual to deviate from the positive norms, was seen in terms of 
a cultural paradigm. This bore a double significance: first of all, the rational choice 
behind an action would be informed by the surrounding cultural context; secondly, 
deviance might be only labelled as such according to a specific customary law'. 
IThe idea of crime as social construction seems to have become paramount in Criminology (Wilson 
and Herrnstein 1985: 21-22; Muncie 1996: 9-10; Eadie and Morley 1999: 438). Furthermore, the 
connection between crime (especially as a violation of moral codes) and cultures is an issue 
common to many criminologists' writings (Muncie 1996: 13), whether discussed from a cultural, 
ideological, historical or political point of view. Malinowsky affirmed as early as 1926 that as 
customs are the primary instrument of social control, even occasional detachment from customs 
produces a tendency to criminality. In this view, perceived deviance gains its existence through a 
detachment from a community's standards, a concept similar to anomie. 
In 1963, Becker outlined Labelling Theory that made the concept of crime relative. According to 
Becker, an act is criminal when it is labelled as such by society (Braithwaite 1989: 2). Becker's 
theory has more to do with hegemonic discourses rather than with culture: powerful groups invent 
the rules whose infraction means deviance. Deviance and crime are not products of bad individuals 
but are what people label as such. So, the rules created by society are not universally shared and 
change in time and contexts (Becker 1963). A criticism which has been put against Labelling 
Theory is that it neglects the role of socialisation of the individual (Braithwaite 1989: 3). The level 
of engagement of an individual within his/her society is not taken into much consideration. If 
people were born in a specific society, they are likely to have `absorbed' its behavioural 
prescriptions to some extent: `we are moral beings to the extent that we are social beings' 
(Durkheim 1961, cit. in Hirschi 1971: 18). The role of socialisation seems to be neglected, 
therefore, in Becker's view. According to Braithwaite (1989: 9) this is a very important point 
because by linking the individual and his/her choices we will find out that they are constrained. An 
individual will commit a crime, therefore, not because he/she will have a different idea about 
crime from the one common in the context, but solely because this idea has been challenged by 
other factors that occurred to mediate the original concept of deviance inherited by his/her society. 
Braithwaite's theory of Reintegrative Shame has therefore its pillar in the concept that individuals 
committing crimes must be studied in a socialised context, and when they break the law they are 
aware of that and are actually breaking one of the rules of `their' society. On the other hand, if the 
society simply casts out the criminal and prevents their reintegration through stigmatisation, for 
instance, it itself pushes them into creating their own subculture with their own set of constrained 
choices (Hirschi 1971: 3; Braithwaite 1989: 26; Wardak 2000: 162). 
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According to Malinowski, therefore, crime and deviance could only be studied by 
setting their definition and the consequential norms in a cultural context. The study 
of the Trobriands, however, was the study of a bounded community that appeared to 
Malinowski as extremely homogenous. In his view, "the Melanesian" (Malinowski 
1926: 64, my emphasis) followed the rules of nature as the laws to be respected. The 
innovation in Malinowski's study seems to lie in the critique of "modern 
anthropology" and its belief that "sheer inertia" constrained "the savage" to exert 
civic law (ibid.: 63), while ignoring social arrangements and psychological motives. 
Such approach was considered a victim of `the mere glamour of tradition' (ibid.: 
65) alluring to some anthropologists. However, Malinowski was not advocating 
more attention to individual agency; although personal choices were considered, 
they were seen as subjected to one supreme rule: reciprocity (ibid. ). Webs of 
obligations and mutual services appear in this text as the one and all encompassing 
rule amongst Trobriandeses. Their behaviour and their law infringement were 
therefore read through the parameters of the rule of reciprocity and the 
Trobriandeses were considered to relate to crime and punishment in a way that was 
essential for a part of their cultural identity. 
This poses a dilemma: if we deny Lombroso's biological connection 
between certain (racial) groups and crime, the question whether some cultures are 
likely to be more violent than others will still be unanswered. At the same time, 
however, if we agree with Malinowski and think that the particular structure of a 
group's culture regulates social control, one may still think that some groups, 
because of their culture, are more prone to break or construct some rules than 
others. 
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Melossi (2000: 296) argues that both approaches may be reduced to 
Lombroso's positivism. The only difference would be that the latter is based on 
group culture, rather than somatic traits. Melossi's argument reproduces in 
criminology the discussion that has taken place in the social sciences about `cultural 
racism'. Some have in fact argued that in the last thirty years racist ideologies have 
abandoned the emphasis on `immutable biological differences' and transferred their 
attention from `pigmentation to culture' (Back 1996: 9). This statement may shed 
some light on the taboo that some have observed in criminological studies over 
considering race as a variable (Russell 1992: 669; Phillips and Bowling 2003: 27 1): 
by considering the specific link (albeit cultural and not biological) between a group 
and crime there may be the danger of constructing some groups as prone to 
deviance. In 1992 Russell argued that there was as much need of a `black 
criminology' as there had been of a feminist one. Although Russell acknowledged 
the emancipatory and positive developments of criminology towards minority 
ethnic groups (for example in the study of discrimination), on the other hand she 
argued that the picture was always incomplete. For example, racial identity2 was 
still mistaken with ethnic and there was a lack of social-ecological sensitivity that 
took into account ethnic diversity (ibid.: 671) 
Even the inclusion of a plethora of variables in criminological studies on 
minority ethnic groups, argued Russell, such as age, gender, socio-economic status 
and employment status did not consider ethnic background adequately (ibid: 673). 
In 2003, Phillips and Bowling were still manifesting the same concerns, proving 
with their writing that criminological theory was much ahead of its empirical 
counterpart, still uncomfortable with tackling ethnicity. Recently Garland et al. 
2 By using `racial' we refer to an identity based on "supposed physical or biological groupings 
linked to skin and bodily features" (Harrison 2005: 2). 
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(2006) have argued that not investigating the ethnic variables may be a result of 
taking the `white condition as normal' (ibid.: 423). This is consistent with another 
theoretical article in criminology that denounced orientalist and occidentalist biases 
amongst criminologists (Cain: 2000). 
2.3. Race and crime in Britain: discrimination, policing and the criminal 
justice system 
In Britain, by avoiding drawing any link between race, ethnicity and crime (Phillips 
and Bowling 2003: 270), criminologists have often focused on discrimination 
towards minority ethnic groups in policing and in the criminal justice system. 
Phillips and Bowling (2002: 583) describe such development by analysing 
the historical context of the 1960s. Enoch Powell and other MPs contributed 
towards increasing the moral panic that White British media were developing 
against `coloured immigrants'. When Margaret Thatcher was elected in 1979 her 
government sympathised with these fears and at the same time started her tough 
campaign against crime. In this tense climate, the Bristol (1980) and Brixton (1981) 
disorders occurred. These disorders were classed as somehow `not English', 
aberrations to the nation (Rowe 1998: 1; McGhee 2005: 15). McGhee (2005: 22) 
argues that, while public opinion was reinforcing the widespread idea of the 
connection between African/Caribbean and crime, the Scarman enquiry and its 
report slightly changed these parameters: African/Carribbeans were not seen as 
inherently destabilising, but were seen as such in the light of the history of their 
settlement. According to McGhce, Scarman registered the experience of oppressive 
policing that African/Caribbeans had borne so far and highlighted the level of social 
and economic exclusion of the areas where many minority ethnic groups lived. 
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However, in spite of the general praise of the effort of the report in mentioning 
over-policing and under-protection by the police towards African/Caribbeans (see 
for example Phillips and Bowling 2002), McGhee argues that Scarman's report was 
still constructing race rather than racism as a social problem (2005: 16). 
At present, British data (Kalra 2003: 142) show that some minority ethnic 
groups are over represented in prison. Whether this is caused by over-policing of 
certain groups or over-offending due to structural constraints is the centre of the 
debate (Phillips and Bowling 2002: 579). According to some commentators 
(Phillips and Bowling 2003: 270; Chakraborti et al. 2004), what seems to be missing 
in most literature, however, is the knowledge by minorities. 
In the growing interest in the race and crime debate in the 1980s, there is at 
least a study showing how race can be very meaningful in the understanding of 
crime. Secret and Johnson's provocative American study in 1989 hypothesised how 
race and not other variables such as socio-economic background, influenced 
attitudes towards crime control. Their conclusion was that race did influence those 
attitudes because different groups had developed different attitudes towards the 
police depending on how they had been treated in the past. Race was therefore an 
important element of studies in criminality as the perceived background of 
individuals deeply affected their chances, rights, interactions and consequential 
patterns of behaviour and construction of the criminal justice system. At the same 
time, Secret and Johnson argued that whenever the police had a good general 
awareness about a certain group, relations between them and such a group had more 
chances of being positive. 
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In the following pages we will present three different approaches to the 
study of race and crime, and towards the conclusion we will illustrate their 
connection to wider debates about the study of ethnicities. 
2.4. Taking culture out of the picture: Alexander's study 
The Asian Gang (Alexander 2000) is an ethnographic study of young Bengali men 
in South London. This study reflects on the complexities and dangers of what 
Alexander fears are all-encompassing notions of culture and ethnicity in relation to 
urban tension, violence and deviance. Here, any study that tries to link race and 
crime is seen as a pathologizing one. For this reason, rather than studying the 
`gang', Alexander argues that such definition is a media construction coming as 
much from the Daily Mail as from the Guardian (Alexander 2000: 5). The author's 
aim is to bring individual stories into the academic gaze and de-construct what she 
calls "the `othering' process" (ibid. ) in a way that has been repeated in other studies 
on Muslim men (Archer 2001; 2003). According to Alexander, in media accounts 
about episodes of violence affecting young Bengali men both as victims and as 
perpetrators, race is automatically seen as negative: if a group of friends have a 
fight and they all belong to the same `race', they become a gang: 
The spectre of "race" with its implications of absolute and hostile 
difference, conflict and "nihilistic ... violence" 
is left to speak for 
itself- at once cause, effect and justification (Alexander 2000: 4) 
Here, `race' seems to blur with `ethnicity' as it refers to cultural dynamics as well 
as bodily or biological features. Individual reasons and choices fade into the 
background because ethnic origin racializes any behaviour (ibid: 102): if more than 
two men involved in violence are of the same origin they are automatically 
described as a gang. This is one of the crucial points of Alexander's critique of 
17 
representations of young Asian men: racialization can hide other important 
variables such as masculinity, peer group (friendship) or individual histories. In 
retrospect, Alexander defines the inclusion of these multiple factors as the key 
characteristics for a new generation of ethnographers with "fragmented lenses" 
(Alexander 2006: 402). The concern to include those variables is shared also by 
those who claim there is a need to open up the race and crime debate. For example, 
Phillips and Bowling agree that focusing on ethnicity may obscure other important 
factors such as gender, class, sexuality and religion (Phillips and Bowling 
2003: 272)3. 
Alexander's concerns about the racialisation of the gang narratives, popular 
in the media (Alexander 2000: 5), appear to be reflected in the fieldwork findings on 
which this thesis is based. However, in the attempt of filling the gap of ethnicity and 
criminality, it can be argued that the over-estimation of such concern may 
contribute to the formulation of the taboo mentioned by Phillips and Bowling 
(2002: 271). If compared to the studies reviewed here and in chapter Three, 
Alexander's is the one that most strongly points at the dangers of explaining 
patterns of deviance by incorporating race and culture in the analysis. What is 
called the "narrative" of Alexander's study (instead of a theoretical framework, 
Alexander 2000: xv), is based on observing processes of inclusion and exclusion of 
family and peer groups, and dynamics of masculinity and age. According to 
3 The same concern will emerge in some of the data collected by the present researcher: 
Me: Is it true that there is a Pakistani gang? 
Jamil: No. I would say gang, but there isn't a Pakistani gang, no... They are all 
races.. . 
but around here there are all Pakistanis... when you see a group of lads together 
they are all Pakistanis... so you really can't call them a gang. They grew up together and 
they stick around together, so it isn't really a gang... it is friends, you know... like a 
bunch. And anybody who drives around they think they are a gang. But it is not a gang. 
18 
Alexander, these are the dimensions that are forgotten by the `old ethnicity 
approach' (ibid: 240, referring for example to Shaw's 1988 seminal study of 
Pakistanis in Oxford). On the other hand, masculinity, adolescence and peer groups 
are the dimensions that are more likely to work towards the construction of Asian 
youth as folk devil (ibid. ). While criminological studies that focus on race are 
blamed for the racialisation of the topic, the sociologists who have tried to include 
masculinity and age as relevant variables end up, according to Alexander, by 
constructing even more pathological images (ibid: 20). Combining race and culture 
with masculinity and age (thus young Bengali men = Asian gang) is seen by 
Alexander as the peak of the racialisation process leading to widespread moral 
panic (ibid. ). Goodey's (1999) and Macey's (1999, see chapter Three) innovation 
into bringing youth in the picture of ethnic studies is blamed for maintaining a 
"cultural twist" (Alexander 2000: 18). Masculinity and age would be subjected to 
essentialist and hegemonic views on Asian young men: `Asian youth is in trouble 
and out of control' (ibid. ). 
Alexander's only possible solution seems to be to take culture out of the 
picture altogether. The actions of young Bengali men in South London thus should 
be seen in a cultural vacuum. It seems that in the de-construction of the Asian gang, 
family, peer groups, masculinity and age are seen as the only significant layers of 
the complex identity of individuals. This is an attempt to create a space in which 
commonality between individuals and not their difference from the majority is 
important. 
Much of Alexander's critique is centred on the increasing attention given by 
the media to Muslim communities. However, not only the media are brought into 
the accusation, but the whole of the `race relations industry', with anthropologists 
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as its allies. Alexander argues that only after the Rushdie affair and the first Gulf 
war did Asians become a heterogenous fragmented front and `problem youth' 
emerged (Alexander 2000: 6; see also Modood 1992 and Samad 1996). These two 
main events are seen as the milestones of the critique of the Asian `Culture- 
rich/culture-bound' nature that contributed to `othering' individuals of such 
background (Alexander 2000.: 13). After the 1995 riots in Bradford, furthermore, 
Asian Muslims' culture has been seen as backward in opposition to modern British 
culture (Ibid: 10). If the assumption is that a culture is backward, studies thus 
generated may result in being patronising and pathologising. The solution would 
therefore be: 
to argue for a more nuanced, local and historically situated account of 
identity formation, which encapsulates often contradictory processes 
of continuity and change, constraint and agency, solidarity and 
diffusion, representation and re-imagination (Alexander 2000.: 23) 
Whether the race relations industry and `accomplice' anthropologists have really 
neglected change and agency will be discussed later in 2.7. Here, instead, it is 
important to highlight that according to Alexander contextualisation in time and 
space must be considered. In 4.3, in fact, it will be explained that the Bradford 
context and the post-9/11 era have impacted on this doctoral study in terms of 
motivation, methods and findings. According to Alexander, however, basing an 
analysis on a `community', whatever meaning we might attribute to such an abused 
word, means essentialising a group (ibid: 13). Here we may disagree with 
Alexander as in 6.4 it will be argued that the local context of Bradford and its being 
so compact is important insofar as the notion of community bears a significance that 
goes beyond race but includes locality and intracommunal relations. In Bradford the 
idea of community is only relatively an abstract construction; apart from being a 
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term that is used by Bradford Pakistanis themselves, the pockets of high 
concentration of the same ethnic group with their semi-autonomous associations, 
structures and economic networks can justify the use'of `community' without 
worrying too much about the accusation of `imagining a community'. 
Alexander's arguments are therefore two. The main one is that including race 
and ethnicity in the study of deviance is necessarily a pathologising process. The 
second one is that grounding research in a `community' is an arbitrary process that 
refers to outsiders' construction of such an entity. Alexander therefore appears as a 
strong supporter of maintaining the taboo of race/ethnicity and crime because such 
link would not enlighten any study but only contribute to the pathologisation of a 
group. 
However, some of the statements in the second half of The Asian Gang seem 
to contradict the alleged solution of leaving race/ethnicity out of the study of 
deviance. For example, it is argued that the deep respect for one's family and 
community (sic) is one of the main tenets for young Bengali men in South London 
(Alexander 2000: 129). Getting to know each other through one's family status as 
portrayed by one's parents in relation to the background in Bangladesh is also 
considered important (ibid. ). Ethnicity is also described as one of the axes of 
alliance for the making of peer group as much as age, gender, territory, history, 
geography and personality (ibid.: 166). Ultimately, culture seems to make its way 
into The Asian Gang. Even more clearly: 
There is a need to reassert the constitutive nature of structure in the 
formation of cultural identities, the play of power and history, but also 
to recognize the only partial circumscription of marginal identities, the 
potential for disruption and the imagination of `Other' sensibilities and 
alliances(... ). Recognising the complex and shifting nature of identity 
also demands the recognition of solidarity and belonging; not the stasis 
of stagnant absolutes but the necessary emotional touchstone of family, 
friends and community (Alexander 2000: 248). 
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Alexander seems to recognize that "cultural identities", "belonging" and 
"community" are "necessary emotional touchstones". Her critique is against "the 
stasis of stagnant absolutes" that seems to be conveyed by whoever deals with 
collective forms of identity. Her protest against the rise of a media and public 
pathologisation of young Asian men risks removing cultural analysis altogether 
rather than reforming it in non-essentialist terms. Alexander, however, analyses the 
relation between race and crime as it is written by media and sociologists: in a 
problem-orientated way. She is not tempted to ask whether ethnicity may be a 
potential resource for the fight against crime. This question does not seem to be 
raised because of the taboo mentioned by Phillips and Bowling (2003) about 
including ethnicity amongst the variables to consider in the study of crime. 
However, in addition to the effort of including individuals with their 
personal stories in the academic gaze, there is another merit of Alexander's work: 
her choice of de-pathologising masculinity and age and considering them as part of 
the set of variables that may influence one's behaviour (see 3.5). This is not what 
happens with Tatum's grand theory that may be considered a step back in the 
discussion of ethnicity and crime. 
2.5. Colonial and Postcolonial criminology: Tatum's theoretical framework 
In Tatum's Crime, Violence and Minority Youth (2000) the main focus is to 
acknowledge the apparent failure of mainstream structural perspectives in 
explaining the high crime rate amongst minority ethnic youth in America (Tatum 
2000: xi). By mainstream structural perspectives, Tatum means both `strain theories' 
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emerging from Durkheim traditions (anomie, opportunity theories and theory of 
delinquent subcultures, ibid: 3) and the `colonial model' (ibid. ). 
By colonial model Tatum indicates a framework that privileges class on race 
and that can be traced back to Fanon (Tatum 2000: 6). In colonial theories, the 
alienation from one's cultural capital (whatever it is) and from political praxis are 
considered paramount to explain social mechanisms of exclusion and oppression. In 
the following section we will see how Pryce's idea of loss of cultural capital and 
sectarianism in Jamaican churches in Bristol might be seen as part of such a 
colonial model. 
In the colonial model, some youth resist the dominant culture of `internal 
colonies' (colonies within the boundaries of the nation) (Tatum 2000: 7). Their 
resistance is the reaction to oppression, and the colonial model recognises that race 
and racism play an important role in the history of internal colonies by examining 
alienation and frustration (ibid: 13). In the economy of the present chapter, albeit 
Tatum does not refer to it in these terms, an analysis that starts from the relation of 
a subject to the oppressors rather than from the subject as an autonomous being 
becomes very important for the discussion of the role of the `race relations industry' 
in studying minority ethnic groups (see below). Modood has expressed a relevant 
concern very assertively: 
Most ordinary people wish to be defined in terms of a historically 
received identity... they wish to be known for what they are, not for 
what others find problematic about them (Modood 1988: 398) 
Muslims are wiser here than anti-racists: in locating oneself in a 
hostile society one must begin with one's mode of being [ethnicity] 
not one's mode of oppression [race] for one's strength flows from 
one's mode of being' (Modood 1990a: 92) 
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According to Tatum, the major faults of colonial theory are not grounded in the 
initial standpoint, as may be Modood's view, but in three other arguments: 
" It does not consider multiple alienations; 
" It does not analyse differential responses to oppression; 
" It does not account for class variables in impact of racism (Tatum 2000: 16) 
The criminological neocolonial model coined by Tatum, therefore, aims at 
including such reflections. For example, alienation is investigated through a 
multiple model based on `self-alienation', `alienation from the racial or social 
group', `alienation from the general other' and cultural alienation (ibid: 56). It is 
important to notice how alienation itself and not the (non) legacy of a certain 
culture or group is the most significant aspect of this model that is applicable to any 
minority ethnic group. 
One of the main points of Tatum's neocolonial theory is that deviance 
studies should focus on differential responses to oppression, especially through 
social support systems (ibid.: 69). Considering class variables in the impact of 
racism on constrained choice related to committing crime, on the other hand, 
implies that one's class aspirations might dictate the perception of discrimination 
and oppression (ibid.: 87). 
According to Tatum and the model tested through her quantitative survey, 
race, social class and their interaction with structural and perceived oppression are 
the main variables that should help in successfully investigating the relation 
between crime and minority ethnic groups (Tatum 2000: 27). These, however, 
cannot be enough if they are not paired with an analysis of the availability of 
specific ethnic social support systems (ibid. ). Here we find a contradiction similar 
to Alexander's: by moving (a specific) culture out of the academic gaze, it is 
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possible to analyse `the family forms that have developed and their impact on 
perceptual, affective, and behavioural adaptations of its members' (ibid: 23). The 
unchallenged consequential assumption, then, seems to be that families and social 
support systems exist in a cultural vacuum and they owe more to economic and 
racial constraints rather than to a resourceful deployment of heritages. However, 
Tatum herself argues that they are not: black families have in fact `generally been 
regarded as deviant or pathological because they differ from the family structure of 
Whites' (ibid. ). 
Again, even in Tatum's postcolonial theory, culture cannot be avoided in 
spite of the struggle of her grand theory. The difference with Alexander's, however, 
is that in this example of neo-colonial theory a proper analysis of multiple variables 
including age and gender seems to be neglected. A combination of neo-colonial 
theory with multiple variables can however be found in a British 1979 monograph 
by Pryce. 
2.6. `Blacks don't have culture': Pryce's participant observation in Bristol 
Pryce's 1979 study of West Indian lifestyles in Bristol could be considered a British 
example of Taturn's neocolonial model, although the data are collected through 
qualitative methods such as participant observation, and deviance is only one of the 
aspects investigated. 
The ground of the monograph Endless Pressure is the belief that history has 
had a very important 
role in shaping West Indians' lifestyles. Pryce originates six 
typologies of men's lifestyles that have probably inspired much later work on male 
youth identities (see 3.5,10.1 and 10.3). According to these typologies, West 
Indians in Bristol 
can be mainly grouped under two categories: "stable law-abiding" 
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and "expressive-disreputable" (those who work and those who hustle, Pryce 
1979/1986: xii). Other sub-categories are hustlers, teenyboppers, proletarian 
respectables, saints, mainliners and in-betweeners (ibid. ). Much criticism of Endless 
Pressure came, after its publication, from black radicals. They argued that Pryce's 
two main typologies were practically saying that some blacks were merely 
criminals instead of "closet politicos" (ibid. : 16). 
The study mainly analyzes the causes for estrangement from legal work. All 
social tensions in Pryce (even the ones between West Indian men and women) are 
analysed principally in terms of exploitation and class. However, the analysis is not 
based on an all-encompassing vision of class overlapping race; rather, as argued by 
Tatum in terms of a neocolonial approach, a range of resistance strategies to 
oppression, based on different class backgrounds, are revealed. 
In the discussion of the taboo of race/ethnicity and crime it is very interesting 
to see how Pryce's neocolonial approach deals with culture. It may be worth 
pointing out here that Pryce's work is based on participant observation, but in spite 
of the popularity of this method in anthropology, he is a sociologist. In 2.7 it will be 
shown in fact that the responsibility for a certain discourse around culture is placed 
by Benson on anthropology, but here we have an example of how a sociologist may 
be accused of a similar fault. In a section titled `Culture, Poverty and the West 
Indian family', Pryce argues that some of the problems of the sub-category labelled 
as `teeny boppers' have to do with the traditional family system back home: 
The aetiology of the teenybopper problem extends back to the 
peculiarities of family life in the West Indies, which in turn owe their 
origin to practices evolved under conditions of slavery and colonialism 
and to macro-structural patterns of underdevelopment as reflected in 
the sub-standard educational facilities of the masses (Pryce 1979/1986: 
108) 
26 
According to Pryce, therefore, the `peculiarities of family life' are such because of 
the structural and historical constraints that have affected life in the West Indies. An 
anti-essentialist cultural approach might agree with this statement (cf. Werbner 
1996), but in Endless Pressure culture is taken out of the picture again, at least as 
far as West Indians are concerned: 
In England, some black youths (like teenyboppers) do not succeed in 
the struggle for survival because of the failure of West Indians in 
general to develop a distinctive culture of their own that is strong 
enough to counteract the disorienting effects of poverty and the 
frustrations of social rejection in a white-dominated society like 
Britain. This is a predicament which contrasts sharply with the 
situation of Indian and Pakistani youths who tend to have a very 
strong sense of identity based on distinctive language, a distinctive 
religion in a highly normative family system. The net effect on the 
West Indian young of the absence of a rooted sense of identity, 
capable of giving guidance and direction in times of crisis, is psychic 
and cultural confusion and lack of confidence in coping with the stress 
of racial rejection. (Pryce 1979/1986: 112, my emphasis) 
It is almost as if Pryce gives cause to Benson's famous provocative statement: 
`Asians have culture, West Indians have problems' (Benson 1996: 47). A very clear 
example of this approach is to be found when the `subalternity' of women is 
discussed by drawing on the story of Bang-Belly and his girlfriend Pamela. Pamela 
is not jealous of the white prostitutes that Bang-Belly pimps, but would be if they 
were `coloured' (sic) (Pryce 1979/1986: 80). Here this tension is seen in terms of 
exploitation and class, not much in terms of aspirations, ideals and cultural capital. 
That would be impossible as the author argues that Bristol West Indians lack of 
those things (ibid.: 112). They appear not to have a culture strong enough to be used 
as a resource, a very essentialist statement: 
[this] clearly reveals the weaknesses of West Indian family life and 
demonstrates vividly how, in the resultant collapse, it is the young 
who invariably suffer. (... ) West Indians still lack a self-contained folk 
culture and a tight communal form of group life (Pryce 
1979/1986.: 119). 
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It is important to note how in all the three studies reviewed, family plays an 
important role, as it will do in the present research (see 9.1,9.2, and 11.1). 
However, it is their problems and not their culture that make generalisations 
possible: `the problems of West Indians in Britain are uniform enough to permit 
generalisation' (ibid. : 271). 
The premises seem therefore to be consistent with a colonial model based on 
alienation from cultural capital and from political praxis. At the same time the 
acknowledgement of different class-based strategies to fight oppression and build 
alternative support systems (such as the ones of `mainliners', ibid.: 223) are enough 
to inscribe Pryce's work in the neo-colonial framework as defined by Tatum (2.5). 
The most controversial part of this work, however, appears to be the idea 
that an entire population has been deprived of a specific culture due to colonial 
oppression. A reverse essentialism of this kind (a celebration of culture-rich/culture- 
bound cultures in a postcolonial context) is the core of the contention discussed 
below. 
2.7. De-essentialising and de-pathologizing: Benson vs. Werbner 
Above we have seen how both Tatum and Alexander are critical of an approach 
explicitly drawing on cultures to develop an understanding of crime in certain 
groups. Alexander very openly criticises the `race relation industry' and especially 
anthropologists for "disguising [their] voice as the legitimate voice of the other" 
(Alexander 2000: 225). In the late 1990s similar accusations grew so much as to 
accuse academics (and in particular anthropologists) of having started to support a 
second colonial indirect rule system within the national borders: 
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These cultural forms [i. e. music] continue to be imbued with an 
exoticised, othered status in the West and our primary goal has been to 
break out of the Orientalist tradition of making knowable these 
cultural productions for an ever-eager academic audience and other 
agencies of control(... ) We recognize interest in a sociology of South 
Asian culture in Britain, and especially youth cultures, as having close 
ideological connections with the disciplines of command that police 
inner-urban neighbourhoods, close down Black clubs, collude in 
immigration control and so on (Sharma et al: 1996: 2). 
And again: 
It must be acknowledged that the anthropological silence on questions 
of racism, power and domination had some uncomfortable 
resemblance to that earlier silence on questions of racism, power and 
domination in the colonial encounter. (... ) Each people or minority is 
analysed in terms of a set of cultural practices and institutional 
arrangements proper to itself, or compared and contrasted in some 
particular respect with another people or minority (Benson 1996: 50) 
This debate was discussed thoroughly in the edited collection Culture, Identity and 
Politics (Terence et al. 1996). Here, anthropologist Werbner refused to accept that 
anthropology in Britain was an accomplice of orientalism and colonialism (Werbner 
1996: 74). The debate between Benson and Werbner that appeared in the same 
edited collection seemed to be pivoted on essentialism and anti-essentialism. 
Benson argued that anthropologists were inclined to work with South Asian 
communities because while doing fieldwork on the door-step they were still able to 
map "predictable patterns" that "fit well with questions of caste, religion, marriage 
systems and so on" so typical of the classics of the discipline (Benson 1996: 54). On 
the other hand, African/Caribbeans were considered lacking in these cultural 
practices and were seen as fragmented and `disordered' (ibid. ) Fluidity, change, re- 
invention were, according to Benson, too disturbing for anthropologists4. Benson 
described African/Caribbeans' culture as "a culture that makes itself up, and in 
4 It may be interesting to note how a study that theorise West Indians' lives as 'disordered' and in 
many ways pathological is actually insider sociologist's study of a Bristol community, see Pryce 
1979/19S6 above. 
29 
some important respects knows that it makes itself up" (Benson 1996: 54). The 
implication of this statement seems to be that other cultures may not "make 
themselves up" and anthropologists choose to study only those that tend to be more 
static. In her reply to Benson, Werbner used her own seminal work The Migration 
process (1990) to demonstrate how anthropological approaches were not 
essentialist, regarded structural constraints as well as cultural ones, and took into 
serious consideration the study population's vantage points: 
In The migration process, it is not assumed from the beginning that 
there is a clearly bounded and homogenous community. Rather, it is 
discovered that people who come from different backgrounds choose 
to make certain friends rather than others. They (the subjects) make 
up a level of homogeneity, this level is not imposed by the 
anthropologist. (... )It is a process (not a pre-given static condition). 
(... ) It is not only supportive but powerfully coercive, disturbing, 
conflictual. (Werbner 1996: 68,69) 
Again, adding a strong argument about the use of `community' as a label to refer to 
a heterogeneous whole: 
Community had become, in effect, a kind of argument through 
practice: an argument of images between those different knots of 
friends with their different lifestyles, consumption patterns and 
visions of what their community should be like, by comparison to 
other communities, seen from a particular vantage point. (Werbner 
1996: 70) 
Werbner argues that other subjects such as nation states and `those who draw on the 
past to think about the future and mobilise for action' (Werbner 1996: 75) are 
inclined to essentialise communities. For this very reason culture is a very contested 
field, and demands to be taken more into consideration in any study that involves 
communities (ibid.: 76). Werbner however does not fully tackle another accusation 
by Benson towards anthropology in Britain: the lack of consideration for racism, 
power and structural constraints (Benson 1996: 50), all elements that according to 
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the three studies analysed above should never be overlooked. However, this 
particular criticism had already been tackled by Ballard in 1992. 
2.8. The structural bias: deprivationism according to Ballard 
Ballard seems to have written one of the most outspoken criticisms of the `race 
relations industry' in his 1992 paper `New clothes for the emperor? The conceptual 
nakedness of Britain's race relations industry'. Here Ballard argues that authorities 
such as the Commission for Racial Equality still cannot make sense of ethnicity and 
prefer to stick to race and connected general disadvantage for any analysis they 
attempt to make. He argues that 
an analysis which limits itself solely to an exploration of deprivation 
will inexorably suggest that the victims of exclusionism lack the 
capacity to take charge of their own destiny (Ballard 1992: 484) 
Ballard suggests that the `race relations industry' should have started looking at the 
resistance against disadvantage rather than disadvantage itself. By doing this, not 
only the dignity of active subjects would be returned to ethnic minorities, but also 
the attention would be switched to a `creative process' that will reveal much more 
about the existences of minority ethnic groups. Although "multiple resistance" is a 
concept used by Tatum to support her neo-colonial model, here Ballard's statement 
aims much further than neo-colonial theory. By analysing "the construction of an 
alternative moral and conceptual vision" (ibid. : 485), policy makers would access 
"a set of values, expectations and understandings which are wholly unfamiliar to 
[minority ethnic groups'] oppressor" (ibid. ). The membership of a specific ethnic 
network is considered vital by Ballard to the structural dynamics of multicultural 
societies. The pejorative label of `deprivationism' is therefore given to the stream 
that apparently seeks to study groups in terms of economic disadvantage and 
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pigmentation (ibid: 492), but fails to consider sufficiently the aspects of agency 
amongst minority ethnic groups in Britain. The concern around deprivationism 
appears to parallel that discussed by theoretical criminology (Russell 1992; Phillips 
and Bowling 2003; Garland et al. 2006) about the taboos of race and crime and 
affecting empirical research. In educational research, Modood (2004) has addressed 
the same deficiency: minority ethnic groups have been considered by 
deprivationists as on the whole underachieving (ibid: 88). This all-encompassing 
notion has neglected the analysis of why there are some pockets of over- 
achievement. Modood argues that `the system' (society-wide economic forces) 
must be analysed alongside `community forces' (minorities' trajectories and 
dynamics) (ibid: 97). Community forces provide networks, skills and aspirations 
that shape action and resistance in society. By considering anything that has to do 
with ethnicity dynamic and fluid, this notion combines internal resources with 
resistance to the system and should provide a basic field of analysis for those whom 
are concerned with minority ethnic groups. 
2.7. Conclusion: towards a `minority criminology' 
In this chapter we have seen how the interest in the study of race and crime in 
Europe has original examples in Lombroso's positivistic accounts on the one hand 
and the culturally grounded observations on Melanesia by Malinowski on the other. 
Both these approaches carry the risk of essentialisation, and the use of Lombroso in 
eugenics has especially contributed to create a widespread suspicion about any 
study that may link aspects of crime to a certain group. We have also seen how 
essentialisation is not necessarily pathologising: Malinowski's `bon savage' 
narrative can be for example considered consistent with British stereotypes such as 
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`law-abiding Indians' (or `Leicester Gujaratis', Modood 2004: 101 versus 
`underachieving Muslims' (or `Bradford Pakistanis', ibid. ). On the other hand, 
many cultural stereotypes carry a negative connotation, as the one leading to the 
construction of the `Asian gang' (Alexander 2000). The studies discussed above try 
to answer the question of why certain groups commit crime in a certain way and 
tend to find a solution to the riddle in limiting the role of any specificity related to a 
group. For example, Alexander uses her "fragmented ethnographic lenses" 
(Alexander 2006) implying that there is no connection between the way individuals 
engage in crime and their belonging to an ethnic group. 
In Britain the race and crime debate amongst scholars has mainly been 
characterised by an emancipatory approach that has tended to study discrimination 
within the criminal justice system. According to Phillips and Bowling this has 
contributed to the creation of a gap in criminology where there should have been 
developed an understanding of how issues are perceived by minority ethnic groups 
(2003: 271). Miller (2001: 2) has argued that often public discussion about the link 
between crime and minority ethnic groups has been very negative for race relations 
in Britain. This can be considered the result of what has been condemned as a new 
indirect rule system in Britain, where social scientists' 
knowledge is functional to 
social control agencies (Sharma et al. 1996: 2). Innovative criminological 
approaches, on the other hand, are more likely to 
insert any variable in their study 
but the ethnic one (see for example `reintegrative shaming 
theory', Braithwaite 
1989: 9), unless it is to the ends of a victimisation study. 
Information presented by 
the police deploys ethnicity but mainly 
in terms of statistical concerns (Kalra 
2003: 140). 
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The taboo (Russell 1992: 67 1; Phillips and Bowling 2003: 271) about 
minority ethnic groups and crimes seem to reflect the debate in ethnic studies that 
flourished in the 1990s (see especially Ballard 1992, Benson 1996, Werbner 1996). 
Then, the discussion was about the alleged essentialisation of certain cultures and 
the alleged neglect of power, economics and deprivation in ethnic studies. Some 
criminologists now seem to be asking themselves similar questions. This thesis 
aims at shedding some light on how Bradford Pakistanis view and `live' crime 
within their `territory', not on whether and how they differ from others in the extent 
or character of their criminal activities Criminal activities will not be the focus of 
the study, but rather its concern will be with how Bradford Pakistanis as active 
subjects construct crime and react to it. Knowledge held by them, instead of 
knowledge on them, should include analysis of their ethnic resources and networks, 
not as an obstacle to their amelioration of status in society, but as a basis for 
different standpoints that may produce different constructions and understandings 
from white British ones. So far this type of awareness (that presupposes the idea 
that they may hold specific knowledge containing part of solution) has been 
unexplored. This hypothesis cannot be ruled out before research is done, although 
the result may be that cultural difference does not impact on this specific labelling 
process. 
The data chapters in part III will attempt empirically to fill the gap detected 
by Phillips and Bowling' s theoretical speculation (2003). This should not obscure 
other factors as both Phillips and Bowling (2003: 272) and Alexander (2000: 102) 
point out, such as gender, age and structural constraints, for instance. However, as 
Ballard (1992), Werbner (1996), Kalra (2000) and Modood (2004) have argued, 
structural constrains may be `cultural' or `ethnic', not only economic. Ethnic 
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resources and ethnic networks must be acknowledged as generating important 
changes in the social world. Anthropology and its traditional methods can help 
understand this process provided that they do not become victim of the "mere 
glamour of tradition" (Malinowski 1926: 65). Anthropology should help in trying to 
discover how culture may be a resource and a constraint, maintaining an equal 
distance between pathologisation and hagiography. 
An analysis of Bradford Pakistanis' values, labelling processes and 
perceived solutions to crime might reveal specific influences and implications for 
the city and its fight against crime. One hypothesis could be that these minority 
ethnic views may turn out to be the same as the ones of the white majority, but until 
studies are completed in this field we cannot be sure. Until then, if serious 
anthropological, sociological and criminological accounts fail to deal with the 
relations between ethnic capitals and crime, the primary analysis taking them into 
consideration will be a pathological one that depicts some groups and sub-groups as 
folk devils. In the next chapter some attempts to deal with this problem will be 
explored, taking into consideration methodology as an important variable as any 
research involving race (Kalra 2006: 467). 
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Chapter Three 
Ethnicity, religion, masculinity and crime in the Pakistani diaspora 
Chapter Two has established that so far criminology and sociology have tended to 
concentrate on certain aspects of the relationship between race/ethnicity and crime. 
This chapter will critically examine some attempts at engaging with the Pakistani 
diaspora and crime. The amount of literature produced in this field is quite 
impressive, although some of the material may be considered only tangential to 
criminology. This chapter, however, will not develop a full and chronological 
review of all the existing literature, but instead will select some academic works on 
the basis of the themes more relevant to this thesis. 
The first study presented is Mawby and Batta's (1980) that reflects on how 
the experiences of migration and settlement impact on crime rates. Here, although 
cultural diversity is seen as relevant to the way the system decides to deal with 
Asian offenders, the specificity of the Pakistani heritage is only marginal to the 
analysis, and religion does not appear in the text unless it is mentioned as a cause 
for insularity. Male youth is not considered a `problem' as in more recent studies. 
It will be argued that the first substantial attempt to highlight religion in the 
study of crime and violence is Macey's (1999a and 1999b). In Macey's work 
religion seems to be closely connected to behavioural dynamics of male youth. In 
general, religion seems to be included in analysis whenever external circumstances 
encourage analysts to focus on it: Macey as well as Imtiaz (2002) are writing post- 
Rushdie affair, while another author who focuses on religion and crime, Quraishi 
(2005), is writing after September 11`h. Amongst those who rather than focusing on 
religion, base their research on a `thick description' of certain sub-groups as 
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problematic, there is Lien's ethnography (2005) on Pakistani gangs in Oslo. 
Webster's (1997) and Wardak's (2000) studies deal with religion and culture, but at 
the same time include multiple variables. Again, male youth is at the centre of 
attention. In the conclusion to this chapter it will be argued that the danger of 
pathologising minority ethnic groups when speaking about crime has not been 
completely avoided by these studies, especially when male youth is discussed, but 
also that the solution to the tackling of the taboo mentioned by Phillips and 
Bowling' (2003) could lie within methodology. 
3.1. Criminality as a migration stage: Mawby and Batta 
The first study about crime and Pakistanis in Britain known to the present author is 
Mawby and Batta's Asians and Crime: the Bradford Experience (1980). Although 
this work is based on the very limited sample of the Mirpuri community of 
Bradford (Quraishi 2005: 29), it attempts to explain changes in patterns of deviance 
according to a general paradigm connected to the stages of settlement of any 
relocating community. The migration process and the many adjustments that 
individuals have to undergo through it are, therefore, considered paramount for the 
analysis, in what Tatum (2000: 6, see previous chapter) would describe as a 
"colonial model". Here, the alienation from one's cultural capital (whatever it is) 
and from political praxis are considered paramount to explaining social mechanisms 
of exclusion and oppression. The level of attachment to one's culture is considered 
an important variable for crime prevention, but not the culture per se, apart from 
exceptions (such as mafia) that do not seem to apply to Pakistanis: 
1 In chapter Two we have already discussed Phillips and Bowling' s belief that criminology has 
been largely affected by what they call the `race and crime' taboo (2003: 579) or the fear of 
pathologizing an ethnic group in relation to crime (see 2.3). 
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[The] strength of the culture of the migrant group has an important 
impact on social control and crime. This is not necessarily the case 
where a criminal tradition is imported, as in the case of the Mafia. But 
where a culture is able to provide a cushion against difficulties 
experienced in migration, or where the social structure of the country 
of origin is retained by the migrant group in the new society, a degree 
of insularity may `protect' the migrants for a not inconsiderable time 
(... ) where an immigrant group maintains its ethnic identity, for 
example through its religion, or where migration is seen as temporary 
and social control as imposed by the homeland is a meaningful reality 
crime rates may remain low (Mawby and Batta 1980: 18) 
Asians (sic) in Bradford were said to be protected from the worst structural and 
racist inequalities by their family system (ibid.: 26), and this idea was reflected in 
how the Criminal Justice system would deal with young offenders: they were 
generally given care orders rather than other types of sentences, reflecting the idea 
of an efficient Asian system of informal social control (ibid.: 41). In general, the 
study argues that in migrant communities the first generation tends to have low 
crime rates, but the second generation might increase them (ibid.: 31). 
Mawby and Batta seem to be very much aware of an Asian `specificity' in 
terms of the authorities' perception and also partly in terms of some objective 
differences in offending in comparison to other groups (such as the lower rate in 
female crime). However, most of their attention is focused on the process of 
disruption of norms and values in general rather than the study of specific norms 
and values. The background of this study is in fact based in Social Disorganisation 
theory. The belief behind this approach is that offences are more likely to take place 
where traditional norms and values, of any cultural origin, are being disrupted 
(Eadie and Morley 1999; Lederman et al. 2002: 514). In the process of settlement, 
therefore, disruption of traditional values can lead to an increment in crime in the 
second generation. These considerations appear to be relevant not only to 
criminology but also to migration, diaspora and identity studies. Intergenerational 
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differences and tensions, and the breaching of some important social and cultural 
norms (as well as consequent sanctions), could reflect and even explain the process 
of cultural chanßcs at different stages of settlement. Deviance and crime could be 
then considered almost as a natural stage of the migration process 2 
One of the most interesting aspects of Asians and Crime is that religion is 
not considered as a crucially important element in the study of crime in that 
community. In 1980, studies of minority ethnic groups were focusing on issues of 
race and pigmentation, while at the time of the present research culture and religion 
play a much more significant role. Then, Islam was not considered as a key factor. 
Religion. and in particular Islam, only started to become much more prominent in 
ethnic studies since the Rushdie affair (cf. Modood 1992). While a number of 
publications have reflected this shift of interest within ethnic studies (see Lewis 
1994). research on deviance has maintained some degree of distance from religion. 
According to Spalek (2002: 5 1) criminology has done so because people's beliefs do 
not fit with "its claim of objectivity and rationalism". If we follow Phillips and 
Bowlings argument (2003) we may be persuaded that such dismissal of religion 
could derive from fear of pathologising a group. Below, two examples of how 
religion was included in the sociology of deviance will be illustrated. 
3.2. Bringing religion into the picture: Macey's bold attempt 
The strongest imlctus given to the study of religion and crime so far has probably 
conic from Macey (1999a; 1999b). Macey writes after two very important events in 
In chahtcr Eight the issue of criminality as hrccs` of adaptation will be discussed on the basis of 
the data collected for the present research. 
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the Bradford and British Asian history: the 1989 Rushdie affair and the 1995 ri ots3. 
Macey's article in Ethnic and Racial Studies (1999a) is written in response to 
Burley and Reid's (1996) account of the latter. According to Macey these authors 
had neglected social class and religion (Macey 1999a: 845), but had had the merit of 
giving greater attention to gender differences within the group they were studying, 
while most of the sociology of deviance had supposedly so far left gender aside (cf. 
also Archer 2001: 79). Material deprivation, poor educational provision, police 
brutality, institutional racism and masculinity, albeit present in the Bradford 
Pakistani community, are according to Macey in themselves inadequate 
explanations for the occurring types of violence (ibid.: 846). She suggests instead 
that patterns of crime are influenced by "ethnic, religious, gender, generational and 
socio-economic influences that intersect and interact with each other (and wider 
social structures) in dialectical formation" (ibid. : 852). While these factors are 
common coinage when processes of identity construction are debated (sec amongst 
others Walluran 1979; Ericksen 1993; Sarup 1996; Kalra 2000), they still often fail 
to enter discussions about criminality. Macey is persuaded, however, that the 
"manipulation of cultural and religious resources to achieve desired ends" is very 
common in the community (ibid. ). 
Macey refers mainly to two examples, one `public' and one `private' (ibid.: 
855). The example of public violence, where religion is manipulated in order to 
justify or threaten actual violence, is the campaign to chase the prostitutes out of 
Manningham. occurred just before the 1995 riots. At the time, a religious ethos was 
% In 2002 Macey published another study including an analysis oi'2001 riots, but the 
comi(Icr. rtions expressed with regard to the use and abuse of religion are substantially the same as 
the ones discussed in I999a and 19991) and on which this section is based. 
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very clearly publicly attached to the violent action4. This followed years of 
frustration after asking the police to put an end to street prostitution in the area 
(Siddiyuc 1993: 119; Burlet and Reid 1996: 146). The `private' example is a 
consideration that arose from Macey's interviews. According to her data, much 
domestic violence in the Bradford Pakistani community was justified through an ad- 
hex interpretation of Islam. 
The most contentious part of Macey's work is her linking of the high number 
of Muslims in prison (cf. also Wilson 1999 and Kalra 2003: 142) to Islam (Macey 
1999x: 856). However, her argument is not that Islam has intrinsic elements that 
lead vounc men to violence: 
Whether this type of Islam is theologically legitimate is irrelevant: as 
long as men use Islam to justify violence, religion must be considered a 
significant variable in its analysis (Macey 1999a: 960)5 
Macey is particularly sensitive to a possible connection between certain 
manipulations of Islam and those versions that are often described as its illiterate or 
rural forms (cf. 'religion vs. culture debate', chapter Six) practiced by the majority 
Mirpuri Bradford Pakistani population (ibid.: 859). However, as elsewhere (Furbey 
and Macc 2005), the inclusion of religion in a sociological analysis appears 
judgemental insofar as there is no analysis of its positive potential. Religion, and in 
particular Islam. has emerged as it `protective factor', for instance in other studies 
that focus on addiction. (Orford et at. 2004: 23). Macey's understanding of religion, 
however. has the advantage of being a complex one, and of avoiding an essentialist 
4 The film 'My on the fanatic' by Udayan Prasad, based on the homonymous short story by I-Ianif 
Qurcishi. although not mentioning Bradford, represents very clearly the religious discourses 
manifrsird amongst the protesters in the Manningham area at the time. 
1-his ohscrvatloll reflects sonic comments about the use of Islam as justification for post-2001 
Icrmnst attacks in Europe. While some commentators are keen to deprive the suicide bombers of 
the identity of Muslim. other. argue that the very fact that Islam is used to articulate their message 
is pri it a reason that demands an analysis that includes Islam (in whatever 
interpretation) as one 
of the fac tots that may lead to these acts. The theologian Siddiqui has clearly expressed this view 
(Siddagw ()[)5). 
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view of Islam. Quraishi (2005), instead, is based on an all-encompassing and de- 
culturalised idea of Islam. 
3.3. Islam and its 'betrayal': Quraishi's transnational study 
Although the title of Quraishi's book is Muslims and Crime, his analysis is the 
comparison of two very precise geographical settings: Haslingden in Lancashire 
(with a community mainly of Sylethis and Chachchis) and a residential area in 
Karachi (Quraishi 2005: 69). The aims of this book are to analyse how Islamic 
criminal law impacts on the understanding of crime of these communities, to 
explore how Islamophobia impacts on victimisation of Muslims, and to give some 
policy-orientated suggestions (ibid.: vii). Quraishi's book is definitely grounded in a 
post-September 111h context. At the outset Quraishi gives more attention to Islam 
than to any other cultural practices, unlike Macey's attempt to disentangle a 
plethora of aspects of religious belief and practice. The first chapter describes 
Islam. sectarianism and Islamic jurisprudence as an objective whole. This is 
supposed to give the reader the benchmarks against which to measure the level of 
impact of religion on crime in both Haslingden and Karachi. Quraishi's main 
criticism of previous literature about Muslims and crime is very heavily based on 
the alleged neglect of rcli-ion. When Quraishi reviews the work of Mawby and 
I3atta (sec above), for example, there is no acknowledgement of the study of 
resistance to racism at the time. Rather, Quraishi's preoccupation is about their 
overlooking Islam. Quraishi's choice, instead, is to outline what Islam is supposed 
to say with regards to criminal law and test perceptions and behaviour of his two 
SI th is an asca in F3angtadcsh and ('hachchis are members of an ethnic group located in the 
Amick dvano of Pakistani Punjab. 
It m, 7y l'c N%; vrth rioting that Mawhy and Batta's study was published in the same year of the 
Bradford 1 sec chapter Four. 
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sample groups against it. Although his sample is very ethnically varied (from 
Sylethis and Chachchis in Lancashire to Mohajjirs8 in Karachi), this is not taken 
into account as he believes that they are all Muslims in the same way9. To make this 
even clearer, it is interesting to note his response to Webster's Keighley study. 
While Webster argues that: 
Islam as such cannot explain how Muslims behave, or how they 
might/ought to behave. Other factors outside Islam must be invoked 
(Webster 1997: 79). 
Quraishi replies: 
Any cursory evaluation of Islamic hadith will provide, according to 
; Muslims, the perfect role model for ideal behaviour, certainly at least 
how they ought to behave. Considering the majority of Webster's 
research population are Muslim, a detailed assessment of religious 
teachings, practice and influence upon youth conformity and 
community self-identity would substantially contribute towards 
deconstructing the Asian offending puzzle (Quarishi 2005: 30). 
While in chapter Two we have seen how essentialising can undermine attempts to 
include culture in the discussion of race and crime, Quraishi seems to fall into the 
same trap by not acknowledging culture in his work, and imposing an essentialised 
idea of Islam to his sample. This attempt, however, seems to fail, as in the 
conclusion Quraishi is forced to acknowledge that Islam is not the most prominent 
element influencing perceptions of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in his 
sample, but "it is an individual interpretation (... )inspired partly by Islamic and 
partly by secular culture" (ibid.: 123). Most of the authors who have attempted to fill 
the gap about race and crime in Pakistani diaspora, unlike Quraishi, have 
% N1 hajjirs is the name. sometimes used controversially, given to the people who moved to the 
new Pakistan from India in 1947, and their descendants. It literally means 'migrants'. 
Not only is Quraishi oblivious to geographical differences in Islamic practices and to the 
ictitzion vs. culture debate' (sec chapter Six), but he also assumes that Islamic criminal law speaks 
to cvctytxkly in the same way, not considering the notion of ijiiharl. This is a technical term of 
lslamic law that describes the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of 
the legal soutecs. the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The opposite of ijril+ad is raglid, Arabic for 
"inwatiom". (http: //en. u-ikipedia. urg/wiki/islamic_law) 
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acknowledged another cultural system apart from Islam and British culture. This is 
often simply labelled 'culture' with reference to one's parents' heritage. 
Anthropological research by Lien (2005) is pivoted around this. 
3.4. The anthropological gaze: Lien's ethnography of deviance 
White studies by Mawby and Batta and Macey have focused on ecological reasons 
behind patterns of deviance amongst Bradford Pakistanis, Lien's study provides us 
with a description of these very patterns. Lien's study is based in Oslo and benefits 
from the author's twenty years' research between Pakistan and its Norwegian 
diaspora. Lien, as a member of the European network for the study of gangs, is 
interested in providing an investigation that highlights the intersection of general 
gang traits and the specificities of the 'Pakistani gang'. The universal aspects of 
Bank life are described through reference to age span, symbols, self-definitions, 
territory, continuity, norms, types of violence and types of crime (2005a: 2). Lien 
provides two case studies of Pakistani gangs in Oslo and articulates the general 
gang traits through their specific cultural background. For example, the specific 
structure of the Pakistani kinship system (biraderi) strengthens participation in the 
gang (ibid.: 12), and sometimes this become the very reason that attracts people to 
join: the whole hiraderi (even up to forty members) may have to face repercussions 
because of the acts of one member and calls for self-defence. While most literature 
on gangs describes them as a substitute for families, Lien argues that in this case 
they overlap (ibid.: 15). Where this literature talks about power and status, in the 
context of Pakistani gangs in Oslo, this becomes a concept intertwined with specific 
notions of family honour (ibid.: 17). The fact that there are gang members of Indian, 
Vietnamese and cross-caste origin is seen more as constructive functional bridging 
44 
of social capital rather than a permanent characteristic of the structure of the gang 
(ihid.: 9). Gangs can also opportunistically liaise from time to time with influential 
elites (for example journalists) and the welfare system (ibid.: 19). Members of the 
gang may also use family traditions to achieve their goals: this is the case with 
traditional elders' mediation to resolve gangs' rivalries (ibid.: 15). Lien capitalises 
on sex iological and psychological theories of deviance drawing on notions of 
ro vcr. emotion and social bonds (2005b: 7). Izzat'0, for example, is treated as a 
psychological trigger that is translated into action through culturally specific 
manifestations of what is nothing other than the universal sentiment of pride. At 
times the description of culturally specific behaviours may appear more as an 
ethnographic curiosity rather than a useful tool to unravel criminological issues. For 
example. Lien describes in detail how members of a gang humiliate rivals by 
forcing them to touch their feet, a sign of submission and respect typical of the sufi 
tradition. Such descriptive excursuses do not shed much light on the relationship 
between a specific group (that is considered highly criminogenic by the Norwegian 
press) and crime. Liens's study seems to be split between her ethnographic concerns 
that often appear to end up as mere curiosity, and sociological and psychological 
theories that use: cultural specificities in order to confirm etic" theories promoting a 
universal pattern of involvement in crime. Two criticisms amongst those posed for 
anthropology in the previous chapter could be addressed to Lien's work: the 
orientalist argument and the `indirect rule' one. Said's orientalist argument (Said 
1985) has been used also in criminology to define the fascination, `otherisation' and 
jO l:; ar can be broadly translated as family honour, status, respect or 'face-saving'. 
'fhc ctic approach assumes that there is always it possible degree of abstraction in the analysis of 
a behavioural st ucture and through abstraction the social scientist can impose models aligned to it 
specific structure: a theoretical framework constructed in totally different situations may be 
applied to a community that has it very distinct history, for instance. Consequently, an 'etic' 
approach is concerned with generalised statements about the data in order to compare them with 
other (i'ikc 1953: 51. 
45 
essenttall sation of another group and their perceptions of crime (Cain 2002). By 
indulging in some descriptions such as the rituals of reciprocal humiliation amongst 
gang members. Lien may be found close to an orientalist approach. By the indirect 
rule argument we refer to the accusation that had been moved to anthropologists 
such as Evans-Pritchard when their studies were used to subjugate new peoples 
under the British colonial rule. Lien, in her split between her ethnographic concerns 
and her etic theoretical abstractions, seems to produce knowledge relevant to 
controlling agencies (see Sharma et at. 1996: 2, quoted in 2.7). The ethnographic 
aspects of her research, therefore, seems to be in function of etic arguments rather 
than of ernie'2 analysis, leaving very little room for minority ethnic perceptions and 
interpretations of criminal issues. 
In the ethnographic sections, Lien does not seem too concerned about why 
young Pakistani men in Oslo are actively involved in gangs, but rather with how 
they do it. Heritage becomes important in the deviant action primarily when it 
appears as a manifestation of an etic psycho-social theory, not in its prevention or 
even in the more abstract terms of social construction of deviance and labelling. 
Lien denies that there is a cultural specificity in the criminogenesis and her 
conclusion is that "crime is the cause of crime" (Lien 2005b: 23). Lien argues that 
this is the only possible way to include the young men into programmes of 
rehabilitation: it is important to understand what crime acts do to individuals, not 
what their heritage is like. The cultural study of the dynamics of the gangs appears 
therefore as an exercise imposing etic psycho-social frameworks on a specific 
"' Emic resrarch "ananpt(s) to discover and to describe the pattern of that (... ) culture in 
tefetcnce to the wav in which the various elements of that culture arc related to each other in 
the functioning of that particular pattern, rather than an attempt to describe them in reference to 
a generalised classification derived in advance of the study of that particular culture" (Pike 
lrK4: S). 
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cultural contest. In Lien's work, even izzat seems to be discussed more as a 
universal feature of masculinity than as an aspect of a culturally specific dimension. 
In all the studies mentioned above, young men, with their identities and 
masculinity. play a very important part in the literature that deals with deviance in 
the Pakistani diaspora. In particular, the following two studies dwell on masculinity 
and identity as the most important factors when studying deviance amongst British 
Pakistanis. 
3.5. Niasculinities and identity: Webster and Imtiaz 
The following studies focus more on broader ideas of deviance rather than crime. 
They focus on men and mention ecological causes of deviance as well as more 
psychological and idctttity-construction-related ones, keeping on the edge between 
identity studies and sociology of deviance 13. Webster's study (1997) is based on 
research in the Bradford District. While he dealt with the problem of crime in an 
earlier work (Webster 1995,1996), here lie broadens the scope of his analysis to a 
classification of male types in relation to their adherence to or deviance from 
behavioural expectations according to their parents' perceptions. Amongst the 
typologics the two categories of experimenters (1997: 77) and go-betweens (ibid: 
78) are the ones including people who break the law. Breaking or abiding by the 
law, however, is not the only benchmark to classify deviance or "propriety" (ibid: 
74). In fact, further categories are the conformists (who adhere to family and 
community expectations, ibid: 77), vigilantes (older, frustrated by lack of police 
intervention and providing protection against "public improprieties") and Islamists 
t' Arm ngst the studies about young Muslim men that give complex accounts of their lives, moving 
amongst gaoler. generation, identity, masculinity, racism, it is important to remember Archer's 
contribution (2(103) in the licId of education. Archer in fact follows Alexander in her theorisation 
of ethnic studies that should account for 'shifting discourses of the family, politics, age and 
trrritýýiý' (ibid.: ihl). 
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(the ones able to distinguish "between a Muslim and an Islamic identity" 14) Both 
evfºerimenters and go-betweens would guarantee stability to the community through 
the preservation of some norms, but would accommodate other emotional, social 
and psychological needs through a `double life'. This typology is clearly inspired by 
Pryce's 1979 work, but also includes a model similar to Tatum's neo-colonial one 
based on "self-alienation", "alienation from the racial or social group", "alienation 
from the general other" and "cultural alienation" (2000: 56). It is important to 
notice how alienation itself and not the degree of detachment from a legacy of a 
certain culture or group is the most significant aspect of this model that is 
applicable to any minority ethnic group. The main difference with Pryce's and 
Tatum's works is that exploitation and class are only two of the factors that cause 
the different typologies to arise. By bringing religion and culture in, Webster in fact 
seems to go beyond their models. 
A similar approach that however tackles crime only marginally, is the very 
clearly contcxtualised study of Bradford Pakistani identities during and straight 
after the Rushdie affair. Imtiaz's doctoral thesis (2002) in social psychology is 
mainly an analysis of the politics of representations of identity, and its relevance to 
this chapter lies with the fact that young men are seen as the problematic focus of 
the Bradford Pakistani community. Imtiaz argues that external representation, 
ideologies and hegemony play a crucial part in the identity generation process of 
young Pakistani men. lmtiaz's model hence envisages three categories of reaction 
to a triple discrimination (racial, cultural and religious) by the different articulation 
of one's cultural capital: coconts, rude boys and extremists (Imtiaz 2002: 124). 
These categories are claimed to be representations from inside (ibid: 125), gathered 
j6 Such distinction can he made clear by paraphrasing these labels with 'Muslims by birth and 
Muslims by choice'. 
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among 'specialists' or members of the community who are engaged in paid or 
voluntary work with young men. The label coconuts refers to those young men who 
are 'brown outside and white inside' (Ibid: 125); they are seen as having benefited 
from a certain degree of social mobility and distanced themselves from tradition, 
even by moving away from their own families. They would apparently be the ones 
that have internalised the external stereotype and created distance from its source 
(Ihid: 147): they supposedly reject whatever is looked down upon by the outsiders. 
'Through this process they tend not to engage with illegal activities (although their 
rejection of their heritage might be read by some as deviant and destabilizing for the 
community in general). 
The other two categories, instead of internalising the stereotype, resist it 
either by capitalising on the difference or by challenging external constructions 
(Ibid. ). Ruda hors in fact are seen as generating a tradition `between Bollywood and 
bhangra' (Imtiaz 2002: 147) and `Mirpur and LA' (Ibid: 127) and revitalise their 
identity pride in spite of unemployment and disaffection from the wider society 
(Ibid. ) However, they do not distinguish between their culture and their religion, 
about which knowledge is not very deep (cf. `Culture vs. religion' debate in chapter 
Six). Rude hens are considered more likely to breach norms. Finally those labelled 
as "extremists" base their identity representation on the search for a `pure' religion, 
relieved from the cultural medium of their parents (Ibid: 21). "Extremists" are 
considered agents of the preservation of `order' in the community (Ibid: 133), a 
notion that overlaps with the one of stability that will be mentioned in chapter 7.6. 
The categories outlined by Imtiaz are said to be very fluid but at the same time 
delineate their subscribers' potential for deviance or adherence to norms. According 
to Imtiaz not crnY attachment to one's heritage (as in Hirschi's theory of social 
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control) is the major factor to explain patterns of deviance. In his work, the key 
clement is instead the constructive use and translation of a certain religious and 
cultural heritage, together with historical pressures. Here, a study on identity 
manages to bring together the various aspects that Alexander considered as the most 
meaningful variables of deviance: age, gender, cultural influences and 
economic/political resources and constraints. This seems not to have been achieved 
yet by criminologists, although Wardak seems to get closer than anybody else. 
3.6. Between etic and emic: Wardak's approach 
\'Vardak-'s study of young men and deviance in a mosque in Edinburgh draws on 
typologies similar to the ones described above and at the same time combines them 
with a universal criminological theory, such as Hirschi's control theory. Here 
attachment and belonging are the most important variables to classify the research 
participants within an analysis frame that can be reproduced in any other context. 
\\'ardak calls conformists the young men who follow their family's transmitted 
social norms (2000: 155,156). Their inherited cultural capital is upheld as ideal and 
deployed in the real world; members of this group are trouble-free, and relational 
proximity between them, their families and the community acts as a deterrent to 
crime, as hypothesised by supporters of social control theory (Hirschi 1971: 17; 
l3urnside and Baker 1994: 21). The category of conformists is followed by 
arcOmumudationists, those who believe some compromises with the family norms 
are acceptable to accommodate their individual needs (ibid .: 156). Their 
compromises are not inherently destabilising for the group they still feel they 
belong to. The category of part-time conformists repeatedly breaks social rules, but 
makes sure to preserve family's reputation by complying to some token activities 
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(Ibid.: 157), such as attending mosque on Fridays or for funerals, behaviours that 
are consistent with the 'double lives' mentioned in Webster 1997. Finally, the group 
violating and challenging most of community 'propriety' is labelled rebels. 
The main argument is that amongst Edinburgh Pakistanis, represented by the 
Pilrig boys, there is a widely shared notion of what `public propriety' is: 
'appropriateness, seemliness, decency, conformity with good manners, conformity 
with convention of language and behaviour' (Cohen 1979: 124, quoted in Webster 
1997: 74). However, propriety often consists of adherence to family tradition, and is 
not independently forged by young men. Agency is mostly neglected. Rather than 
studying how households perceive deviance and engage in their choices, Wardak 
classifies them according to his own etic benchmark, attachment to their parents' 
culture. He does not agree with Alexander about the opportunity of studying young 
men in a cultural vacuum (Alexander 2000: 18,102,140), but rather he is only able 
to see them in a cultural context which is the one founded by the older generation of 
scoters in Edinburgh. Although faith and religious practice are important variables 
of the study (whose participants were all attending a madrasa), this did not seem to 
produce a sub-group as in Imtiaz and Webster's works. This may be because in the 
Pilrig mosque exclusivist influences (such as Tableegh Jamaat, see 11.1.2) were not 
present. The tension between Islam and the traditional cultural background is not 
registered. the only conflict represented is seen as the one smoothed out by the 
double lives of the young men. We have to remember, however, that Wardak's is an 
etic account. While at times reference to the boys' own (emic) constructions of 
propriety and deviance are analysed, his categories are based on his own analysis of 
the data collected amongst the Pilrig boys. His theorisation of sub-groups' different 
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behaviours is nncant to become comparable to other studies based on Hirschi's 
social control theory, and gives only limited space to insiders' comments. 
3.7 Conclusion: anthropology, minority perspectives and criminology 
The studies here analysed show that the field of crime in the Pakistani diaspora has 
produced a varied body of literature. These studies include and analyse variables 
such as gender. age, identities, religion, settlement and economic and political 
constraints. They tend, however, to focus more on the problems rather than the 
possible solutions. In this respect, there seems to be a tendency to pathologisation, 
esi ccially as far as male youth are concerned. The aim of the present thesis is to 
move beyond these very important studies and look at agency and local influences 
as a resource, not only as a problem. 
Studying specificities of a minority ethnic group does not necessarily follow 
from the will to collude with social control agencies (cf. Sharma et al. 1996 cited in 
2.7). Instead, it follows from reviewing the literature above and the need to 
including more minority ethnic perspectives in this field. This does not want to be 
an invite to contribute to a government's indirect rule based on sociological 
analysis, but rather to highlight how in this field the inclusion of minority ethnic 
groups has been neglected. 
If we consider social reality as made up by individuals, their choices based 
on certain values systems, their practices, and their thoughts as they practically 
enrage with the world and the structures they built, we will need a wide and 
extensive knowledge of all these entities. Therefore, not only one aspect of the 
community under study will he considered as crucial to the understanding of it, but 
all the parts of that unique social world will concur to the progress of the research. 
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Local history is one of the important aspects that may contribute to produce relevant 
knowledge (see chapter Five). Acknowledging this standpoint should lead to the 
choice of an appropriate methodology that in the Bradford context has appeared to 
he emir and ethnographic, as it will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Part II 
The contexts and the methodology 
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Chapter Four 
Methodology 
This chapter provides the background information about the methodology applied 
to the doctoral research in epistemological, practical and ethical terms. 
The epistemological observations will explain what approach has 
influenced this research and why the emic and interpretative interactionist choice 
seemed to be the most feasible way to build relevant knowledge about crime in the 
Bradford Pakistani Community. 
Practical observations about the methods utilised during fieldwork are 
particularly important as access to Muslim communities for research after 2001 
has proved particularly difficult (cf. Gilliait-Ray 2005; Spalek 2005). In the course 
of the chapter an excursus about anthropological method will discuss its crucial 
help in gaining access and developing knowledge of the study cultures in order to 
persevere with the interpretative epistemological framework. 
The ethical issues encountered in the development of the research together 
with safety precautions will conclude the chapter. 
4.1. The epistemology of the research: the emic and the interactionist 
As discussed in 3.7, one of the main aims of the present work has been to give 
voice to an alternative point of view, weltandschaungen (views about the world), 
in the context of the Bradford Pakistani Community. Instead of evaluating 
external analyses that have so far investigated the criminal problems in this setting 
through class and deprivation, the emic approach "seeks experience from within 
(... ) and attempt(s) to capture the meanings and experiences of interacting 
individuals"(Dcnzin 2001: 40). 
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As stated in 2.9, the criminological debate on race and crime tends to focus 
on deprivation and class, while the combination of these structural factors with 
cultural ones (cf. Macey 1999a; Phillips and Bowling 2003) sometimes goes 
almost unnoticed. Even in the accounts where the culture is given some degree of 
importance, agency seems to be only ancillary to a more structural analysis. In this 
chapter the theoretical construction behind the thesis is discussed in order to 
explain how the emic standpoint seems to be adequate to represent agency and 
also to start filling in the criminological gap about minorities' perspectives 
(Phillips and Bowling 2003: 272). 
4.1.1 The definition of emic 
The terms etic and emic were coined by Pike in 1954. These terms were 
constructed through the study of the language analysis and the definitions of 
phonemic and phonetic. Pike was arguing that the study of any kind of complex 
human activity could not rely only on that specific activity, but should analyse it 
in the whole of a `unified set of terms and a unified methodology'(Pike 1954: 1). 
In an introductory example, Pike says that an analysis of a language that does not 
include an analysis of behaviour is bound to have theoretical and methodological 
discontinuities, and vice versa: 
the activity of man (sic) constitutes a structural whole, in such a way 
that it cannot be subdivided into neat "parts" or "levels" or 
"components" with language in a behavioural compartment insulated 
in character content, and organisation from other behaviour. Verbal 
and non verbal activity is a unified whole, and theory and 
methodology should be organised or created to treat it as such' (Pike 
1954: 2) 
From this sta ting point, building on the language studies analogy, Pike says that 
examining the structural whole of human behaviour can imply either an emic or 
an etic approach. 
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The etic approach assumes that there is always a possible degree of 
abstraction in the analysis of a behavioural structure and through abstraction the 
social scientist can impose alien models to a specific structure: a theoretical 
framework constructed in totally different situations may be applied to a 
community that has a very distinct history, for instance. 
Consequently, an etic approach is concerned with generalised statements 
about the data in order to compare them with others (Pike 1954: 8). An emic 
approach, instead, is concerned with only one "relatively homogenous" culture 
(ibid. ). While etic research aims at comparison and generalisation, emic research 
attempt(s) to discover and to describe the pattern of that (... ) culture in 
reference to the way in which the various elements of that culture are 
related to each other in the functioning of that particular pattern, rather 
than an attempt to describe them in reference to a generalised 
classification derived in advance of the study of that particular culture. 
(Pike 1954: 8) 
It is evident, therefore, that an emic approach is clear from any deductive' 
inference and can be consistent with abductive strategy and grounded theory: emic 
units are discovered by the analyst in the specific reality of a study, not created by 
her/him a priori or by imposing categories created for other settings (ibid: 20). 
It is important to highlight how a social scientist who subscribes to this 
approach may not be able to neglect any aspect of the lives that are being 
observed, as they all contribute in making the culture in question function as it 
does: 
an emic approach must deal with particular events as parts of larger 
wholes to which they are related and from which they obtain their 
ultimate significance, whereas an etic approach may abstract events 
(... ) from their context or local system'(Pike 1954: 10) 
The broadest definition of emic is the one that includes notions of `internal' or 
`domestic' standpoint as the behaviour is classified `in reference to the system of 
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behaviour of which it is immediately a part' (ibid: 10). An etic study tends to 
produce an analysis of the structure in question very early (ibid.: 9), while an emic 
one requires a longer process as even the study population might need time to 
produce conscious awareness of many of the units constituting a pattern. 
Consequently the emic scientist will be as close as possible to the structure in 
question, while an etic analytical standpoint (which, on the contrary, might be 
called "external" or "alien") requires the analyst to stand far away or even 
"outside" a particular culture "to see its separate events of other cultures" 
(ibid: 10)1. 
If we consider social reality as made up by individuals, their choices based 
on certain value systems, their practices, and their thoughts as they practically 
engage with the world and the structures they built, we need a wide and extensive 
knowledge of all these variables. Therefore, not only one aspect of the community 
under study has been considered as crucial to the understanding of it, but all the 
parts of that unique social world in that historical moment have concurred to the 
progress of the research. What has represented evidence of the parts composing 
the social reality under study have been everyday concepts, practices and 
meanings as they have been produced, negotiated and transmitted within the 
community. Hence, three components and their interaction have been paramount 
in the social investigation: economic and political disadvantage (cf. chapter 
Seven), ethnic resources and networks (cf. chapter Eight) and individual histories 
(or, in more sociological terms, agency, see case studies in 11.1.1 and 11.1.2 ). 
1 The terms etic and emic have been at the centre of anthropological debate for a while after Pike's 
publication of his 1954 work. Critics of Pike's theory have ofen been accused of having 
misunderstood his writings and misrepresented his concepts of emic and etic. The most famous 
controversy was the one stirred by Marvin Harris who wrote about his own understanding of the 
two concepts in The Rise of Anthropological Theory. A History of Theories of Culture, New York, 
Thomas and Y. Crowell, 1969. Harris's version of emic and etic is still considered by Pike's 
followers as a gross misunderstanding of the original concepts. 
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4.1.2 The interpretative interactionist approach 
If the emic approach was deemed to be the most functional approach to unveil 
those variables about crime within an ethnic group in the shadow because of 
certain taboos of criminology (cf. Phillips and Bowling: 2002: 271) , the 
interpretative interactionist choice was a viable option for conducting the research 
in a social world to be considered a complex working whole. As Pike put it: 
The value of an emic study is, first, that it leads to an understanding 
of the way in which a language or a culture is constructed, not as a 
series of miscellaneous parts, but as a working whole. Second, it 
helps one to appreciate not only the culture or language as an ordered 
whole, but it helps to understand the individual actors in such a life 
drama- their attitudes, motives, interests, responses, conflicts, and 
personality developments (Pike 1954: 11). 
I define the interpretative approach to social reality as one which focuses on social 
actors with their social and cultural capital as they interpret it. This is coherent 
with the choice of an emic approach because it does not seek a-historical 
generalisation, but rather emerges from the unique interaction of elements such as 
structure, culture and individuals, and the interpretation given from within. The 
possibility of getting to know this social world is given by the study of the set of 
meanings as they are lived, performed, interpreted and transmitted by the 
members of the Bradford Pakistani Community. How the different parts of the 
social world are constructed can be investigated through the study of the 
interaction of the history of the community (see 5.8), the biographies of people, 
their ethnic resources and networks (see 9.4) and how in the diasporic context they 
try to re-adjust, re-interpret or revitalize certain cultural and social assumptions 
(see 9.4,10.5,11.2,11.5,12.6. ). 
The awareness of the multiple influences shaping the experiences of this 
particular social world is grounded in an anti-essentialist standpoint that 
recognises the presence of multiple influences and experiences on the individuals 
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involved in the research. In this piece of work, saying that the community holds its 
own set of meanings does not simplistically mean that there is a homogenous and 
static entity where all the individuals behave very similarly (see Alexander's 
critique in chapter Two). This will be particularly clear when the sampling 
strategy will be discussed: individuals inform their behaviour through information 
coming from the community experience and draw on their ethnic resources and 
networks, but their choices in the end are motivated also by their individual 
histories. 
Although the focus of this research is on emic sets of meanings, the role of 
the researcher in the building of a relevant knowledge should not be 
underestimated. The epistemology of this research is grounded in the process of 
the researcher's engaging with social actors as what is initially spontaneous and 
natural to them and is de-stratified and discussed dialogically (Geertz 1973), 
because `interpretive interactionism attempts to make the world of lived 
experience visible to the reader' (Denzin 2001: 34). 
The lived experiences of the actors of the social world of the research have 
been tested iteratively in order for them to inform the subsequent steps of the 
research. This is the premise of grounded theory, but it is also coherent with an 
interpretive interactionism approach as `properly conceptualised, interpretive 
research becomes a civic, participatory, collaborative project, a project that joins 
the researcher with the researched in an ongoing moral dialogue' (Denzin 2001: 5, 
my emphasis). An abductive strategy that has reiteratively looked for relevance 
and accuracy of the categories used in the analysis has been employed on the basis 
of a grounded theory, "by drawing on the concepts and meanings used by social 
actors and the activities in which they engage" (Blaikie 1993: 176). 
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4.2. The choice of classic anthropological methods 
As the thesis focus its interest on mainly three variables (economic and general 
disadvantage, ethnic resources and networks and agency) the methodology has to 
reflect this approach. In previous studies where the interaction between culture 
and structure has been investigated, the choice of the methods has been seen as 
problematic (Metcalf et al. 1996). While the choice of a large-scale quantitative 
survey is more able to abstract from general local economic factors, a qualitative 
and ethnographic approach enables the researcher to explore a multitude of 
experiences. Also, no quantitative strategy would be suitable for an interpretive 
approach, where the thoughts and interpretation of facts are relevant (Fabietti, 
1991, Herzfeld, 1982). Furthermore, qualitative, interpretive research on a 
sensitive topic in the extremely suspicious Bradford Pakistani Community 
(McLoughlin, 2000) demands a very high grade of involvement of the researcher 
to gain first hand interpretation. 
In the case of the present thesis a qualitative ethnographic approach 
allowed the researcher to collect a considerable amount of material about the 
insiders' points of view on the subject and also helped in establishing a bond of 
trust with the sample in order to gain access. It could be argued that an 
impersonal, quantitative approach would have never guaranteed me the trust and 
consequently the access that I was able to gain through the anthropological 
strategy. Although anthropology has been accused of being incapable of 
explaining very recent social phenomena where there is a high level of 
intertwining of factors (for an account of this debate see Werbner 1987), the 
methodology of this research is grounded in the belief that without 
anthropological methods the researcher would have not been able to gain access in 
the community and collect reliable data. 
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4.3. Access 
Participant observation was a tool to build access before becoming the means to 
collecting data. Bradford Pakistani community, where most of the information 
system is based on word of mouth, has always required a very high level of 
involvement of the researcher to gain first hand information (Murphy 1987; 
McLoughlin, 2000). After 2001, high involvement has become indeed the only 
way to defeat suspicion of research and negotiate access. This denotes a 
significant change in strategy for the researcher as global politics affect what 
happens in the field. 
Initially, there seemed to be a need to find a couple of `official' locations 
where participant observation could be conducted at the same time as 
symbolically returning something to the community. Otherwise, I risked failing to 
respect the basics of the research bargain, or creating the exchange that aims at 
legitimising the researcher's work with the researched (Adler and Adler 1991: 175; 
Lee 1993: 137). Not being affiliated to any institution or community group meant 
that I was not seen as affiliated or espoused to any particular `lobby'. In fact one 
of the characteristics of community groups in Bradford is that they are fragmented 
on a multiplicity of layers (McLoughlin 1998c) and therefore more or less subtle 
conflicts are quite common. Past anthropological research in Bradford (ibid. ) 
relied on voluntary work in a specific setting for participant observation and the 
starting point of snowballing. 
Although I was keen to develop a similar strategy I realised that the 
educational background of the Pakistani population in Bradford nowadays has 
improved to the extent that grass roots organisations are able to organise volunteer 
work with competent people from within the community rather than seeking 
outsiders. 
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While offers of collaborating with bodies that worked on forced marriages 
and gun crime were forthcoming due to my presumed `expertise', these had to be 
declined as public affiliation could have undermined the ease people felt while 
talking with an outsider who was not publicly showing affiliations by pro-actively 
engaging with political or social activities. I realised that by engaging with the 
community on such themes I would occupy a public position and might be 
subjected to strict scrutiny. 
The researcher-respondent rapport is however built on many more levels 
than simply economic or practical help (Sanders 2004: 27). I had to respect the 
"norms of reciprocity" (Alder and Alder 1991: 175), and expose my research 
persona as well as myself as much as I could in order to become visible, 
transparent, and recognizable. My identity had to become public and liable to 
observation (Harrington 2003: 597) if the research was to succeed. 
This did not mean that respondents would directly benefit by our 
relationship (as the highest degree of research bargain would imply), but they 
were given agency and more power by allowing that the researcher could be 
questioned and `scanned'. Before collecting views from members of the 
community, it was only fair that they were allowed to get to know me and decide 
how much trust I should be afforded. 
The snowballing process, or the practice of reaching individuals through a 
chain of acquaintances, made it possible for people to `check my references' 
through those who introduced me. In a sense, the potential research participants 
exercised their power in controlling access for the researcher (Lee 1993: 124). It 
was essential that I accepted becoming `public'; I had to go through a `scan' in 
order to be `let in', not only by individuals but by the community at large. This is 
why the fieldwork was built on a series of activities that were not necessarily 
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directly functional to the data collection. These access activities included 
frequenting the sport centre, watching Bollywood movies in local cinemas, 
shopping at the local green grocers', textile shops and mobile phones shops, going 
to Cannon Mill market (a South Asian bazaar in a former textile mill), and 
attending concerts and public events. `Hanging around' or waiting to be 
approached by passively stating one's interest has been considered key to gaining 
access (Harrington 2003: 612; Gilliat-Ray 2005: 25, referring to Lewis' successful 
research based on his ability to relate to Muslim clergy because of his position as 
`man of God'). Physical proximity is the first step towards access (Lee 1993: 133). 
The danger of getting too close to the sample was real, but this level of interaction 
was the only one that guaranteed access and trust during the interviews. The idea 
that I had a fluctuating position in the community but I was not necessarily always 
`signposted' as a researcher by a tape-recorder and a note-pad, was nonetheless 
the opposite of the `undercover' strategy. Being undercover would have been 
firstly impossible, given my appearance, and secondly would not have contributed 
to the process of gaining trust. Trust was a circular process, where given the 
potential sensitivity of the topics I was working on and the characters of some 
interviewees, I had to trust the respondents before spending time alone with them. 
Relational proximity can help with one's self protection. My personal safety, for 
example, was enhanced by my high involvement, through a system of patronage 
that made me known as `attached' or `affiliated' to some individuals. I also 
believe that informants were more likely to give me reliable accounts as our 
rapport would not end in the formal interview, but would linger and repeat itself 
on a number of occasions. Although at a first glance I might look English, as soon 
as I spoke with people, they spotted my foreign accent, and once questioned about 
my origins I found out that my status as a double outsider (non-English and non- 
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Pakistani) played a very important part in access. Perhaps there was an 
unconsciously strategic identity match (Harrington 2003: 614): I was considered in 
a non-antagonistic manner and at the same time I was independent enough from 
the community to be trusted not to gossip within it, should I be given some 
`saucy' piece of information. The fact that when interrogated about my faith I 
answered that I was a Catholic seemed, in the majority of cases, to contribute 
towards the idea that I was a person with good morals who followed a religious 
code and therefore could be trusted. 
4.4. Applying grounded theory through the analysis of the Pilot stage 
A grounded approach could be defined as the process of comparison, iterative 
analysis and creation of conceptual categories during the fieldwork, as opposed to 
an analysis taking place at the end of it or to a deductive strategy. 
Strauss and Corbin (1997: viii) define one of the crucial characteristics of 
grounded theory as the process of researching through formulating theoretically 
oriented questions. At the beginning of the fieldwork in October 2004, my 
research questions were: 
1. How do Pakistani people in Bradford perceive crime, its components and 
its significance? Are there variations between groups (based on 
generations, gender, class, etc. )? 
2. Do Pakistani people in Bradford feel there has been an increase in crime 
within the community? If yes, what do informants generally perceive as 
the features of the change and the cause of the increase of crime? 
3. What is generally perceived as the biggest problem as far as crime is 
concerned, and are there any differences of perception in different strata of 
the community (young people, older generation, community workers)? 
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4. According to the community, what role `structure' plays in social control 
(external factors in their economic form, institutions, etc. )? 
5. According to the community, what role does the `culture' play in social 
control (tradition, beliefs, customs)? 
6. According to the community, what role does religion play in social 
regulation? 
At the end of the pilot stage (Christmas 2004), the research questions, 
theoretically driven by the emic and interpretive approach, seemed to be 
consistent with the preliminary results of the abductive strategy and therefore 
were not modified. 
The pilot stage was important to realize the non feasibility of a participant 
observation that was not multi-sited. The multi-sited participant observation was 
on the other hand consistent with the anti-essentialist ontology of the research. 
The area that was more affected by the evaluation of the pilot stage was the 
sampling, as it will be discussed in the next section. 
All the interviews collected during the pilot stage were transcribed and 
analysed through N-Vivo on a free-coding basis2. Such iterative analysis 
contributed to the establishment of ethnographically driven categories (Kalra, 
2000: 32) that compensated for some essentialist assumptions found in the 
literature review process (for a critique of essentialisation of Bradford Pakistanis 
see Webster 1997). This is to say that the themes that emerged from fieldwork 
were then translated into the organisation of the analytical categories (in N-Vivo 
terminology `free nodes', see list in Appendix Two). When the researcher felt that 
`theoretical saturation' (Goulding 2002: 70) had been achieved, and new themes 
would rarely come up, free nodes were clustered (in `trees') so different discourse 
2A much greater number of themes than the ones used in this thesis emerged during fieldwork. 
These may be utilised for further research or publication. Some of these themes have already been 
analysed for a paper on 1995 and 2001 Bradford riots (Bolognani 2007a, forthcoming). 
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analyses could be started. The organisation of causal links through the comparison 
of information about structure, culture and agency took place in the stage 
preceding the writing-up. 
The process of continuous verification and comparison during the 
fieldwork inevitably produced different phases that kept influencing and adapting 
the methodology of the research. The organisation of these different phases can be 
represented as follows: 
Table 4.1 Synopsis of the research process 
Date Theoretical Data Collection Data Analysis Changes implemented 
Assumptions Activities Activities 
Oct 04- Theoretical Interviews, Participant Transcription, 
Dec 04 sampling observation (fieldnotes), N-Vivo free 
Stock-taking coding 
Dec. 04 Sampling changed 
`Step- according to insiders' 
back' Writing-up of the Pilot Stage categories. Inclusion 
(Strauss of Focus Groups 
and 
Corbin 
1998: 7) 
Jan 05- Refinement of Interviews, Participant Transcription, 
March 05 methods of data observation (fieldnotes), N-Vivo free 
collection Stock-taking coding 
March 05 Identification of 
`Step- Writing-up for conference papers `trees' of `free nodes' 
back' 
Apr 05- Consolidation Interviews, Participant Transcription, 
June 05 observation (fieldnotes), N-Vivo free 
Focus Groups, Stock- coding 
taking 
June 05 Writing-up of the methodology chapter Development of 
`Step- awareness of 
back' theoretical saturation: 
no new evidence 
emerges 
July 05 Consolidation Interviews Transcription 
Sept 05 Analysis theoretical elaboration 
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Given the success of the pilot stage, interviews conducted at that stage were 
included in the main body of data. 
4.5. The sampling and the labelling of sub-groups 
As this study aimed from the beginning at being an anti-essentialist account of the 
Bradford Pakistani community, at the start of the research a theoretically guided 
sampling strategy was created in order to guarantee the representation of different 
sub-groups. In order to set up the snowballing process and create benchmarks for 
the further stock taking, some sub-groups had to be identified as previous research 
and literature review seemed to suggest (i. e. by accounting for generational 
differences). Subsequently the selection of these theoretically constructed groups 
was adjusted through ethnographically derived categories. 
First of all the sampling strategy had to take account of the representation of 
different generations and times of settlement in Bradford. Generational studies 
have had an increasing popularity in sociology (cf. Edmunds and Turner 2002) as 
they are supposed to reflect an important component of change in society. The 
question of generation for the Bradford Pakistani community can be controversial 
as the majority of marriages are organised between England and Pakistan 3 (Shaw 
2001: 319). If we consider individuals coming from Pakistan and gaining 
permanent residence in the UK as `first generation' and their children as second, a 
problem of `diluted' generation will occur in the definition of an individual born 
3 Given the political implications of the debate on inter-continental marriages, the researcher feels 
it is important to note the heterogeneity of the stories of 'imported partners'; amongst the people 
interviewed, one woman who came in her late teens is twenty-five years later completely fluent 
and literate in English and weekly works as a volunteer in more than one local community group; 
one woman who comes from a city in Pakistan, after 8 years in the country, works in social care 
and leads a life that could be labelled as 'middle class'; a woman from a village in Mirpur has 
slowly learnt English, got a job, bought a house in a middle-class area with her savings and 
divorced her husband. Although these are not representative of the majority of cases, it seems 
important to remind the reader that 'imported partners' are not necessarily contributing to 
deprivation and lack of integration as it has been claimed recently (see Alibhai-Brown, Y. (2001) 
Mr Blunkett has insulted all of us The IndependentlO December). 
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of two parents of a different generation. For this reason, the generation-based 
sampling appeared soon to be problematic or even irrelevant for the representation 
of the individuals in the sample. See for example: 
I think there is quite a divide between the elders who are generally 
quite religious and generally good people, you know, and then there 
seems to be boys.. . the second and third generation ... I am first 
generation, really, because I was born in... my father came here and I 
was born here, I am the first generation who was born here. So we 
sort of grew up as the first generation of this country, but the second 
or third generation that came along, they-just their general outlook, 
just their cockiness, and that kind of stuff, their demeanour is 
different from what mine is. (Zameer) 
Rather, experiences and organisation of daily lives, beliefs and level of integration 
in the community and in Bradford, seemed to be far more significant variables 
according to the first interviewees. 
In the thesis, the only term used to define generation is `first generation', 
by which people born in Pakistan and naturalised British are described. It is 
important to establish this convention as a few interviewees understood `first 
generation' as the first individuals of Pakistani origins were born in UK. 
Two sample groups were initially identified as the `young people' and `parents' 
groups. The latter was supposed to provide the points of view of individuals who 
were likely to be seriously engaged in safety and moral issues concerning their 
children's upbringing. The second sample group was therefore chosen on two 
criteria: age and position in the community. 
At the end of the pilot stage, though, two issues emerged as far as the 
second sample group was concerned. The first issue was about the language 
barrier between the researcher and the first generation; the first two members of 
the first generation that were approached for an interview agreed to answer my 
questions provided that their son would do the interpreting; this interference by a 
related subject could have undermined the reliability of the data. The second 
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problem regarded the finding that interviewees seemed to regard marriage as an 
important threshold rather than age and parenthood. Marriage was often described 
as a rite of passage for most of the individuals (see 11.1.4) who apparently tended 
to change their life style after the nuptial rites. Therefore, after the pilot stage, the 
second sample group became more an age cum marriage group and relied on an 
English speaking sample. 
The popular debate about ethnic segregation in the city (see 4.3) had 
originally led the research to include only individuals who could be defined as 
`Pakistanis' (although from 4.1 it is clear that the majority of the population 
classified by the Census in Bradford of Pakistani origin are actually from Azad 
Kashmir, that holds a special status within the geo-political boundaries of 
Pakistan). Four months into fieldwork the author was presented with the 
opportunity to include in the sample some willing Muslims of Gujarati origins. 
Gujarati Muslims seemed to be in most cases profoundly socialised within the 
Pakistani community (they live in the same areas, are invited to weddings, 
exchange visits, attend the same mosques, share patterns of marriage; mosques 
with Gujarati imams are attended by Pakistani people in spite of the usual 
ethnically based participation in prayers, (cf. Lewis 1994). One individual of 
Bangladeshi origin who is particularly socialised in the Pakistani community was 
also interviewed. In terms of area of residence, the vast majority of interviewees 
lived in inner-city Bradford. Their educational achievements and their social 
class4 were varied. 
Some white people were included in the sample in order to provide some 
terms of comparison in understanding and some alternatively generated 
°I deliberately excluded `social class' from the core variables of the research as its definition 
would have been an etic one (see also 8.4). At present there is no study on emic perceptions of 
social class amongst British Pakistanis and such study was beyond the scope (as well as time and 
means) of this thesis. 
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information about the research context. Among these a focus group in a high 
school composed by white pupils and some white members of the police force 
who were interviewed as they held important insight about the 2001 riots. 
The final organisation of the sampling strategy is consequently based on three 
groups: 
1. Unmarried under twenty-eight (16 to 28 years old) 
2. Married or divorced individuals 
3. Practitioners 
4.5.1. Unmarried interviewees under twenty-eight 
This group includes unmarried individuals under thirties. In order to perform a 
periodical stock taking within this group, during the pilot stage these variables 
were highlighted as relevant to the heterogeneity of the representation: 
1. gender 
2. relation to the criminal justice system 
3. location (in terms of interaction, i. e. peer groups, out-groups, etc. ) 
4. religion (how the commitment to religion is operationalised)5 
5. how they are labelled by the community 
During the pilot stage these variables remained unchanged, apart from the fifth that 
resulted to be a very inconsistent and fluid process (see 10.1). 
Table 4.2 describes the first sample group in detail. The white pupils' focus group 
(eight students) has not been included as none of the data became relevant to the 
thesis. 
S It is impossible to describe in detail an intimate and personal thing such as faith; in order to 
describe the level of acquaintance with religion (but not necessarily the faith community in the 
case of the women who mostly do not attend mosque), levels of religious practice have been 
classified into three. `Non practicing' for the non-believers; `occasionally practicing' for those 
who would pray or attend mosque only on special occasions; `practicing' as those who pray or 
attend mosque at least weekly. 
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Table 4.2 Unmarried interviewees under twenty-eight 
Name 6 Age Gender Religion Area of 
residence 
Occupation Offences 
1. Ali 26 M 
Occasionally 
practicing 
Leeds Artist n. a. 
2. Zaara 22 F Practicing Manningham Shop assistant No 
3. Adam 26 M Practicing Leeds Road Community 
worker 
No 
4. Azad 19 M Occasionally 
practicing 
Leeds Road Unemployed Yes 
5. George 17 M N/A Leeds Road Catering industry n. a. 
6. Salman 16 M Practicing Leeds Road Student n. a. 
7. Munir 16 M Practicing Leeds Road Student n. a. 
8. Fatima 19 F Practicing Barkerend Student no 
9. Bano 17 F Practicing West Bowling Student no -. " 
10. Yousef 16 M Practicing Heaton Student no 
11. Bashir 19 M Non 
Practicing 
Shipley student no 
12. FG1 (Focus 
Group 1) Bano 
18 F Practicing West Bowling Student No 
13. FG1 B 17 F Practicing Lidget Green Student No 
14. FG1 C 17 F Practicing Leeds Road Student No 
15. FG1 D 17 F Practicing Undercliffe Student No 
16. FG1 E 17 M Practicing n. a. Student n. a. 
17. FG2(Focus 
Group 2) A 
16 F Practicing Barkerend Student No 
18. FG2 B 16 F Practicing West Bowling Student No 
19. FG2 C 16 F Practicing West Bowling Student No 
20. FG2 D 16 F Practicing West Bowling Student No 
21. FG2 E 16 M Practicing Leeds Road Student Yes 
22. Mahima 28 F Practicing Great Horton Student No 
23. Jamal 22 M Practicing Girlington Student No 
24. Khalil 17 
(Bolognani 2002) 
M Occasionally 
practicing 
West Bowling Unemployed Yes 
6 All respondents' names have been changed for confidentiality reasons. 
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4.5.2. Married or divorced interviewees 
Originally, as mentioned above, only individuals with children were to be 
included. In the pilot stage, however, childless individuals who were or had been 
married became relevant. The variables guiding stock-taking sampling were: 
1. gender 
2. occupation 
3. time of residence in the UK 
In this sample group many more individuals engaged in informal 
conversations but did not agree to be formally interviewed. For this reason the 
table below is composed by only 11 individuals, the ones interviewed in-depth. 
Table 4.3 Married or divorced interviewees 
Name Age Gender Religion Area of 
residence 
Occupation Offences Born in 
UK 
1. Jamil 36 M Practicing Leeds Road Entrepreneur n. a. Yes 
2. Imran 33 M Practicing Heaton Teacher No Yes 
3. Tahir n. a. M Practicing Great 
Horton 
Teacher No No 
4. Amir 35 M Practicing Little 
Horton 
Unemployed n. a. Yes 
5. Aliya 70 F Practicing Little 
Horton 
Housewife No No 
6. Akbar 70 M Practicing Little 
Horton 
Retired No No 
7. Zameer 33 M Practicing Great 
Horton 
Community 
worker 
n. a. Yes 
8. Shaheen 42 F Practicing Barkerend Housewife No No 
9. Hussain 27 M Practicing Barkerend Unemployed Yes Yes 
10. Fozia 27 F Practicing Barkerend Uemployed No Yes 
11. Shazia 
(Bolognani 
2002) 
30 F Practicing Keighley Lawyer no Yes 
12. Nadira 55 F Practicing Undercliffe Housewife no no 
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4.5.3. Practitioners interviewed 
The third sample group was identified as a cross-generational group whose feature 
would be to work within a field relevant to crime or crime prevention and 
therefore apparently possessing expertise. Categories it was possible to draw from 
were: politicians, police, social workers, youth workers, probation officers, media 
and members of the clergy. 
In this group a higher number of non-Pakistanis have been involved, including 
police officers and community workers. 
Table 4.4 Practitioners interviewed 
Name Age Gender Religion Area of Occupation Offences 
residence 
I. Abdul 42 M Practicing Leeds Road Social Worker n. a. 
2. Ayesha 43 F Occasionally Girlington Community No 
Practicing Worker 
4. Armley 33 M Practicing Batley Imam No 
prison 
Muslim 
Chaplain 
4. Alina 37 F Non Heaton Community no 
Practicing Worker 
5. Kamran 33 M Practicing Great Horton Community n. a. 
Worker 
6. Ameena 21 F Non Undercliffe Community yes 
Practicing Worker 
7. Umar n. a. M Practicing Manningham Civil Servant no 
8. Alan n. a. M N/A n. a. Police officer No 
9. Shamim 40 F Practicing Manningham Community no 
Worker 
10. Majid 33 M Practicing Barkerend and Imam n. a. 
Little Horton 
12. Iqbal n. a. M Practicing Leeds Road Businessman no 
and Politician 
13. Andrew n. a. M n. a. n. a. Police officer no 
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4.6. Applying the Methods 
Participant observation with individuals seemed to be very encouraging already 
during the pilot stage. The feared distrust in researchers was although hanging in 
the atmosphere, quite easily overcome; people who met me for the first time 
agreed to meet for an interview after the first encounter. Urdu knowledge at 
beginners' level seemed to be a very effective means to convince individuals to 
participate in the research. 
The ongoing process of a dialogue was consistent with the predicaments of 
the grounded theory. In the fieldnotes, this strategy of systematic reciprocity 
aimed at data collection but also at constructing a clear research persona with 
whom people could decide whether to engage or not, was called `double 
exposure': I was exposed to the daily life of the community, and the members of 
the community were constantly exposed to my presence so they could get to know 
me, my aims and my personality. The `double exposure' was the strategy that 
guaranteed the access in a context where researchers are seen with suspicion. 
Forty-eight individuals are represented in the Nvivo analysis. Numerous 
additional occasional short conversations were recorded in field notes and they 
crucially contribute to the general understanding of the relevant issues. The data 
were handled either through transcription of tape-recorded interviews, notes of 
unrecorded interviews or notes on focus groups. Some individuals were 
interviewed more than once. 
In-depth interviews were mostly recorded. The individuals who asked not 
to be recorded never presented the issue as a confidentiality one, but instead they 
mentioned the fact that they would not feel at ease. Amongst these, the offenders 
are included. 
7 This suspicion seems not to be directed to white researchers only, cf. Murtuja, S. B. (2004) 
Pakistani Muslim Communities in Britain and Germany: informal Familial Care of Elders and 
Processes of Social Exclusion Sociology, Leeds: University of Leeds. 
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At the beginning the interviews were very structured, but once the answers 
became too repetitive and I became more confident with a more grounded project, 
the interviews became more unstructured, although they remained based on a 
check list of themes to be covered (see also questionnaire in appendix Three). 
After the pilot stage the key themes were directly drawn from the free nodes of the 
preliminary Nvivo analysis (see appendix Two). By employing unstructured 
interviews the spontaneity of the narratives seemed to be better preserved and the 
discursive streams that I would develop in the analysis became more evident. The 
interviewees were allowed to fall into an informal and more personalised 
language, more likely to represent their thoughts. This also gave them sufficient 
ease for digressing into stories and `grapevine' accounts that could be 
subsequently recycled as `vignettes'. 
4.7. Focus Groups 
Focus Groups were the only data collection activity organised through formal 
channels. One respondent informed me that the school where she had taken her A 
levels had two teachers who were particularly keen in discussing local issues. 
Some classes in this well-known school were completely composed of Pakistani 
pupils and the teachers agreed to allow me to run three focus groups in exchange 
for two lectures on crime. Two focus groups were composed by students of 
Pakistani heritage and one by white pupils. The scheme of work of the focus 
groups is reproduced in Appendix Four. Two students agreed of being interviewed 
in-depth one week after their focus group. 
All the focus groups were tape recorded and the students were given flip 
charts to develop their ideas in writing, but only the first two focus groups were 
transcribed and analysed through Nvivo. 
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The addition of focus groups to the set of methods of data collection was 
made necessary by the realisation that young teenagers would otherwise been 
difficult to interview. The delivery of a short lecture before each focus group had 
also the aim of helping the researcher and the participants to develop a mutual 
understanding in terms of the terminology used to describe deviance (see again 
Appendix four). 
4.8. Conclusion: ethical and safety issues 
The fluidity of the approach would not have allowed a coherent and fruitful use of 
`consent forms' for the interviews, but the ethics of the research emerged from my 
close involvement, as I would continuously be in contact with the research 
participants. Paradoxically, consent forms could have undermined the relationship 
of trust. The ethical practices of the research had to match the social and political 
context of the field. 
A great deal of flexibility had to be deployed in other contexts as well. For 
example, a number of conditions were set by some interviewees during meeting 
me. I contacted a man whose phone number was on a leaflet of an anti-drugs 
event; he referred me on to an older person who agreed to meet me to check if I 
was the kind of person his acceptance would have an interview with. urino a 
second meeting, the interview took place, and it was recorded both by me and the 
interviewee. Once my political views were exposed through an informal chat, I 
was actually overwhelmed with information and both written and audio material. 
Others asked to be given a list of questions beforehand in order to 
negotiate in advance what they would answer and which topics were off-limits 
(see appendix Three). This never led to a censorious action, but reading the 
questions seemed more a tactic to scan my beliefs and intentions to find out what I 
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was really getting at. Once the questions were positively sanctioned, nobody ever 
refused to answer a query. 
Given the emic standpoint of the thesis, the ethical grounds for the research 
were set according to the hints given by the informants. At the beginning of the 
fieldwork, some issues were presented to me by some informants with whom I 
was negotiating an interview: 
1. Bradford Pakistani Community is over researched and researchers either 
are not accurate and suit their needs in the writing up of their findings, or 
the results of the research are never disseminated amongst the interested 
subjects 
2. different researchers tend to speak with the same people ( the so-called 
community leaders) over and over again and some strata of the community 
are neglected (especially women) 
3. research tends to focus on tragic or problematic situations and the positives 
are overlooked as they do not lead to sensationalism 
In order to reassure the individuals who have generously contributed to the 
research that my findings will be re-invested in the communityg, I have 
collaborated with different grass roots organisations where my alleged `expertise' 
was required I organised lessons based on preliminary findings of the fieldwork in 
the school where the focus groups were organised. More broadly, `things were put 
back in the community' in less evident ways, such as lending material about 
Bradford to students who were writing relevant dissertations. This was important 
also in terms of triangulation of data. In December 2005, for example, I printed 
some research findings thanks to the Centre of Ethnicity & Racism Studies at 
Leeds University (Bolognani 2005). Those were circulated amongst most of my 
8 `Putting things back in the community' will later emerge as a clear discourse of reciprocity 
generally positively perceived by respondents (see 7.5.1). In the case of the researcher I found that 
a similar ethical concept could be applied. 
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research participants so that I could gain feed-back on my data analysis. In terms 
of triangulation, it seems important to highlight that often it was impossible to 
check some information given by interviewees, especially when names of 
criminals were denied. In spite of the danger to reproduce inaccurate or imprecise 
information, given the emic approach, perceptions of events rather than their 
realistic description, seemed to matter more to the ends of the present research. 
The second ethical issue seemed to be resolved through an effective 
sampling strategy. 
The issue about the supposed sensationalism of most Bradford based 
research seemed to me resolved by the original idea behind the thesis that together 
with the emic approach I wanted to focus on the agency of the community, and 
therefore my strategies implied an a-priori belief that the study population had the 
potential for a positive assertiveness towards its own future. 
As basic good practice, the researcher made sure that before engaging in 
any of the data collection activities, the aim of the research was clearly explained 
to the participants. Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed to all 
informants. As some interviews became possible only on the grounds of a very 
profound trust of the researcher (cf. Finch, cit. in Mason 1995: 201), during the 
analysis of transcriptions, where possible, such trust was valued by seeking feed- 
back from the informants whenever there was a doubt about the interpretation of a 
statement. 
Safety was a very important feature of participant observation. In the initial 
stages of the research, while I was establishing my research persona and building 
the `double exposure', I was particularly cautious in revealing details about myself 
and my research. Basic research precautions for fieldwork in settings where 
purdah is prominent were followed: unless in a public space I was never alone 
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with a male. Only once was I invited to a place where I felt my safety might have 
been at risk had the man I did not know before turned out to have a hidden 
agenda. Apart from this episode from which I disentangled myself without any 
problems, I never felt in danger, threatened or harassed at any moment of the 
fieldwork, even in situations where I was the only woman present and I was not 
necessarily complying with the traditional dress code of Muslim women (i. e. in a 
gym sauna). 
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Chapter Five 
History of Bradistan 
The city of Bradford is home to the largest Pakistani population outside of London 
and is widely referred to, satirically, as Bradistan (McLoughlin 2006b). As a post- 
industrial city with economic problems and such a high percentage of South Asian 
inhabitants, Bradford has been a centre of attention for debates on citizenship, race 
and class and violent disorders. 
This chapter will draw on the existing literature and on the author's 
findings collected in previous fieldwork (January-August 2002, Bolognani 2002) 
and follow the history of the city and its intersection with the Pakistani community 
since the early 1960s. The processes of settlement, survival through economic 
disadvantage and the emergence of political awareness will also be discussed. The 
account of the last fifteen years of violent episodes will be primarily addressed 
descriptively, but it will draw upon the most significant studies about the riots' in 
order to emphasize how deprivation, racialism and politics may have influenced 
urban tensions, outsiders' perceptions and the lives of the communities who inhabit 
Bradford. 
5.1. A `BrAsian' city 
To newcomers, Bradford is generally described as ruled by Pakistanis: 
First thing I was told when I moved here, my uncle he said to me: 
"Whatever you do, don't upset a Pakistani". I went: "Why? " He said 
to me: "They tend to be really violent here". I said: "Why? " 
"Because there are so many of them. They think they can do 
anything they want, kick off with a Bengali, with an English or 
1 Although the term 'riots' has been disputed by academia (Burlet and Reid 1996: 155), the public 
opinion recognizes such events under this label and, more importantly, 'riots' has been the charge 
applied to young men convicted in 2001. 
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whatever because they know all they need to do is to phone a few 
numbers and all their friends and family come to help. They have all 
the connections because they know all of them come from the same 
place [in Pakistan], (... )If you do [upset a Pakistani] run. Don't stay 
there because in five minutes you will have fifty of them" (Chilli, 
Bengali University student from Northampton, quoted in Bolognani 
2002) 
In reality, Pakistanis constitute no more than 19% of the nearly 500,000 
inhabitants (2001 Census), but the clustering is such that the inner city appears to 
visitors as mainly Asian2. Stressing the idea that the city is not Bradford any more 
but is instead Bradistan, may contribute to worsening the relations between 
communities: the African/Caribbean community, for instance, apparently feels 
neglected because of the prospect that Pakistani lobbying deprives them of the 
attention they seek towards their problems ( Singh 2002: 62; Harrison and Phillips 
2005: 196). However, the prominence of the `Asian' aspect is a reflection of the 
impact that South Asian Muslims have had on this Northern town. However, 
Bradford is also rich with descendants from various other nationalities: Indians, 
Bangladeshis, Italians, Polish, Ukrainians, Chinese, Germans, Afghanis, South 
Americans, Irish (Mawby and Batta 1980: 34; Siddique 1993: 18; Singh 2002: 17). 
Most of them were drawn to Bradford by the prospect of work in the textile 
industry. 
The first study of Bradford Pakistani men was published in 1974 by Dhaya. 
The object of the study was mainly related to residential patterns and community 
history since the 1960s (McLoughlin 2006b). Some of his observations were about 
2 Although in the Bradford district "Asian" is commonly used to indicate Pakistanis, in this thesis 
the term Asian will be used to indicate people who were born in South Asia or who descend from 
there. The term Indian will include Sikh and Hindus. When not specified, the term Pakistani will 
refer to Muslim independently of their sub-group (i. e. Pathan, Kashmiri, etc. ). The term Kashmiri 
will refer in particular to the people coming from the Mirpur District, who are the majority group 
within the Pakistani population of Bradford. 
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biraderi3-based support, the widespread suspicion about White people, the reasons 
for clustering and the lingering on of the myth of return (Bolognani 2007, 
forthcoming). 
In 1964, when Dahya started his research, the Pakistani population in 
Bradford was estimated at 12,000 (5.400 Mirpuris, 3.000 Chachchis, 1.800 
Western Punjabis, 300 Pathans, 1,000 from various parts of Western Pakistan and 
1.500 Sylhetis) (Dhaya: 1974). In the 1961 Census, only 3,457 Pakistanis4,1,512 
Indians and 984 African/Caribbeans were recorded. In 1970 the Pakistani 
population in Bradford was already estimated as 21,000 (ibid. ). 
The 1991 Census registered the Bradford population of South Asian descent as 
65,450 (14% of the city population). 48,900 of them are being regarded as 
Pakistani/Kashmiri. As such, Bradford became the second largest British urban 
centre for Pakistani concentration. The latest data (Phillips: 2001) show that in 
only a decade, the Asian population has grown to 94,520. Importantly, 73,900 of 
them are Pakistani/Kashmiri. 
Table 5.1 Asian population in Bradford from 1961 to 2001 
1961 1964 1970 1981 1991 2001 Census 
Census Figures Figures Census Census (Phillips: 
(Dahya: (Daliya: (Macey: (Phillips: 2001) 
1974) 1974) 2001) 2001) 
Number of 
Asians 3,457 12,000 21,000 46,720 65,450 94,520 
Percentage of 
Asians 1.1% 10.6% 14% 19% 
Number of 
Pakistanis/ 
... 5,400 ... 34,116 48,900 73,900 Kashmiris 
3 The extended family of agnatic descent (see 5.2). 
4 Until 1977, year of Bangladesh independence, the term Pakistanis includes Bengalis as well. 
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As far as single nationalities are concerned, Bangladeshis (mainly 
Sylhetis) compose the smallest significant identifiable sub-group within the Asian 
community (around 4,000 in 1991) and are distributed in the city with a pattern 
very similar to the Pakistani one, that is to say, they tend to cluster according to 
provenance. Nevertheless, there is no area where Bangladeshis are present in a 
percentage higher than 5% (Phillips 2001: 2). 
Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs, or Gujarati Hindus, have a very different 
location from Muslims in the geography of the town. These relatively small 
communities who once lived side by side with the Muslims, or even shared 
accommodation, are now moving to suburbs or to more heterogeneous areas 
(Ouseley 2001: 9; Singh 2002: 25). Ethnic clustering, self- or forced segregation 
are some of the themes that will recur in the thesis when arguments about the 
alleged insularity of Bradford Pakistanis will be put forward (cf. 9.3). More than 
80% of Pakistanis live in areas defined as affected by multiple deprivations, 
against 45% of Sikhs (Phillips 2001: 3). 
5.2. Ethnic disadvantage 
Having been one of the wealthiest parts of the country when the textile industry 
was at its peak, Bradford is now amongst the most deprived (Neighbourhood 
Statistics 2001). TUC researches have suggested that Asian unemployment in 
Bradford is the worst in the country (Singh 2002: 168). Businesses are suffering 
from the bad image and are considerably affected by crime (Bradford Chamber of 
S BY multiple deprivation we refer to a situation of disadvantage in more than one field: poor 
housing, overcrowded households, malnutrition, illiteracy, educational underachievement, 
unemployment, etc. The criteria used to measure these factors might be perceived in a different 
way depending on the background of the observer; for instance, a household perhaps might be 
defined as overcrowded more easily by a White British person rather than by a British Asian, but 
statistics use established UK official standards. 
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Commerce and Industry 2003). Social conflict in the former industrial centre is 
high due to several factors such as racial tension, wide spread economic 
disadvantage, drugs and criminal groups (WYP 2003: 14-15,17); the Pakistani 
population is often blamed by some of the local white working class for violence, 
crime (Webster 1995: 11), political corruption and periodic riots (Amin 2003: 461). 
For some the perpetuation of Asian models of living also affects an already 
precarious situation, brought about by the textile crisis of the 1970s (Webster 
1995). Other commentators focus their social analysis of the context on supposed 
Pakistani underestimation of education, different attitudes to consumption, 
marriages with partners sent from Pakistan and gender issues (Macey 2001). 
The 1991 Census revealed that the unemployment rate among Bradford 
Asian and African/Caribbean youth was amongst the worst in the country with 
one out of three young people from minority ethnic groups out of work, 
In education Bradford schools are apparently amongst the poorest 
performers in the nation, in terms of structural inadequacy, quality of teaching 
and truancy (Ouseley 2001: 13, Singh 2002: 172). 
Together with residential segregation, there is also a phenomenon of 
school clustering, and the situation in non-white schools is generally supposed to 
be the worst. 
In the educational sector many issues of Multiculturalism are challenged. 
We are speaking amongst others about language problems, different festivities, 
and lack of staff recruitment from ethnic minorities. More than 30% of primary 
school pupils speak English as a second, third or even a fourth language (Singh 
2001). The survival of the use of the original languages may be partly due to the 
fact that for a long time every year 60% of the marriages in the Asian community 
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were transcontinental (Darr and Morrell 198 8)6 and therefore one member of the 
family will speak their mother tongue with the children; children frequently only 
play with peers of the same cultural background and consequently tend not to 
speak English; most of their afternoon since the age of six is spent in Mosques 
where the Quran is not taught in English. 
In 2001 Muslim pupils attended school in only seven of the thirty Bradford 
wards (Lewis 2001); the 13 Asian councillors (out of 90 for the city as a whole) 
have been elected from these same wards. Nineteen First Schools, eight Middle 
Schools and three Upper Schools are attended by 90% of all the Muslim students 
(ibid. ). National statistics for examinations taken by 15 and 16 years olds indicate 
that while Indian children out-achieve white pupils - 54% getting five or more 
GCSEs at Grade A-C against 47% for whites in 1998 - the figures for Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi pupils are 29% and 33% respectively. This will be reflected in 
their occupational patterns (ibid.: 1). 
While clustering and general disadvantage have characterised the history 
of the Bradford Pakistani community, it seems important to highlight that 
economic and wider resistance strategies to general disadvantage have changed 
throughout the history of the settlement. 
5.3. The migration history 
In Bradford there is a paradigm of South Asian male migration recounted more or 
less in the same way in all households encountered by the present writer. 
Typically, a male member of the family would have been given a voucher to go to 
Britain and work in the textile industry. Men from the Mirpur region were 
6 More recent data are not available, but during fieldwork the impression was that a great number 
of marriages are still transcontinental. 
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prioritised in the distribution of such vouchers as compensation, agreed by the 
Pakistani government, for the loss of land as a result of the construction of 
Mangla Dam (for a deeper analysis of the consequences of the dam, see Kalra 
2000: 65). 
Once settled, individuals attracted relatives or friends over, organizing their 
journey and provided accommodation on their arrival. Through these processes 
financial remittances to the family or village increased, and when the original 
voucher had had to be topped up with family help, this was the occasion to 
reciprocate efforts. The migration system has been described as chain migration 
(Ballard 1990: 222; Shaw 1994: 39; I1ahi and Jafarcy 1999: 1). Chain migration is 
"the processes by which prospective immigrants learned of opportunities, were 
provided with passage money, and had initial accommodation and employment 
arranged through previous immigrants" (Macdonald and Macdonald 1962: 435). 
Such processes help explain why the Asian communities of Bradford are so 
homogenous in provenance: migration was based mainly on personal relations on 
which were built mutual help and support. Some informants recalled their fathers' 
experiences like this: 
After Second World War there was a lack of men in this country. 
England had a massive wool industry and needed cheap labour. Our 
grandparents came here to help them. (Sharukh, quoted in Bolognani 
2002) 
My grandfather fought in the Second World War [and stayed here]. 
Then, my father came over, and the rest. Bradford was famous for its 
mills. He wanted to make money and go back. Then he realized he 
could earn 15 or 20 times what he got in Pakistan [and stayed] (Sadiq, 
quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
My dad comes from Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and came here in the 
Fifties. He worked in Scotland and in the Midlands. (... ) He came 
through an agency, British people sponsoring British interests. (... ) He 
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brought a few relatives when he got established. In the Sixties, my 
mum came. (Amjad, quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
These stories sometimes carry a romantic attachment, as they seem built on the 
heroic motives of men leaving the homeland for an economic but somehow epic 
adventure (Werbner: 1980), although this experience was not totally new, as 
Pathans, Kashmiris and Bangladeshis apparently were traditionally travellers. 
My dad came on a boat in the late Sixties, not earlier. He had no 
money, the only thing he had was the clothes he was wearing. He used 
to be in the army, he was a male nurse and he had saved up [for the 
journey]. [All he] had [was] the name and the address of a person in 
Newcastle (Ronnie, quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
My father was from North West frontier in Pakistan. There was a very 
difficult climate in the Fifties and he decided to move to Karachi and 
Dubai. He was fifteen at the time. (... ) His leg needed to be amputated. 
His friend in Dubai had the same operation in England. (... ) My dad 
was a world famous tailor. He sent his brother on a scouting mission, 
just to see. (... ) My uncle came over in 1960, he did not know a word of 
English but he got by. He had an English girlfriend. When my dad 
came over, he kicked the girlfriend out, had his leg amputated and 
became the first textile merchant in Bradford. (Amir, quoted in 
Bolognani 2002) 
Nevertheless, the idea of the pioneer generation in Britain and the aura around 
what has been described as the `community of suffering' (Werbner 1980) carries 
consequences in the definition of an alleged generational gap today, a recurrent 
topic in the present research interviews (cf. 9.2) 
I think generally [elders] tend to think that our youth today they are 
out of hand because they don't have jobs. That is one of the most 
popular reasons. They haven't got jobs, they are bored, they want to 
cause troubles, that [is] why they do it. And they don't look upon [the 
younger generation] too greatly, the elder generation. They seem to 
think that if we had the hardship that they had in their times, then we'd 
be more.. . sort of responsible, more thoughtful 
in what we do, but we 
are only reckless, and thoughtless because we have more freedom, 
we've got more facilities available to us then they ever had in those 
times. I remember my father used to tell me he used to survive on 5 
pounds a week, that was his wage. And I could never survive on 5 
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pounds a day, never mind a week. But you see the time have changed 
and they strongly believe that because the times have changed we have 
been given... what's the word... more freedom and 
more... more... flexibility. (Zaara) 
The first waves of the migration could not build on any chain. Men at the time 
used to link up casually and move in together regardless of caste and provenance 
in order to minimize their expenses. It seems that the very first Indo-Pakistanis 
arriving in Bradford were a group of sailors who made their way from Hull in 
1941 and rented rooms from Polish families (Dhaya 1970; 1974). Today it is still 
possible to see traces of the once large Polish community in the area between 
Manchester Road and Little Horton Lane: their catholic church, the working 
men's club and a delicatessen. 
Slowly the Polish relocated and the Pakistanis pooled enough money 
together to buy their first houses. Bradford was still a textile capital, they were 
working long hours and did not waste their earnings. Importantly, their traditional 
informal system of non-interest money lending helped make their start on the 
property ladder possible (Siddique 1993; see also 6.2.2). 
With the purchase of the first buildings, an institution of mythical 
connotations was born: the bachelors' house (Werbner 1980). The era of these 
overcrowded basic houses is recalled by the first migrants as the golden era of 
the migration: the only rule seemed to be camaraderie. In the accounts of the 
people who lived in a bachelors' house there are extraordinary episodes of 
generosity; if a new arrival did not find a job straight away, he was maintained 
by the rest of the group even for up to one year; if a member of the family died in 
Pakistan, the men of the house would raise the money to send the relative home. 
These times might be seen as the ones when these men were happiest, when 
they maintained their traditional values and beliefs, apparently unspoilt by the 
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materialism of Western life, another recurrent theme in the fieldwork on which 
this thesis is based (see for example 8.3). 
The living conditions of such accommodation, however, were very poor: 
the eldest or the ones who had been in England for longer had their own beds, 
while the others used to share one ( the so called "warm bed") with whoever was 
on a different shift, but many slept on the floor or on two chairs put together 
(Siddique 1993: 20). 
The heterogeneity of provenance in bachelors' houses did not last long; 
different contingencies modified the orientation of migrants of different origins 
in different ways. For instance, Sikhs who had fled Pakistan after the blood 
events post-Partition (Ballard 1990: 226; Singh 2002: 24), decided to make 
England their new home and before any other ethnic group called their families 
over (Mawby and Batta 1980: 36). The same thing happened with the Punjabis 
expelled from East Africa. With women and children, bachelors' houses became 
unsuitable, although they survived for some time within the Pakistani 
community. Some observers have seen earlier family reunion of other Asian 
peoples as one of the reasons behind better economic achievements and 
integration patterns when compared to Bradford Mirpuris (cf. Singh 2001). 
With the arrival of families, the organization of the immigrants' areas 
changed considerably: halal meat shops, garment retailers, specialised green 
grocers and especially mosques and madrasas started flourishing. The first proper 
mosque (men originally prayed in a room of a house) was opened in 1959; in 
1969 there were six mosques in Bradford, growing to seventeen in 1979, and by 
19897 there were thirty four. 
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Although accurate data have not been produced, probably due to the problems in 
self-ascription, it is commonly known that most of the Pakistanis were from a 
relatively small and deprived district of Azad Kashmir called Mirpur, and this 
group is still the majority (McLoughlin 2006b). Other migrants were from 
Campbellpur district, in the Attock region. People from Attock are called 
Chachchis and are popularly seen as a sub-caste of Pathans. Pathans, who are not 
very numerous in Bradford, came from the North West Frontier, near Afganistan. 
The Punjabis of Bradford are mainly from Lyallpur (Faisalabad), Rawalpindi and 
Gujar Khan. Only it few are from urban areas. There is also a small community 
from Pakistani Gujarat (Mawby and Batta 1980: 36). These different ethnic 
origins still seem to play some role in social interactions and stereotypes 
circulating in Bradford (cf. 10.5). 
Anthropologists have argued that the rural origin of the migrant population 
has contributed in shaping chain migration and subsequent settlement. Ballard 
(2001), for instance, argues that the typical family organization of the Pakistani 
rural areas is characterised by an active solidarity that guarantees a better 
performance of an individual in a foreign land in terms of reciprocal moral and 
financial support. Furthermore, in the rural areas the common mentality suggests 
relying only on your own people and being suspicious of strangers. Trying to 
avoid borrowing money outside the family, living in a sober way and not relying 
on anyone but relatives seem parts of the rural Pakistani culture, especially the 
Mirpuri (see 5.1). 
Direct sources and relevant literature (Dhaya 1970; Anwar 1979) agree in 
depicting the first years of life in England as nostalgic of the homeland; men were 
hoping to return to their land and families as soon as they had built up some 
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capital to invest. England appeared as the land of sacrifice where no rest or 
pleasure should undermine the achievement for which the family in Pakistan had 
sent a man abroad. On the other hand, there were attempts to integrate; for 
instance, Siddique (1993: 25) describes Pakistani men who dismissed the 
traditional Muslim outfit in favour of jacket and tie and socialized with the 
indigenous opposite gender. 
Contacts with the relatives were kept constant through letters and pictures. 
Shaw (1988) argues that a difference in attitude came about when in 1962 a 
rumour spread that the United Kingdom wanted to restrict immigration laws. 
Apparently, Pakistani travel agents took advantage of the rumour to encourage 
more men to leave. Young children of 7-9 years old joined a father or an uncle 
and, sometimes, by claiming to be older, apparently entered the textile mills. 
Overall, however, children were systematically enrolled in local schools as 
education was generally seen as a good investment (Siddique 1993: 21). The 
Pakistani migrants felt that they had to make the most out of the last years of 
relatively easy immigration, and as a result some women followed their male 
family members. Some men who had attempted to return saw their business 
projects fail and came back to England The majority thought it better to stay, 
fearing that if they were not successful in Pakistan, they might have not be able 
to enter again. One informant described her father's experience in this way: 
My dad borrowed the money off my mother's side. My mum's dad 
had given him the land because he didn't want him to take his 
daughter away. (... )After two years he went back. He realised the 
money wasn't enough and came back again. Eventually my mum 
came over. Then I was born and they were trapped. (... ) My mum 
always says " he brought me here saying we would only stay for a 
few years" (Shazia, quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
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Collecting the money for the journey was not an easy task, especially if contacts 
with a textile mill had not been established in order to get a voucher. The ones 
who left for England were people who were not deprived. Most of them belonged 
to higher castes that had had better contacts through the army (and had been 
apparently the favourite groups to be recruited during the British Raj; Ballard 
1994) and usually were better off. 
Some informants confirmed the relative prosperity of migrants: 
My dad [and his relatives] they came from quite a small village. They 
didn't have to come. They were quite comfortable there (Amjad, 
quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
The first time I went back was two years ago, wanted to see the place 
where I was born. (... )I saw huts with dried leaves and mud. They 
were really poor people, they live there. It made me think. (Did your 
dad use to live like that? ) my family was better off than the ones in 
huts because they used to farm. (... )We are Raja7(Malik, quoted in 
Bolognani 2002) 
5.4. "From textile mills to taxi ranks" (Kalra: 2(00) 
In the 1970s, textile mills and related industries, such as engineering, were in 
difficulties. The textile industry had coped, in spite of obsolete machinery, partly 
because of the cheap labour provided by South Asian workers (Mawby and Batta 
1980: 33; Siddique 1993: 20; Amin 2003: 461). Nevertheless, not even the 
flexibility of the workers proved to be enough. 
Migrants who were making their way to England after exhausting 
interviews in migration offices in Pakistan would not be given category A visas 
any mores. 
7 Short form for 'Rajputs' one of the highest castes of landowners. 
H According to the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, category A visas were given to people 
who had been offered it job in the UK, category B to people with qualifications and category C to 
unskilled workers (Siddique 1993: 22) 
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By the 1970s, however, many Asian families had settled down. The 
working men who had been made redundant acknowledged the benefits of the 
welfare state, and some of them were able to build realistic expectations out of the 
education available to their children. In this context, most of the families decided 
to stay instead of returning to their homeland. In earlier study rare cases have been 
reported to the present writer of people trying their fortune back in Pakistan 
(Bolognani 2007b, forthcoming). 
Neither investment in Mirpur nor in Bradford was rewarded straight away. 
In Pakistan, lack of infrastructure to support ambitious business, bureaucracy and 
complicated family dynamics apparently undermined the success of courageous 
entrepreneurial attempts. In England, poor economic conditions meant tight 
competition between Asians and Whites for jobs, accommodation and other kinds 
of resources (Mawby and Batta 1980: 33; Singh 2002: 169). 
In 1959 Pakistanis in Bradford owned only five enterprises: two food stores 
with a butcher and three cafes. In 1966 there were 133 businesses owned by 
Pakistanis: 51 food stores and 16 cafes; in 1970 there were 260 amongst which 
were 15 private clubs and two bakeries (Dhaya 1974). In 1978 Pakistanis owned 
600 businesses (35% of which were in Manningham) (Aldrich et al. 1981). 
Some data collected in 1982 show that in Britain 18% of Asian men were 
self-employed, against only 14% of whites (Modood: 1996). This proportion is 
similar to Bradford's and shows that entrepreneurship is a likely outcome for Asian 
minorities. Instead of being a consequence of investing an already present capital, 
the aetiology of Asian entrepreneurship is much more complex (see 8.1). 
While between the 1970s and 1980s the demographic growth of the Asian 
population naturally required more and more specific shops, recession did not hold 
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back their economic development. Entrepreneurship was in fact a solution to what 
has been called "blocked upward mobility" (Aldrich et al. 1981). Furthermore, 
during recession, the Pakistani community was able to rely on resources that were 
not available to the white community: they widely took advantage of traditional 
interest-free credit options within the community (i. e. kameti, a system of credit 
rotation especially used by women, Shaw 2000; Werbner 2001). While English 
shops were closing down, Asian shops were being opened. Asian entrepreneurship 
was not only a symptom of assertiveness but seems to have been generated 
primarily by resistance to adversity. In businesses, mostly run by family, flexibility 
of workers and total commitment guarantee better outcomes and durability 
compared to the contemporary unstable condition of the British labour market. 
The success of the businesses in those years depended on the need for a 
specific market able to provide for the specific needs of the Asian community. The 
differentiation of the market kept the competition between English and Asian 
enterprises to a minimum for a long time and has also been seen as a factor 
enhancing segregation in the city (Aldrich et al. 1981). 
One evident change, like in other former textile cities in the North, was 
what has been captured in the phrase "from textile mills to taxi ranks" (Kalra 
2000). 
Pakistani-owned taxis are significant indicators of the economic history of 
the community. This is a very convenient occupation for men who still appreciate 
the value of tradition by performing all the duties of visiting family and friends, or 
who periodically return to Pakistan for several weeks, as Private Hire Companies 
can be flexible (Bolognani 2002). Sometimes the taxi licence is shared by 
relatives, so the same car can be on the road for more than one shift, driven by 
96 
more than one person. Taxi drivers seem to represent a substantial part of the 
`Asian economic niche' (see 8.1). At the same time, however, due to their mobile 
lives and relatively unsanctioned freedom, they appeared during the research as 
the occupational category more likely to be treated as a folk-devil (cf. 8.1). 
Perhaps the most famous Asian business sector in Bradford, however, is the 
catering industry; Bradford is often referred to as the UK's `Capital of Curry'. 
Importantly, attached to this industry are related activities such as specialised 
butchers and food import companies. However, this is only one of the industries 
that have flourished in Bradford as a result of Asian entrepreneurship. Recently, a 
new plan of regeneration for the city has been based on the BrAsian (McLoughlin 
2006b) identity of Bradford: a museum of spices and a public hall called `Casa 
Mela9' which is hoped will be the centre of the renewed city centre. The identity 
of Bradford, it seems, is now permanently bound to its strengthening Asian 
component 
5.5. Assertiveness, self-defence and political struggles in the 1980s 
While the Asian communities in Bradford were struggling to survive following 
the economic recession of the 1970s, the early 1980s saw the British National 
Party widely campaigning in West Yorkshire. The National Front opened the 
Yorkshire Campaign to Stop Immigration, and racial attacks and violent episodes 
increased. Asians were being blamed for the bad economic situation (Amin 2003: 
461) and some of them felt compelled to find alternative ways to resist and defend 
their community. 
In 1981 the police at-rested twelve teenagers (later to become known as the 
`Bradford Twelve') who were putting together home-made bombs, apparently for 
9 'Mcla' is the Indian term for 'fair', from the hindo-european root 'ml' (to meet). 
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the purposes of self-defence (Murphy 1982; Singh 2002: 27; McLoughlin 2006b). 
At the same time the Asian community found itself once again cohesive in spite of 
internal differences; they built a strong lobby to persuade the council to provide 
halal meat in schools (Siddique 1993: 162, Singh 2002: 27). 
Between 1982 and 1984, Bradford was on the front pages of national 
newspapers through the so called Honeyford affair. Honeyford was the 
headmaster of the Drummond Middle School in Manningham, one of the areas 
with the highest concentration of Muslims. Honeyford published a series of 
articles against the multicultural position of the City Council. In an article which 
appeared in the Times Education Supplement, he accused the Pakistani 
population, according to Siddique's (1993: 168) and Kureishi's (1996) 
reconstruction, of having a genetically hereditary lack of democratic knowledge. 
If these racist views were not enough, some crucial passages from the Salisbury 
Review were translated into Urdu in the Yorkshire Post (Singh 2002: 35) and they 
had such publicity in the Muslim community that many of the families felt as if 
they had been challenged in their izzat. Subsequently, an alliance between Muslim 
families, left Labour and Socialists compelled Ray Honeyford to retire. 
The Honeyford affair has been regarded by some interested in the political 
history of Bradford as a turning point for the participation of the Asian 
community in public democratic life. Mirpuris in particular, who successfully 
mobilised against Honeyford, realised their capacity to apply pressure even 
without involving other Asian groups. The council for Mosques opened in 
1981and quickly gained recognition in the city by participating in a variety of 
political campaigns; its members took part in the first attempts to free Lumb Lane 
from prostitution by organising petitions (Siddique 1993: 119). 
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5.6. The Rushdie affair and vigilantism 
After the awakening of political awareness during the Honeyford Affair, there was 
another event which marked a turning point in the way the Pakistani community 
perceived itself in the city-the Rushdie affair. 
In January 1989 a group of Pakistani men publicly burnt a copy of The 
Satanic Verses (Samad 1992; Siddique 1993; Lewis 2002; Singh 2002; Herbert 
2003). The Local W. H. Smith was forced to remove the book from its shelves and 
even today Bradford University Library only gives access to a copy after the 
completion of a form; the subject is still considered sensitive. 
The promoter of the public outcry was the Council of Mosques, the same 
institution that had coordinated the upheaval against Honeyford and had been 
commonly perceived (Lewis 2002; Singh 2002: 41) as a major example of good 
will in Bradford race relations matters. 
The absence of a blasphemy law covering the Muslim faith became the 
focal point of the protest (Herbert 2003) and heated debates in the city lasted 
until they were absorbed in 1990 by issues surrounding the war in Iraq. In this 
tense atmosphere, somewhat like that of post - September 11`h 2001, Bradford 
Muslims became victims of physical attacks and prejudice (Samad 1992). It 
seems that the popularity of and the reliance on the Council of Mosques grew 
sharply. While the few Asian councillors were perceived as too diplomatic, the 
Pakistani community saw in the Council their principal defendant. Samad argues 
that, thus, a pseudo-religious revival got started. In fact, religion was in some 
sense a political issue and a means of cohesion, as the number of people 
regularly attending mosques did not undergo any change: 
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The Youth were resorting to Islamic idioms and metaphors to express 
their discontent against society which refused to accept them on an 
equal footing. Symbolically this was epitomised by their exclusion 
from the Yorkshire Cricket Club, despite being excellent cricketers 
who were born and bred in Bradford (Samad: 1992: 516) 
Samad also reports about some young people lobbying the council of Mosques - 
willing to create continuity with the younger generation- not only to condemn the 
war on Iraq, but also to support Saddam Hussein. It was clear that none of these 
positions were seen favourably by the majority of the city, and political success 
on these matters naturally was impossible. 
Together with the pseudo-religious revival, Herbert (2003) has pointed 
out how important it is to contextualize the Rushdie affair in the Mirpuri cultural 
locality. Herbert argues that Bradford Muslims, with what is considered by many 
as almost worship of the Prophet as almost a deity, were particularly affected by 
the `lampooning' of his person in the book. 
While the Honeyford affair was a political matter relating to 
multiculturalism and citizenship, the Rushdie Affair and its continuation for 
some participants into the support of Saddam Hussein became a stimulant for 
religious radicalisation. 
One informant synthesised this process in these words: 
It is a logical step to become radical as a Muslim in the West 
(Amjad, quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
One of the main manifestations of public actions based on or at least articulated 
through religion was the eight week violent struggle in 1995 against prostitution in 
Manningham, followed in the summer by the riots. 
The 1995 riots were the climax of something that had been building up 
since the elections in the spring. The electoral campaign in the Asian areas was 
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characterised by contests imported from Kashmir. Even the younger generation 
got involved, and groups of young men organised noisy public manifestations in 
the streets shouting "Jat" or "Gains", depending whether they were supporting the 
candidate of one caste1° or the other (Vine 1997). In Pakistan, this is the way 
electoral campaigns are conducted (Samad 1992), but it may have contributed to 
creating a climate of unease in the city. 
At the same time, a group of residents, including whites, started patrolling 
the streets in order to prevent prostitution. Soon a religious group monopolised the 
campaign. The clamour for action led to other men joining in the campaign and it 
was soon transformed into something else, as described by Bradford-born, novelist 
Alam: 
(... )Manningham [is] a pretty quiet part of town, compared to what 
it used to be a few years before. The locals, mostly fanatical 
Muslims (words from the press, not me) set up little petrol squads 
which chased out prostitutes and dealers (... ). And when I say 
chased, that's just what I mean: ran them out, with bats, petrol 
bombs and God knows what else. (Alam 2002: 123) 
The action lasted eight weeks. As the campaign had started by referring to the 
necessity of changing Manningham into an area more compatible with Islamic 
values and customs, the religious idioms were taken over by the ones who had 
joined later and resorted to violence. Many older men, although taken aback by 
such action, struggled to condemn the degeneration of the campaign because of its 
Islamic connotations. After rediscovering their Muslim identity in the Rushdie 
Affair, the younger generation tried it out as a powerful cohesion device, as a 
source of pride and satisfaction (Macey. 1999a, 1999b) 
The riots took place between 9th and 11th June 1995. Around 300 young 
British Pakistanis attacked the `Cop Shop' on Toller Lane and non-Muslim shops, 
10 The author is aware of the controversial use of `caste' in Pakistani studies. However, the use of 
this term in the present research reflects the one made by research participants. 
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looted and got hold of petrol bombs. At the end of the riots, the action was 
reconstructed (Allen 1996; Singh 2002: 43) the starting point was traced to a 
rumour about police attacking a Pakistani woman and her child and the running 
over of a Pakistani man. Further investigation (Allen, 1996; Macey: 1999a, b) 
showed that police had only intervened to suspend a street football match that had 
appeared to be becoming violent. When the police were insulted as a response to 
their intervention, the tense atmosphere and the prejudice which had built up in the 
few months earlier exacerbated the situation. Rumours circulated and stirred a 
protest not addressed to any specific target. Some Pakistani women tried a 
mediation in the streets between the police and the men ready to riot (with the 
experience gained after the guerrilla action against prostitutes), but unsuccessfully. 
There is a belief nowadays in Bradford that police tend to disregard many 
ambiguous behaviours of Pakistanis, because they have experienced how easily a 
riot can begin even from an innocent intervention of theirs, but this is countered by 
perceptions of `over-policing' and complaints about discriminatory stop and search 
(see 12.5). 
Subsequent interpretations noted the lack of preparation of the police and 
bias of the council (Taj 1996). The Conservative government refused to invest 
money in a public inquiry and Bradford itself was able to produce documents 
which were not cohesive and ended up being published separately (Taj 1996; 
Macey 1999a; Singh 2002: 46). 
5.7. The climax of tension: 2001 
Between 1995 and 2001 Bradford's smaller police stations were attacked a couple 
of times and periodically small groups of young Pakistanis confronted the police. 
The national press had overlooked such incidents and the outburst of the 2001 riots 
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surprised British public opinion. Bradfordians, however, had seen the escalation of 
violence and some were in a way prepared for it. In spring 2001, a commission 
chaired by Sir Herman Ouseley had started working on the report that was 
launched just after the riots in July. 
The Bradford riots had been preceded by a series of events in Northern 
England that had put the police on the alert (see disorders in Lidget Green, 
Bradford, Leeds, Burnley and Accrington, Lancashire, and Oldham, Macey 2002; 
Bagguley and Hussain 2003b). On 7`h July 2001, after a public Anti-Nazi league 
rally against the BNP (who had threatened to march on Bradford, but had been 
banned by the local authorities) the worst riots in 20 years on English soil took 
place (Macey: 2002). The rioting went on for two days in the Manningham 
area' land cost Bradford council 23 million pounds and the Policel0 million 
pounds (ibid. ). 
The 2001 riots seem to differ from the past as there was no clear collective 
political agenda behind it and it was mixed with organised looting and stealing 
(see Khalil's quote below). The political demands implied but not articulated with 
the same force as in the previous 1980 and 1995 episodes were that police should 
have defended the territory from the BNP/NF: 
[The rioters] were really pissed off with the police because the police 
took their [BNP] sides rather than ours, rather than moving them out, 
they moved us out... as if.. . these were outsiders, they should 
have got 
rid of them first, they shouldn't have allowed them to come12 (Jamal) 
1' Manningham was the centre of 1995 and 2001 riots and its history and demography has made it a 
popular setting for research and media accounts of Bradford problems. Locals strongly believe that 
a serious postcode discrimination is implemented against people from Manningham (Harrison and 
Phillips 2003: 200). Manningham is one of the most deprived areas of Bradford with 32% 
unemployed compared to the 10% average of West Yorkshire (Phillips 2001). Amongst the young 
Manningham Pakistanis the situation is even worse and unemployment is calculated as around 45% 
(ibid. ). 
12 This seemed to be the general perception. However, the police publicly declared that 
four NF 
members arrived at Bradford Interchange station and were sent back from that very platform 
(Bagguley and Hussain 2003c) 
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A clash between the young men and the police materialised in the absence of the 
real target, the BNP/NF. The Pakistani community, however, seemed to be united 
in its condemnation: most of the elders condemned the events and it is said that 
many denounced the young people who had taken part in it (Macey 2002) when 
pictures of more than 150 rioters or alleged rioters were published (Bagguley and 
Hussain 2003b). However, a feeling of double standards in terms of sentencing 
prevailed, and in 2005 it was more popular amongst Bradford Pakistanis to 
observe a feeling of indulgence for the rioters: the 2001 riots seemed to gain a 
more rounded political status after their occurrence. Had it not been for the harsh 
sentencing, the condemnation of the actions of the few young men may have 
lasted longer. The majority went to prison and the harsh sentences they served 
were widely criticised: 
These young lads only wanted to go looting (... ) but what about 
these football hooligans? How comes they are not in for 3/4 years? 
(Amir, quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
The harsh sentencing was perceived as discriminatory against minority ethnic 
groups (Kalra 2003), as a result, on coming out of prison the young men were not 
ostracised by the community and some were even praised: 
My sister was just telling me that one of her friends', her brother just 
got released from prison, not because of the riots, but because of 
something else, and on the same day there was this other boy who 
had been released because of the riots, and their family, they ordered 
a limousine and they had like quite a lot of music, and happiness that 
he had come out of prison. But they made a big show about it! 
(Laughs) It was this idealising way, that you took part in a racial 
thing... fighting for your own territory. (Fatima) 
In 1995 the lack of policing in areas inhabited mostly by Pakistanis and the 
perception of police racism were some of the causes of the riots. Locally, the 
institution of the Minority Police Liaison committee guaranteed a better exchange 
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between minority ethnic groups and the police. Nationally, the publication of the 
MacPherson Report (1999), with the recognition of Institutional Racism, dictated 
new guidelines and focused public attention on the police. The recognition of 
minority ethnic groups and their needs became paramount. The 2001 riots seem to 
have been organised on a different premise. Most of the community was not 
behind the young men who participated in the violence. Collective rights were not 
part of the discourses used by most of the rioters when speaking about their 
experiences: 
Jamal: The people I know who were in the riots, they said'we were just 
having a laugh'... their intentions was to get past the police, go into 
town, break into shops, get all the design clothes for themselves, keep 
them or sell them, this is all they wanted to do. 
Me. You imply there was no link with the threat of the BNP? 
Jamal: That was an excuse. The first guy who got slashed by the BNP13 
lives around here and I was chatting with him yesterday and the guy 
who has come out from prison was there as well, it was the three of us. 
Basically he said.. . the riots was because of the BNP and the BNP 
shouldn't have been there, (... ) so it was a bit of both ... a laugh and the BNP. 
Causation may not adequately be explained by thinking in terms of a response to 
a pattern of social exclusion and discrimination linked to racist governmental 
practices, but rather in terms of a multiplicity of local factors (such as long term 
cultural, educational and material deprivation, see 4.2) and grievances with local 
police accumulated over a number of years. 
Numerous racist attacks against Asians took place after the riots as a 
punishment for the 7`h July disorders. 
Below there are two reports about the event: the first by a member of the 
Anti-nazi League, the second from a young man who was not present but whose 
best friends were involved and claims to know exactly how things developed: 
13 This refers to a racist attack carried out by a white man on a Pakistani man in the early afternoon 
of the first day of the riots. The perpetrator's membership to the BNP has not been confirmed. 
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They all blame young people and the Anti nazi league and individuals 
like myself. (... ) if anything actually gave that the publicity... the fact 
that there was violence... they reported it much more because of the 
violence... Like in Prague, like in Genoa 14 (... ) they had to start (... ) it 
was perfect and that's what happened in Bradford (... ): for the whole 
day was tense (... )we got Mps, pop stars, nobody talks about that, 
nobody talks about the fact that there was no violence between 
midday and half past four(... ) (... )I think it was a bit of fun once the 
riots had happened. (... )The police, they portrayed it as if 700 
people[from BNP] had turned up in Bradford and were attacked by an 
Asian mob, the whole day wanted a riot. You have to look at Genoa 
with Fini15 visiting all the police stations(... ) something very similar 
happened in Bradford. They know how to provoke Asian youth, 
15/16/17 years olds kids. But I tell you what if we need 15/16 years 
olds(... ) to stop the National Front and the BNP from doing what they 
did in Oldham and Burnley we'll do it again. (... ) I won't condemn 
the young people for the violence because it is far too simplistic to 
condemn them. (... )The bourgeoisie politicians who equipped the 
police with stone guns(... ) gas and rubber bullets(are to blame)We are 
not the problems! I get a bit worked up ... I 
just think newspapers are 
full of too much crap and all it is to bring down Asians (Shahid, 
quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
Khalil: We get searched whenever they want 
Me: Is it because of September 11th or the riots? 
Khalil: I feel it has more to do with the riots, do you get what I mean? 
(... ) I've got plenty of friends who were there. (... )My mates just say 
shit happens, it's just one of them things, innit ?I was abroad, when I 
came back I said "Wow, I should have been here". (.. ) After that white 
people in white areas smashed up Asian shops and restaurants. Lot of 
my mates got 4-5 years just to throw three stones. (... )[The ones who 
stole the cars]took the cars first, no number plates... what can you say 
shit happens. Them people who were trying to sell them were White 
and Jamaicans. The pakis got shafted, all the rest [enjoyed] free shops 
you could get what you wanted and nobody said anything. (... )(If I 
had been there) I would be a millionaire now. (Khalil, quoted in 
Bolognani 2002) 
Between 2001 and 2002 Bradford was in the limelight when major political 
changes were occurring both in Europe and on a global level. While the debate 
about the civic loyalty of Muslims was developing in Britain following the riots, 
14 Where in that year manifestations organised by the Seattle Movement ended up in violent 
confrontations with the police. In Genoa, 20 years old Carlo Giuliani was shot dead by a police 
man. 
15 Gianfranco Fini at the time was the leader of the Italian post fascist party, Alleanza Nazionale. 
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the world was struck by September 11`h. In spring 2002, in France, Le Front 
National with its candidate Le Pen won second place after Chirac in the national 
elections, increasing the fears of fascism that had stirred the riots in Northern 
England eight months before. 
5.8. Local and Global: Bradford post 11th September 
Bradford in 2001 was struggling to reduce the national stereotypes about the city 
that seem to be perceived as mainly related to its Pakistani community. At the 
same time, a series of problems connected with crime had served only to reinforce 
the general perception of a `degeneration' of inner-city life. In 2002 Bradford had 
been given the name `Capital of Heroine' (Apaxton 2002). Although there are no 
data that screen the ethnic proportion of the criminals, Asian areas of residence 
are widely affected by the phenomenon (ibid; Careers Bradford 2002: 3). Drugs 
are one of the main problems and the police have taken up a zero-tolerance 
strategy to break the dealing business (WYP 2004). In 2001 and 2003 the 
Bradford Chamber of Commerce and Industry conducted an independent crime 
survey among its members as well as responding to the one distributed by the 
British Chamber; the results show that all five priorities outlined by the 
respondents in order to improve their business regarded the fight against 
deprivation and crime control (BCCI 2003). 
Although in Bradford there is little official evidence of a significant Pakistani 
share in drug related business or in drug consumption, the city seems to have been 
victim of a moral panic that regards Pakistanis as the main agents of trafficking 
and selling (Webster 1996; Macey 2002). Emphasis on the alleged self-segregation 
of communities (Phillips 2001), their `otherness' (Alexander 2004) and the 
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international climate of suspicion affecting Muslims (Grillo 2004) have all 
contributed to a moral panic about British Pakistanis in general and Bradford 
Pakistanis in particular. 
As we have seen in this chapter, since the Eighties with the Bradford Twelve 
episode, the Honeyford case, the Rushdie affair, and then the 1995 disturbances 
and the 2001 riots, the Pakistani community in Bradford has presented an image 
of assertiveness. But, at the same time, forms of unconventional protest have 
contributed to the racially motivated moral panic present in this northern city 
(Samad 1992; Herbert 2003). Various cases of violence have taken place in the 
last twenty years which have been viewed as political acts or as self-defence 
(Mawby and Batta 1980: 18). Asian Vigilantism was a turning point in 
territorialisation and the process of acquisition of a local identity (Webster 1999: 
549,551; Alexander 2000: 4), but has been misread as the change in reliability on 
law-abiding Asians (Alexander 200: 8,128; Kundnani 2002). Visibility of 
territorialism, and `spectacularisation' of particular events like the public 
disturbances have given a bad image to the Pakistani community (Webster 1997). 
It is the intent of this thesis to investigate to what extent the crime issue is 
affecting the Bradford Pakistani Community and how it is tackled by all 
generations in terms of prevention, social sanctions and reintegration of the 
criminals. This reflection may benefit from a contextualisation into the diasporic 
history of the community, as the level of general integration may also be 
measured in terms of patterns of deviance, as Alam sarcastically states: 
I'd come across ignorant racists in my time and the ones on the drugs 
scene sounded no different. For these people, pakis took their jobs, 
their women, their shops, their homes, and now, pakis were in on their 
criminal activities. Us pakis, we had this habit of taking one liberty 
after another (... )Fucking losers couldn't even work out why they 
were so shit at what they did. (Alam 2002: 70) 
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Chapter Six 
Ethnic resources and networks in the Bradford Pakistani Community 
Chapter Five described the history of the settlement of Pakistanis in Bradford. 
This chapter will provide an analysis of the elements that may justify the use of a 
singular noun to refer to the Pakistani community. Although the author is very 
conscious of the number of different provenances, castes, religious sects that may 
lead some to think that there is no justification for the use of a singular term to 
describe the community, it will be argued that an exclusive history, a broad 
cultural reference and the outsiders' un-nuanced representation is mirrored in the 
interviewees' own use of `community' rather than `communities'. Both Saifullah 
Khan (1976b) and Imtiaz (2002, cf. 3.5) have made a point out this. The latter 
argues that hegemonic representations of Muslim youth during the Rushdie affair 
were internalised and re-elaborated for the production of self-representation; the 
former, more broadly, argues: 
Contact with non-Pakistanis who tend to classify minorities according 
to nationality, colour or some notion of "Race" influences the self- 
perception of the individual concerned, particularly when and if the 
connotations are derogatory. This external definition, and the 
accompanying behaviour influence the development of a minority. 
(... )The external definition of the majority is indicated in the persistent 
use of such terminology as "The Pakistani Community" in the society 
at large, in the media and, most significantly in the field of community 
relations. (Saifullah-Khan: 1976b: 104) 
This chapter will therefore explore the heterogeneity and at the same time the 
consistency of the Bradford Pakistani community, providing the description of the 
main cultural and social elements that will be functional to the social control 
analysis of the following chapters. At the same time the analysis will show how at 
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the present stage in Bradford adaptation leads to some major internal changes. 
Throughout the chapter a particular focus will be placed on family, its `moral 
economy', the social specificity of biraderi and the debate designated `religion vs. 
Culture'. 
6.1. The role of family in the settlement 
Anthropologists have argued that the scale and the success of the Mirpuri 
migration can be satisfactorily explained only by taking into consideration their 
traditional family structure (Saifullah-Khan 1974; Ballard 2001). In fact, external 
circumstances such as the distribution of vouchers after the construction of the 
Mangla Dam (cf. 5.3) would have not been successfully taken advantage of unless 
there was a supportive network sustaining the migrant. For example, the family 
cooperated in pooling extra money together for contingencies, in looking after the 
wife and the children of the migrant and in guarding properties. 
The importance of the Kashmiri family system imported to Britain has 
been considered as paramount also for the development of entrepreneurship 
(Metcalf et al. 1996; Ballard 2001), for the urban segregation of communities 
(Alder, Cater et al. 1981; Phillips 2001; Singh 2003) and the choices about 
education and careers (Shaikh and Kelly 1989; McLoughlin 1998a; Shaw 
2000). On the other hand, the family has gone through changes and has adapted to 
the social environment. 
6.1.1 The `moral economy of kin' 
Analysing the various elements that compose cultural capital in the Bradford 
Pakistani community will underlie the basis for the evaluation of whether there is 
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a form of cultural capital that may prove successful in the economy of crime 
prevention. Values such as internal solidarity and rules of reciprocity appear to be 
consistent with the definition of cultural capital by Bourdieu as `symbols, ideas 
and preferences as they have been consciously or unconsciously transmitted and 
accumulated in order to inform individual actions' (1986: 245). 
The family was important for many reasons: for chain migration, for 
finding jobs, for buying the house- kameti1, no interest loan. Family is 
finishing now. Also, the family had a role in education: people 
compare their children's careers. In all this marriage, family play a 
very important role, as without it people would have struggled to get 
married (Umar) 
In these instances, cultural capital has proved profitable (Bourdieu 1986: 241), as 
it has been converted in the `economic capital' (ibid. ). 
Understanding the family structure and its gender underpinnings may help 
to highlight some dynamics of discourses about family based crime prevention in 
part III (for example 9.2 and 11.1). The main question to be answered is whether 
traditional kin groups may be able to successfully translate their cultural/moral 
capital in a way adequate to a current British urban environment. 
Families' settlement in Bradford only occurred in a second phase of 
migration. Unlike many other migrant populations, the Mirpuris started their 
relocating adventure as only men (cf. 5.3). Furthermore, while nowadays part of 
female migration from South America and other Asian countries is stimulated by 
a need in private care for female workers (Williams 2001: 486), in 1960s UK there 
was not a high demand for women in private care, while the textile industry was 
still requiring a cheap workforce. More than anything else, as the honour (izzat) of 
the women in Mirpur is a priority because it affects the reputation of the entire 
1 'kameti' or 'committee' is an informal mode of credit rotation. 
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extended family (Afshar 1989: 214), sending them abroad to work in promiscuous 
environments would have been putting the whole of family honour in jeopardy. It 
has also been suggested that some families did not wish to encourage women to 
join their husbands in order to incite their return (Saifullah-Khan 1974). As 
families were concerned about physical and moral safety of their women (see also 
7.4 and 11.1.1) and the living conditions of the up to then transient men were not 
appropriate and comfortable for women, Mirpuri women did not come to England 
straight away. They also arrived much later than some other spouses, for example 
Sikhs, who joined their husbands with the intention of settling and staying after 
the traumas of Partition (Singh 2001). Saifullah-Khan (1974) again reports 
informants' tales of Mirpuri women sent to England once gossip reached villages 
that men were seeing English women and spending their money on them. At this 
point biraderis (extended family) sent their wives abroad (vilayat) to remind them 
of their obligations. 
Once the women arrived, the bachelors' houses (see 5.3) changed into 
family houses. Properties were rented and bought around the mills where the men 
had temporarily settled. Families started transforming the alien environment into 
something more familiar. 
Informants from previous study by author (Bolognani 2002) state that as 
the banks were reluctant to start mortgage procedures with Pakistanis, and Islam 
discouraged them from dealing with money lending unless interest-free, they 
chose to pool money together and start buying the cheapest houses around the 
mills where they worked. As previous migrants or white people were moving out 
of inner city areas (Singh 2002), they were able to buy houses close to each other 
and establish a setting in some respect similar to the villages back home. 
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In rural Kashmir, families belonging to the same biraderi live in houses 
attached to each other. As well as being a way to maximise collaboration and 
defence, such a building strategy allows the women to move freely among related 
households. The division of the living quarters is an effective image to help 
understand the gendered roles in the Mirpuri family. In Mirpur, men are normally 
taking care of the external world and the family connections to it; they lead a 
social life that goes beyond the home walls and their reputation and honour is 
expected to be constructed or challenged in the public sphere, in contrast with 
women's domain in the private sphere (cf. Gilmore 1987; 1990). 
Women are however generally in charge of certain matters within the home 
walls (Saifullah-Khan 1974; Afshar 1994; Wardak 2000; Ballard 2001). They are 
generally meant to be the principal educators of the children as far as behaviour 
and values are concerned (Afshar 1994), and at the same time they seem to be the 
most responsible for the family honour (izzat). 
In 9.2 and 11.1 family and children upbringing will emerge as one of the 
most important variables of crime prevention strategies according to research 
participants. In 8.2 family will be mentioned as an economic shock absorbent 
providing an informal welfare system in times of hardship. Women seem to play a 
very important role in the administration of the family `moral economy'. They 
also seem to be supposed to contribute in an essential way to the perpetuation of 
ethnic resources and networks. Women not only are socially constructed as 
markers of the community for the way they behave or implement traditions of 
honour and purity, but also are the main transmitters of cultural values to their 
children (Afshar 1994; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1996; Archer 2001: 97). In 
114 
particular, women are the main izzat carriers. Izzat2 is situationally translated as 
family `honour', `reputation'. `face-saving' and `prestige': 
Amrit Wilson (1978) reports Izzat to be more than honour or self- 
respect, it is "sometimes plain male ego. It is a quality basic to 
emotional life ... It is essentially male but it is women's lives and 
actions which affect it most. A woman can have izzat but it is not her 
own, it is her husband's or her father's. Her izzat is a reflection of the 
male pride of the family as a whole. [What is more] saving her izzat 
(and through her own izzat) is perhaps the greatest responsibility for 
her parents or guardian" (Afshar: 1989: 214) 
How a woman manages her izzat can consequently be considered as an indicator 
of her family's status, their socio-economic position and their moral values. 
Izzat is a pillar of the social life of rural Pakistan. The role played by a 
family in a community is strictly linked to its reputation (Lutz 1991: 129) and 
reputation may be strictly linked to the concept of reciprocity (Chaudhary 
1999: 68). The importance of reciprocity or the diasporic version of `putting things 
back into the community' will be discussed in 7.5.1. The question of honour is 
therefore typical of closely knitted gemeinschaften3 and appears to be more the 
consequence rather than the cause of isolation (Ibid. ). Bradford Pakistani 
communities, being still very `face-to-face', seem to continue to be largely 
regulated by izzat. As one interviewee put it: 
What happens in the Asian culture itself, it depends ALL on your 
family background. It is... my opinion, I am not suggesting... but it is 
my own opinion. It all depends on how your family is, how you've 
been brought up, how your ancestors... it goes back... you know, it is 
the entire family, the way they were (Jamil) 
2 Chaudhary (1999: 64) considers three types of 'shame': izzat ('prudery or consciousness of what 
constitutes shame'), haya ('inner modesty') and ghairat ('successful defence of honour and 
women'). In the fieldwork and in the diasporic literature review this author has only encountered 
the term izzat that seems to include both haya and ghairat. 
3 For the difference between gemeinschaften (community) and gesellschaften (society) see 
Tonnies, F. (1887) Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, Leiptig, Fue's Verlag 
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Later in the thesis it will be investigated if izzat had an influence on criminal 
behaviour, in deterrence or in social control (see 11.1 and 11.2). 
6.2 Definition of biraderi 
Kinship amongst Bradford Pakistanis is thoroughly constructed on the biraderi 
structure, as it is in rural Punjab, Azad Kashmir and the Attock District, where 
most families come from. The definition of biraderi has been considered a 
complicated matter and is still controversial; a digression that explains practically 
what its role is seems to be necessary as the term is considered to be very flexible. 
According to Anwar (1979), biraderi derives from the Persian word baradr, 
brother, and indicates a group of men who recognize descent from a common 
ancestor. Rather than a static and rigid unit, however, the biraderi should be seen 
as a system of alliance as often it includes men who virtually join because of a 
specific merit towards a family or special friendship. In biraderi inclusion, blood 
relations are ideal but not crucial. Wardak, quoting Wakil (1979) synthesizes the 
combination of kinship and affinity in biraderi in this way: the biraderi "is 
generally an endogamous group of individuals who consider themselves related to 
each other (... )(my emphasis)". Relations considered as if based on blood ties, but 
not so in reality have been called biraderi of recognition (Saifullah-Khan 
1974: 44), of participation (ibid: 230) or effective biraderi (Wardak 2000), that 
however are invented terms not used by non-scholars. In theory, the biraderi 
should not cross caste, but esogamic4 marriages do occasionally take place in 
Pakistan and are increasing in Britain (Shaw 2000). 
° Literally: "out of one's group". It can refer to interethnic marriages but in this case to cross-caste 
ones. 
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Loyalty and attachment to biraderi are considered to be particularly crucial 
values in Mirpuri moral economy; non-Kashmiri groups in Bradford claim that 
the 'MPs" (derogatory nickname for Mirpuris) lobbies take over most of the 
enterprises and make opportunities rare for others (Bolognani 2002) and such clan 
attachment plays a major role in the outsiders' definition of the Mirpuri as 
backward (McLoughlin 1998a: 97). Sometimes the loyalty within the biraderi is 
sarcastically described as Mafia (see 10.4), as again exemplified by the novelist 
Yunis Alam: 
This was a kin thing, a fucking biraderi thing, an OUR mother-fucking 
thing that I wanted no part of. We were worse than the fucking Mafia 
when it came to those troublesome family matters. (... ) One thing that 
got me was how all these people were the same. Either they were 
relatives, or people who lived in the same village in Pakistan. Most of 
all, there was this caste thing going off, and that was what really got 
me thinking. (Alam 1998: 92) 
As well as being the main network of help and support, the biraderi is also a 
controlling unit; an informant described the influence that biraderi control and 
its "politics" had on his family in this way: 
Sadiq: I don't like living in Manningham, there's too much Pakistani 
politics. 
Me: What did you mean by Pakistani politics? 
Sadiq: My sister was restricted. She went to upper school and then she 
didn't do anything else because of relatives saying "She shouldn't do 
this, she shouldn't do that"(... ) A lot depends on the elder members of 
the family. The majority of my relatives live around me (quoted in 
Bolognani 2002) 
Social studies acknowledging biraderi (Saifullah-Khan 1974; Anwar 1979; 
Werbner 1989; Chaudhary 1999; Shaw 2000; Akhtar 2003) and direct observation 
conducted by the author in the Pakistani community of Bradford in 2002 and in 
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the Mirpur district in 2003, contributed in creating the following list of features of 
the biraderi system: 
- in subjects' biraderi usage recalls terms cohesive with family context; 
- although shallowly translated into English as "extended family", biraderi 
can include non-blood related individuals who were included on an 
honorary basis because of special deeds, out of friendship or because they 
come from the same area and they have shared the same experiences 
abroad; 
- it is often influenced by caste in spite of the egalitarian tenets of Islam; 
- it has a normative and controlling role and regulates information and 
communication; 
- it has recognized hierarchies within it; 
- branches of biraderi separated by migration tend to interrelate and 
influence each other's decisions; 
- it is the main context of vartan bhanji5; 
- its members perform lena dena (reciprocal taking/giving); 
- it maximises the flows of goods and services. 
Such complexity and dynamism of biraderi very clearly embodies the close 
relationship between Bradford Pakistanis' cultural and social capital. Not only is 
biraderi the ensemble of relationships, but it also seems to be the vessel for 
specific cultural symbols, norms, and ideas: 
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources 
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition- 
or, in other words, to membership of a group- which provides each of 
5 Exchange of gifts or services and extensive exchange of visits. 
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its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital 
(Bourdieu 1986: 248-49) 
Another specificity of biraderi is the contextualisation of its meaning. It can in 
fact from time to time refer to national provenance (or quom, Chaudhary 
1999: 11), village provenance (or sharika, ibid. : 13), caste subdivision (or goot, 
ibid: 13), family tree (or khandan, ibid: 14) or nuclear family (or ghar, ibid: 15). 
Biraderi appears therefore to be a very broad concept that in terms of 
social capital is not clearly definable in terms of strong/weak ties (Granovetter 
1973) or bonding/bridging social capital (Putnam, 2001: 22; Woolcock 2001: 13- 
14). 
6.2.1 Biraderi as a unique `ethnic capital' 
Granovetter defines strong ties as the closest relationships that one has (i. e. family 
and friends) and weak ties as the ones that link the individual to the outer world 
(1973: 1378). Woolcock defines bonding social capital in a similar way to strong 
ties and bridging social capital as the one encompassing "more distant ties of like 
persons, such as loose friendships and workmates" (2001: 14). In detail, 
Some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, inward 
looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous 
groups. Examples of bonding social capital include ethnic fraternal 
organizations, church-based women's reading groups, and 
fashionable country clubs. Other networks are outward looking and 
encompass people across diverse social cleavages. Examples of 
bridging social capital include the civil rights movement, many 
youth service groups, and ecumenical religious organizations. 
(Putnam, 2001: 22) 
`Inward looking' to describe bonding social capital sounds negative and indeed 
Putnam privileges bridging capital (Field 2003: 36): bonding may in fact be the 
mode of gangs, satanic sects, etc. 
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The specificity of biraderi is that strong and weak ties or bonding and 
bridging fail to be easily distinguishable. Biraderi may imply any term of the 
dichotomy at different times. However, positive and negative perceptions coexist 
as they do for social capital. This may be even more apparent when analysed in a 
historical continuum. 
Kinship-based networks had a paramount importance in the first stages of 
migration when without such unconditional support it would have been 
impossible to buy houses or start enterprises. The role of such networks 
nowadays, however, will appear throughout the thesis as being quite controversial 
(cf. 9.3) and may be referred to with the derogatory form `biraderism'. Currently, 
the link between relationships, networks, and the traditional cultural capital may 
not be as consistent as it used to be. For this reason, although Bourdieu's 
definition of cultural capital seems to describe some aspect of biraderi, the 
broader and more pragmatic Putnam's definition of social capital may be more 
apt. However, Putnam's definition of social capital, refers to any kind of 
interrelation between individuals and individuals and between individuals and 
communities (Field 2003: 34-36,65) and it is always described as a positive 
feature (Boggs 2001: 287). Biraderi, as someone has pointed out about social 
capital (Bankston and Zhou 2002: 286), may be failed by definitions that do not 
consider its form as a process rather than as quantifiable content (more 
appropriate to cultural capital or `cultural stuff', Barth 1969). For this reason, and 
in order to avoid value-laden definitions such as Putnam's, the term preferred in 
this thesis will be `ethnic resources and networks'. 
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6.2.2Changes in biraderi through the stages of settlement 
Informants have often linked the key to a successful biraderi to marital strategy. 
In the Mirpuri community marriage between cousins is generally explained as 
rooted in the necessity of maintaining the property undivided. The marriage to 
cousins (preferably patrilateral parallel, but also cross or matrilateral cross) is 
also seen as beneficial as it emphasizes the internal biraderi connection as the 
marriage happens between two different households and individuals involved will 
feel more part of both (Shaw 2001: 326). Relations within the biraderi are very 
complicated to understand for an external observer: a hypothetical male ego, for 
instance, can be at the same time cousin and husband to the same woman, nephew 
and son-in-law to a couple, cousin and brother-in-law to his brother's wife. 
Agreement and balance within an endogamic unit might become difficult 
from time to time, but the collective belief in the importance of biraderi is a very 
strong incentive to make marriages work. One informant expressed his views 
about endogamic marriages in this way: 
If you don't get married inside the family you get grievances, they 
don't forget easily (... ) Plus, if I get married outside the family and 
[the wife] doesn't get on with my mum, whom should I side with? 
(Sadiq, quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
Later on when the role of family management of social control will be discussed, 
it will be interesting to review how individuals compromise between their 
personal interests and the ones of the family; most of the time these overlap. Shaw 
(2000), for example, gives an insight when a young Pakistani man refused a 
prestigious, interesting and well-paid job for a local Council as this wouldn't be as 
beneficial to the family as his employment in their garage; the man was not 
6 Cross cousins are the children of the father's sister or the mother's brother; parallel cousins are 
the children of father's brother or mother's sister. 
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regretting his choice because his personal satisfaction overlapped with that of the 
biraderi (see also concept of `propriety' discussed in 3.5 and 10.1). On the other 
hand, biraderis are not always a cohesive and collaborative unit. Financial 
matters, contrasting views about marriage plans or simply clashing personalities 
can divide the family. 
Akhtar (2003) argues that while biraderi is a system that resists change to 
an amazing extent because it provides the individual with all he/she regards as 
important (an affective network, a moral authority, unconditional solidarity, a 
sense of security), for some people, biraderi has now become a cause of misery 
because it is considered as a priority itself and is reluctant to allow for internal 
historic changes. 
British Pakistanis' marriage strategy, nevertheless, has gone through some 
relevant changes, although it has been argued that marriage strategies in Pakistan 
are much more flexible than outsiders are led to believe (Fischer, forthcoming). A 
West Yorkshire study (Darr and Modell 1988, quoted in Shaw 2001) and one 
conducted in Oxford (Shaw 2001) register an increase of marriage amongst first 
cousins in the younger generations since the 1960s. At the same time `the rate of 
marriage to cousins and other relatives seems to decrease the longer the 
youngsters have lived in Britain' (Shaw 2001: 330). The younger generation 
appear to work towards family recognition of a personal choice of partner by 
calculating the level of compatibility of the bride or groom with their family 
(Smart and Shipman 2003). The first example of the switch from bonding to 
bridging is therefore in the changing patterns of marriage strategies. 
7 Malinowsky (1926: 112) described the same dynamics in Trobriandese clans saying that the `clan 
dogma' of unity was a fissured core, `not a perfectly welded unit'. 
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Families progressively growing out of purdah and izzat in general, will do 
so more easily if they can transcend the exclusiveness of the Pakistani 
community, where the log's (people) opinions affect gossip. Some families might 
decide to move out of Asian areas to be less influenced by surrounding log, while 
some might only restrict activities not well looked upon to non-Asian areas 
(McLoughlin 1998a reports the case of a young Pakistani girl who was asked by 
her father not to renounce going clubbing but to go outside Bradford to avoid 
gossip). Bridging may therefore imply the weakening of strong ties and this 
dilemma will be a crucial theme of discourses of attribution of blame for crime 
(see 9.4). 
Moving out of Asian areas is possible for economically successful 
families, for professionals who find jobs elsewhere and for the ones who do not 
have a large family in the vicinity. On the other hand, families who have many 
relatives in England seem to feel more responsibility in preserving izzat for 
everybody's sake and if they live surrounded by other Asians, will find it more 
difficult to dismiss purdah and izzat in general (McLoughlin 1998a; Shaw 2000). 
While izzat is considered to be restrictive and static, on the other hand 
some families are becoming more flexible towards it. This is sometimes possible 
through changes in religious practice. 
6.3. The 'Culture 8 vs. religion' debate 
Contrary to the common western understanding of Islam as patriarchal or even 
misogynist (Fallaci 2005), it is possible that a more thorough understanding of the 
8I must thank Keir Martin from Manchester University for sharing with me his research notes on 
kaston: and social change in Papua New Guinea. Although a systematic comparison of our data 
has not been attempted, many of his reflections have helped me in finalising the analysis of the 
label `Culture' in the Bradford setting. 
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religion is becoming a crucial tool for some women to become more assertive and 
less dependent on their families' traditional standpoints (Afshar 1994: 13). 
McLoughlin's findings about a cathartic use of Islam for Bradford Muslim 
women are summarised like this: 
For at least some women, `reinvented', `authentic' accounts of their 
religious experiences are the most organic feminist tools that they have 
to `think' alternatives with (McLoughlin 1998a: 103) 
My respondents (... ) experienced Islam as a set of discourses and 
practices which could be deployed both hegemonically, in an attempt 
to control and discipline young women, and counter-hegemonically, so 
as to legitimate their concerns about issues such as higher education 
and marriage (McLoughlin 1998a: 105) 
Inspiration for assertiveness and independence has been found by informants 
throughout the Quran. Whether this is a particular interpretation or a theological 
statement, they have found grounds for autonomy in reading the holy book: 
The Prophet's wife was a merchant banker, she proposed to him 
(Shazia, quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
Family history, social class and social relations, together with affiliation to a 
particular school of South Asian Islam, affect the meaning given to the religion. 
Therefore, there is a large spectrum of women with very differing attitudes 
towards their lives. Age is also an important variable, as many women from the 
older generation are not generally fluent in English. There are also a high number 
of spouses coming every year from Asia and if they are coming from rural 
Pakistan they will have a perception of life more similar to the older generation. 
While a religious revival or a revival of Muslim identity may be very 
popular amongst women in Bradford, with a gendered division that will be 
encountered many times throughout this thesis (cf. 7.. 4,10.6 and 11.1.1), there is 
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evidence a growing number of young men are resorting in their personal lives to 
behaviours incongruous with the Islamic teachings: 
[Young men are] able to take advantage of the relative laxity of 
parents to be largely irreligious in behaviour but Muslims in name.... 
Young [Muslim] women may, in a sense become the targets of the 
assertive Muslim identity of their male peers, who find that a 
convenient way of emphasising their own `Muslim' credentials is to 
insist upon the virtuous conduct of their wives, sisters and daughters 
(Samad: 1998: 430) 
The role of religion in ethnic studies is quite controversial. Barth (1969) and 
Smith (1992) tackle religion as if it is one of the elements instrumental to the 
cause of ethnicity. Others, like Jacobson (1997) distinguish very clearly between 
ethnicity (intended as the cultural capital of a group) and religion. According to 
Jacobson, ethnic boundaries are flexible and blurred, while religious boundaries 
are more clear-cut, given and non-negotiable. 
If Jacobson's view was applied to Bradford, this would go along with the 
most popular emic one. Amongst young Muslims the idea is very common that 
Islam in South Asia has been profoundly influenced and contaminated by local 
cultures and there should be a process of purging from it what is not consistent 
with the Prophet's teachings. `Spurious' Islam would affect the lives of Muslims 
in a very different way from the original one, as one informant put it: 
... they should give girls some autonomy 
because Islamic law allows 
girls some autonomy (... ) Bradford is conservative, the community is 
conservative. The biggest problem I think is the culture, and culture 
has nothing to do with religion. For example: weddings. The traditions 
(of weddings) are Hindu traditions. (... ) (it is something) that has been 
inherited and it sticks, like culture. (Sadiq, quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
An attempt to go back to `the original Islam' has been adopted by movements and 
associations of young people (for example Young Muslims UK, the Muslim 
Women Forum and Islamic Society of Britain, cf. McLoughlin 2006a) in 
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Bradford and is the cause of most of the changes in the practice of Islam locally. 
For example, in 2002 the Muslim Women Forum was promoting the creation of 
areas for women in the local mosques, as only a minority of buildings provide this 
facility. One of the changes in the perceptions of Islam by the younger 
generations is that while for a large part of the older generation Islam becomes 
important during life-cycle rituals (McLoughlin 1998a: 99), for an increasing part 
of the younger generation who read the Quran in translation, religion is apparently 
an integral part of their lives which has a constant bearing in daily life. For these 
individuals religion becomes a public matter and is practiced through strict dietary 
rules and the political demands (for halal meat in refectories, for example). 
In times of discrimination or even offences against Muslims, Islam becomes a 
resource for asserting individuals' collective identity (Samad 1992; 1998). In the 
context of growing Islamophobia, young people tend to revert to Islam, protect it 
and feel protected by its community: 
I think it is important [the Whites] associate me with Islam, and then with 
my race, my ethnic background. I have to protect my faith, I am not 
bothered by my ethnic background (Tehmina, quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
In spite of an originally very culturally mediated version of Islamic education, the 
older generation has started practicing religion on a different basis. First changes 
occurred with the reunion of families, as the presence of children led to money 
collection for opening mosques and madrasas. Some (for example Kalra 
2000: 146) relate the new religious engagement to the profound changes brought 
by differences in life styles after the economic crisis in former textile towns: 
Look, sardarji, our story is a simple one. When we worked in the mills 
we were in the pubs and drank beer and ate kebabs. Now we are out of 
work we spend our time in mosques saying "Allah Allah" (Haaji 
Mehrban, quoted in Kalra: 2000: 146) 
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While in the first years of migration different sects and ethnic groups prayed 
together in the same rooms adapted to mosques, with the arrival of families 
diverse forms of Islam became prominent (McLoughlin 1998c:. 217). Pathans, 
Mirpuris and Bangladeshis built their own mosques. At the present time, however, 
many Pakistani Muslims seem to be resorting to global Islam as their 
comprehensive Umma (Muslim global nation) (McLoughlin 1996); although 
individuals keep attending mosques where their families have gone for years, 
nevertheless there is less emphasis on sects. Muslim brotherhood is felt all over 
the world, especially in an era when Muslims have been involved in conflicts: 
You know, it's like the Christians having this thing about the body of 
Christ.. 
. it's our local community and our national Umma: when a Muslim dies needlessly, when somebody is martyred, you feel pain. 
(... ) In Bradford these issues have been discussed. (... ) Muslims have 
all been victimised in Bosnia, Chechnya, but also in Bradford, in 
France... (Amjad, quoted in Bolognani 2002) 
Attachment to other causes of Muslims around the world is shown through an 
electronic network that daily inundates with emails that denounce Israel and the 
United States or report on human rights violations against Muslims in other parts 
of the world. 
Although a new rhetoric and certain terms of global Islam are becoming 
more familiar with Bradford Pakistanis, Samad argues that it is not ascertained 
how much there is a clear understanding of the underlying issues: 
Islam.... Plays a role in the construction of masculinity;... [the young] 
project a `hard' image of tough aggressive macho men... [and claim] 
membership of Hamas or Hizb-ut-Tahrir9... Yet the same individuals 
were unaware who Shias were, and how they differed from Sunnis, 
and did not know what Hamas or Hizb-ut-Tahrir represent. Neither 
were they observant in their religious rituals..... and were quite often 
in trouble with the police for petty crime, drugs etc. Thus the daubing 
9 Hizb-ut-Tahrir is an international Muslim organisation which is described often as extremist. It 
publishes a monthly magazine, Khalifat that works towards the ideal of the re-establishment of the 
caliphate. 
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of the walls ... with the slogan `Hamas Rules OK', or supporting anti- 
semitic, homophobic and misogynist organisations such as Hizb-ut- 
Tahrir, was more an act of rebellion and defiance rather than the rise of 
`fundamentalism'. 'It is all about being `hard'... these affiliations 
seemed to be linked with territory... [with Islamic nomenclature, such 
as Hamas, Hizb-ut-Tahrir or Tablighi Jamaat [used] to [map and] 
define territorial control. (Samad: 1998: 425) 
6.4. Caught between biraderi and Umma 
This chapter has described how biraderi is a central and probably unique feature 
of the Pakistani communities of Bradford and the historical development of their 
settlement can be only fully understood by acknowledging the role of biraderi in 
it. For the scope of this thesis, however, it was important to highlight how a 
traditional structure such as biraderi may strengthen internal relational proximity 
that has been considered by some as a crucial variable of informal social control 
(Braithwaithe 1989: 14; Burnside and Baker 1994: 19,21; Wardak 2000: 16; Hope 
2001: 430). Such internal proximity may be considered both an asset and a 
liability and later on in this thesis it will emerge that there is an increasing number 
of individuals who would refer to `biraderism' as a negative phenomenon (see 
9.3). During the research stronger ties were often perceived to potentially cause 
fragmentation, while weak ties as more advantageous for individuals (see 9.5 and 
13.4). Virtual ties such as the one of the global Muslim nation, Umma, also 
played an important role of reference for discourses encountered during 
fieldwork. 
By comparing the researcher's 2002 findings (Bolognani 2007, 
forthcoming) and the present ones, it was possible to see a consistent use of the 
word `community' as the signifier of an ethnic and religious group. Although this 
term was rather fluid and could significantly change depending on the contexts, 
by for example referring to regional parochialisms, it was important to confirm 
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that a Bradford Pakistani distinctiveness was recognised in terms of culture, 
symbols, religion and modes of interaction. In spite of the internal fragmentation 
of diasporic groups, it has already been observed by other commentators (see also 
Saifullah Khan in the introduction to this paragraph), that `community' may not 
be an imagined construct necessarily conveying ideas of homogeneity. Back, for 
example, argues that 
Ideas about `community' are understood to consist of a series of 
organising principles (community discourses) that are interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing (a semantic system). (... ) I view the notion of 
`community' or `local style' as the product of competing social 
definitions, not homogenous, and composed of a variety of community 
discourses and although I accept that in some contexts particular 
definitions-or versions- of community predominate, all community 
discourse should be treated as having equal significance (Back 1996: 
29,30) 
Werbner illustrates a similar standpoint through a British Pakistani example: 
Community had become, in effect, a kind of argument through 
practice: an argument of images between those different knots of 
friends with their different lifestyles, consumption patterns and visions 
of what their community should be like, by comparison to other 
communities, seen from a particular vantage point. 
Community was nevertheless constituted as practice by the traces of 
localised discourses and interactions taking place in a myriad of public 
events: at weddings and funerals, fund raising drives, mosque elections 
factional struggles, public protests, religious festivals, national and 
religious celebrations and ceremonies, as well as in multi-cultural or 
multi-racial or multi-religious forums and arenas created by the state 
and local state (Werbner 1996: 70). 
During the Bradford fieldwork the strong sense of community and the frequency 
with which it was made reference to, contributed to understanding how Bradford 
Pakistanis earned the name of `urban villagers' (Saifullah Khan 1976a) in the 
1970s. Today, they may be called `global villagers', an exception in the "isolated, 
anomic, acted out segmented roles of urban men and women" (Bell 1976: 292), 
but at the same time increasingly literate with discourses of international 
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brotherhood and sisterhood, of universality and maximum `bridging'. They have 
preserved certain characters of distinct ethnic resources and networks, "trust, 
norms, networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions" (Putnam 1993: 167) and have characterised the survival at 
first of a gemeinschaft in a gesellschaft (Ibid: 114), but now seems more and more 
inclined to situate itself in a global `Ummatic' setting (see for example role of 
Muslim satellite channels in social control in 12.2). 
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Part III 
Crime, control and prevention: the emic views 
Chapter Seven 
The construction of crime within the community 
Section 2.9 highlighted the necessity of more studies about race, ethnicity and 
crime involving minorities' perspectives (Philips and Bowling 2003: 270,272) 
and accounts of structures as well as agency. Literature advocating such a change 
registers a `taboo' in criminology derived from the fear of pathologizing minority 
groups in relation to crime (ibid: 271). Outside academia, instead, racialization of 
crime (that is to say the alleged link between a specific group and some criminal 
activities) has been much more explored and often, it has been argued, with 
counterproductive results for race relations (Miller 2001: 1), reviving the belief 
that some cultures may be more violent than others (Curtis 1975: 115, see 2.2). 
Werbner (2004: 898), for instance, has exposed the situation of a `South 
Asian morality' under scrutiny by the public gaze of White Britons. Webster has 
denounced the construction of a "British Asian criminality" (1997) and Alexander 
(2004: 535) has recorded a widespread public concern towards an "Asian 
disfunctionality". As described in 5.8, this moral panic has particularly affected 
external representations of Bradford and its Asian community since 2001 when 
the riots took place and the attacks on the Twin Towers spread the fear of `home- 
grown terrorists' (see Sengupta 2005, in The Independent). 
Instead of reviewing external views on crime in the community, this chapter 
will analyse the internal points of view. Unveiling the major preoccupations 
according to the community rather than to outsiders will link practical crime 
concerns to an emic `working whole': 
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The value of an emic study is, first, that it leads to an understanding 
of the way in which (... ) a culture is constructed, not as a series of 
miscellaneous parts, but as a working whole [my emphasis]. Second, 
it helps one to appreciate not only the culture (... ) as an ordered 
whole [my emphasis], but it helps to understand the individual actors 
in such a life drama- their attitudes, motives, interests, responses, 
conflicts, and personality developments (Pike 1954: 11) 
Analysing how practical concerns, cultural and religious beliefs and moral 
dilemmas play a part in the construction of the idea of crime will be the first step 
towards verifying the existence of a distinct `community criminology'. 
The chapter opens with an evaluation of the positions on a supposed 
Bradford Pakistani pathology in reference to crime. Informants denounced a moral 
panic about their community stirred by biased media attention, while their 
community, it was said, was facing the same problems as any other. An ethnic 
specificity, however, was to be found in a distinctive way of facing the same 
problems and defining criminal activities. A classification of the priorities in the 
fight against crime emerged in terms of the crimes perceived long term effects on 
the structure of the community, and drugs were indicated as the present greatest 
problem. 
By comparing the main concerns expressed by the media (i. e. terrorism and 
racial tension bursting into rioting) and those expressed by the community, the 
conclusion will attempt to produce the first data-based evidence of distinct 
community criminological discourses. 
7.1. Crime in the community: an endemic problem? 
In starting to investigate the existence of community-based criminology, it was 
important to delineate a definition of `community' responding to its usage made 
by the research participants. The fluidity of the term community or `apna log' (our 
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people) has already been discussed in 6.4. It is important to recall here that a 
strong Bradford Pakistani distinctiveness was recognised in terms of culture, 
symbols, religion and modes of interaction both by insiders and outsiders, but at 
the same time coexisting subcultures, religious differences, or ethnic provenances 
constituted important variables of heterogeneity of discourses. 
Once the existence of such constructions of the community was verified, it 
was possible to investigate whether Bradford Pakistanis also believed that their 
relations to crime as both victims and perpetrators had some specificities if 
compared to other groups in the city. 
Throughout the research, participants claimed that in their views crime in 
the community had risen exponentially in the last few years (usually it was said in 
the last ten years). Most of the sample lived in areas with a high level of clustering 
(cf. 5.3) and this may be a reason why when they spoke of crime they mainly 
referred to deeds committed by members of the community, and only in a few 
cases by outsiders (either people coming from different cities or Bradford Whites, 
African/Caribbeans and Gipsies). 
The transmission of the Channel 4 documentary `Edge of the city", 
however, had a considerable impact on the interviewees, a majority of whom saw 
it as a biased account of some of the district's problems that damaged the 
reputation of the Pakistani community. They had felt over-exposed as a group for 
the actions of a few individuals when, it was argued, similar things were 
happening in all communities. The reaction of the community towards the 
documentary had reached such an extent that a young film maker was researching 
into the topic in order to make a counter-documentary: 
The documentary was the account of the working lives of Keighley social workers fighting 
against a spiral of `grooming' of young girls by Pakistani men (see Hall 2004). 
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Have you seen the programme `Edge of the City'? You see, that's why 
we are gonna do this [documentary], we do it in response to `Edge of 
the City', because when I watched that I was really disappointed (.. ) 
on things that we can see happening in Bradford(... ) It is not only 
Asian men, it is a big... it doesn't only happen in Bradford, it happens 
in Manchester, London and it starts... some people come from 
Liverpool, Manchester here and they start ... treating the girls nice and 
stuff and give drugs, and they sell drugs or start mixing the drugs. It 
might just be simple marijuana but it might be mixed with cocaine to 
make it stronger. (... ) (Ali) 
In the course of fieldwork the research itself was often challenged as most 
interviewees found that such a study on crime might create a pathological view of 
their community, while they believed that the whole of society was under the 
same strains. However, once the aim of the research was clarified, participants 
usually pointed out that some degree of specificity existed: 
I personally don't think it is a problem with a particular community. I 
believe there is a problem with the society at large; the only 
difference is that certain communities have decided to deal with it 
differently (Imran) 
Although the whole society had to face the same problems, then, the Pakistani 
community was seen as having a distinctive mode of facing them. This specificity 
regarded how some deviant behaviour interacted with ethnic resources and 
networks (see 9.3 and 10.5), the solutions proposed (see 11.8), but also the 
labelling process. 
7.2. The labelling process: crime within and without the community 
One of the first questions that the research had to answer was whether the 
Pakistanis in Bradford had a distinct idea of crime and deviance. Some literature 
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has in fact highlighted how in cross-cultural settings, these definitions may be 
ambiguous (Krase and Sagarin 1980: 215; Wilson and Herrnstein 1985: 440). 
Labelling seemed to be based on a classification of potential dangers to the 
community: the higher threat seemed to be perceived as the one that was 
potentially more destabilising for the group. 
Some expressed the view that the centrality of the self-preservation of the 
community was testified by episodes in which the condemnation for crime 
committed elsewhere did not stir as much uproar as the ones committed within: 
A young boy was knocked over in White Abbey Road. He was just 
going home with his father and his brother and he was crossing the 
road. Now this person was in a car... three men overtook three cars 
and went straight into middle aisle and killed him instantly on the 
spot. They were speeding (... ) they overtook three cars unnecessarily, 
because they had stolen that car. They took someone's life-these 
same people having been causing a nuisance in our neighbourhood 
for God knows how many years. We know this person's brother has 
gone to jail because he killed this person in Batley (... ) with a 
screwdriver... they are from our neighbourhood, so... he has gone to 
jail and his brother has just taken another life. They boast about the 
fact [that they killed a white man in Batley]. . . they 
won't be boasting 
this fact 'cos it is... as sad as it is to say.. . they killed an Asian person, 
a white person to them didn't matter, they were boasting about that 
(... ). It is disgusting, but they found it all right but now because they 
killed an Asian person they are not going to get away with it in a 
sense where the community will not allow to get away with it. And 
they are not gonna be scared of them because somebody has lost this 
child and they are gonna do something about it whether it is taking 
them to court or do something themselves as a family, as it happens 
(Zaara) 
This, as it has already been mentioned, did not mean that crime was seen as 
mainly perpetrated only outside one's community, but rather that the recent rise of 
crime inside was creating a moral panic even amongst Pakistanis. This moral 
panic was mainly articulated through images of deviant young men as will be 
explored in detail in 10.1. Two women, one in her thirties and the other one in her 
forties, commented on the fact that now the situation was such that one happened 
135 
to be almost as prejudiced as white people (sic) when encountering young Asian 
men on the streets: 
I think for a Pakistani to be afraid of a Pakistani it is very sad, isn't it? 
I think going back a long time, when we came, everybody at that time 
they wanted to live with their own community, we want to live with 
Pakistanis... but now we are running away from it. Very sad 
(Shamim) 
All the young people interviewed knew somebodywho had been sentenced either 
for drugs, stealing cars or the riots. According to some respondents the situation 
had degenerated so much that already the idea that crime was something to put up 
with had started trickling into the popular understanding: 
They [the parents] will be worried because it is their kids at the end of 
the day, but the thing is, right, you know when there is something 
happening in the community and is happening regularly like a routine 
sets... (Adam) 
The kids ... I suppose... it is all they know-they are very street wise in 
the sense that they know what is going on around them and I think 
they accept that sort of life. (Bashir) 
But I think [by] the elder generation... they are looked down 
upon.. . but they [the older generation] don't say it, because of this 'we 
are gonna die soon, it really doesn't matter'. You know the sense of 
hopelessness.. . it does exist, quite a lot. (Fatima) 
The ones who were able to compare today's situation with the one of their 
adolescence seemed pessimistic: 
I am not joking but virtually every second family... is accepted. It has 
become a social construction thing now, where it is accepted as an 
ideal (Amir) 
Me: And what about these shootings that happened, do you think 
people are scared of walking around? 
Jamil: No, this is normal! Seriously... 
Adam: He is right... you see, something happens, a couple of days 
later... 
Jamil: It dies out! 
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However the diffused sense of hopelessness and frustration was accompanied by a 
unanimous indication of only one key-source of the general criminal threat to the 
life of the community: 
When we were growing up there wasn't so much drug around, and 
there wasn't so much violence.. . and we, I am not saying we were 
angels, because as teenagers you do good and bad, you misbehave 
and I think we misbehaved as well, but the difference is proliferation 
of drugs (Zameer) 
The causes of the recent proliferation of deviant behaviours, therefore, were not to 
be looked for in a Pakistani endemic pathology, but in the universal problem of 
drugs. 
7.3. Many problems, one name: drugs in the community 
As we have begun to indicate, one of the findings consistent with other published 
information (Apaxton 2002; WYP 2004) was that one of the main problems 
affecting the community was considered to be drugs. Although there is only a 
limited amount of research on the drug problem amongst Asians in the Bradford 
district, this is consistent in reporting that Asians are under-represented amongst 
users (Webster 1996: 11; Pearson and Patel 1998: 17). In spite of these data, drugs 
were cited by the respondents as their main concern. 
Drugs were seen as the trigger of almost all the other criminal activities, 
from prostitution to gun crime, but also, and more importantly, as destabilising for 
the core of the community. Drug-related offences, in fact, were seen to jeopardise 
the stability of families and produce role models and lifestyles not consistent with 
either the Muslim ethos (cf. 9.4) or the binding collective social values of the 
Pakistani traditions (cf. 9.2). 
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Although drugs were part of those problems considered by the research 
participants to affect all communities, there seemed to be a popular understanding 
that the drug market nowadays was mainly in the hands of men of Pakistani 
origin. One teenage girl expressed the view that asylum seekers from Iraq were 
playing a major part in the local drug market at the moment, but this view was not 
been expressed by anybody else or backed up by any evidence. The popular 
understanding was instead that the drug market had been taken over from men of 
African/Caribbean origin by men of Pakistani origin. 
Twenty years ago when I was growing up, you had the Afro Caribbean 
community, quite a large community in Bradford. And they were into 
a lot of the drug dealing, prostitution and stuff like that. Now we have 
sort of taken over from them, while the Afro Caribbean community 
have sort of moved on, and we are doing that kind of stuff, although if 
you look at it from our community, it is frowned upon, that kind of 
behaviour, if you look at our background, our religion... you know, 
that is the last thing we should be doing, selling drugs and pimping 
(Zameer) 
Tahir: When I am travelling in a taxi I talk with taxi drivers, and they 
tell you. Some of them are very hurt that the community is into this, 
some of them are very proud that all the drug business is ours now, 
and we are taking over. I have heard this! 'We have taken over from 
the Afro Caribbean, and there was a big fight', and whether it is 
bravado or this person is involved, God knows, but you would hear 
'we have taken over', but obviously this person is criminal, that is why 
he is very happy with his achievements. 
Me. They wouldn't tell me these things... 
Tahir: Yes, but because I am mischievous myself and I try to find out 
information, I am saying 'what is happening with this fight' and the 
lingo would suggest that I want information 'what is going on here' 
and also they think maybe I am Pakistani, I would approve this, or 
maybe [I would] feel happy, a part of the gang maybe (laughs). 
The black community are currently kicked out from Bradford because 
the Pakistani Community, the drug dealing Pakistani Community, is 
too strong. (Abdul) 
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7.3.1 Drug dealing, drug taking and the chain of criminal activities 
While during the interviews the older generations did not clearly distinguish 
between drug taking and drug dealing, the younger the respondents were, the more 
they were able to provide detailed information on the drug market. 
Drug dealing, according to all the young respondents, was in some sense 
spread more widely than drug taking as some people would take up the former as 
a business venture or as a way to gain quick cash but would not take part in its 
consumption: 
I used to believe that they had to take drugs to sell them on, but there 
is somebody, some sort of disgustingly selfish people, who look after 
their own body but won't think twice about destroying someone else's 
body. There will be people who take drugs and sell them but then I 
also know people who are very clean-cut, the only thing they take 
from the drugs is the profit they make by selling them on. (Zaara) 
Participation in the drug business was described as to be not necessarily a life- 
time activity. It was possible, it was said, that some individuals would agree to 
sporadic drug deals (cf. also Webster 1997: 78) or even a one-off job when in need 
to pay a debt or to invest in a business venture. The demand for such jobs was 
such that one could easily move in and out of the drug dealing circle, unless 
caught: 
There were two Pathans, they were brothers and one of the brothers 
said to the other, if you bring the heroin back you can pay the 
mortgage off and you will have a big life. And the police followed 
them from UK to Pakistan and chased them and they caught them in 
Manchester airport. (... )They used to work and everything, and. they 
got into this one drug thing and nobody knew until they got caught. 
(Adam) 
Such mobility across the boundaries of criminal activity (some people being 
defined by Webster as `go-betweens', see 3.5) was, albeit disagreeable, not a 
major source of stigma for the ones who had been known to have participated in 
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illegal activities for a limited period with a view to investing such revenue into a 
'kosher business' (Kamran, interview with author). Those who did this tended to 
benefit the community in some way, for example through donations to mosques 
(Amir, interview with author). As discussed above, the higher grade of stigma 
appeared to be based on the relation between it criminal activity and the stability 
of the community: the most serious offence was the one perceived as undermining 
the cormnrunity. The ones living off the drug business and drug addicts, therefore, 
were the cause of the most serious preoccupations expressed in the course of the 
research. Informants tended to believe that drug taking would rarely be a sporadic 
activity, but would often become an addiction, in contrast with existing research 
evidence registering high rates of recreational use (Pearson and Patel 1998: 17). 
Because of health and behavioural effects known to be produced in the 
addicted, class A drugs were linked to the potential breakdown of families, the 
core of the community structure (cf. 6.2.1). More surprisingly, when addiction 
was discussed. dependence out prescription drugs appeared to be a major concern. 
especially as far as women were concerned (data consistent with Pearson and 
Patel 1998: 14, I5). Practitioners recorded it rise 
in depression and consequently it 
growth in the chance of abuse of the medicines prescribed (see below). 
Individuals who abused prescription drugs were often said to having sunk into 
depression or 'stress' due to family problems. Sometimes even the consumption of 
cannabis was linked to family problems, although amongst young men its 
consumption had often started as a recreational activity: 
Ntc: what do you mean by stress then'? 
Bano: :\ lot of Asian families I think... what happens 
in families 
nowadays, maybe when... 11 have got a mate, a really, really good mate, 
and he is a guy and his sister ran away from home and he smokes 
weed like on a daily basis, like he has 2,3 cigarettes a day of weed, 
and i as asking 'why chi you smoke'? ' and he says 'it 
just releases me, 
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it is like if I did not smoke it and I came to school, I would be like a 
miserable git, so when I smoke weed I feel so happy, it just releases 
the tensions'. The sister, she liked this guy and she ran away from 
home. She has gone hack now but it is like ... we call 
it izzat. Basically 
it is had name, like if it goes out in the community, it will be really 
had name. That is why a lot ofguys smoke it because they can't take 
the pressure, they just want to get everything off their shoulders and 
that is the main reason why guys smoke weed. (... ) 
)My dad] started smoking weed when he was about 15 and now he is 
about 40 something. 
Mc. Is your dad born here'? 
Kano: No. my dad was horn in Pakistan. He came here when he was 
about 10. Ile has been here most of his life and he smokes weed, 
so... hut he is so addicted to it he can't leave it and that is why he is so 
ill, because when he leaves it he gets so ill. Because when my 
granddad had it stroke he fell into depression and now he hasn't really 
been able to Let out of it. 
Many pcoplc who would smoke cannabis would not drink alcohol, as their 
Popular understanding of the Quran, orally transmitted by older friends or family 
members, mentioned alcohol but not cannabis (cf. Pearson and Patel 1998: 15). 
Recent research about addictions in Asian communities in the Midlands found that 
amongst Muslim drinkers, the majority tended to indulge in 'binge drinking' 
(Orford ct al. 2004: 27) and even in Bradford it was rare to hear of occasional 
drinkers amongst Muslims, as those who broke the Quranic law were, according 
to intcrvic%%ces, more likely to be 'hinge drinkers' or alcoholics. 
lien consuming alcohol or drugs were perceived as more likely to commit 
other offences, including domestic violence. Although it was not one of the most 
commonly mentioned issues in the research, domestic violence was a serious 
concern for practitioners who were said to see a high proportion of these episodes 
happening in the Pakistani community: 
Obviously (domestic yiolcncej is not only [based on] one factor, is a 
combination of factors, and majority of my clients, I can say with 
ce lainty. they are either dealing drugs (I am just focusing on the 
Aran community, because I work with Asian clients), or taking drugs, 
and all kinds of frauds. I have got clients whose 
husbands are doing 
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hcnefit frauds. or clients whose husbands who are known pimps in 
Bradford (Alina) 
1 
Domestic violence was therefore again something connected with the use of 
drugs. Nevertheless. according to some respondents, it was part of the troubles 
present in the community even in the pre-drugs era. 
During the research, honour crimes such as killings or mutilations were 
very rarely talked about. but sexual behaviours not conforming to Islamic laws 
that prescribe abstinence before marriage were seen as connected with deviant 
behaviour. In particular an imam who was routinely called to help families whose 
children were taking drugs (see also 11.3) was convinced that it was through 
sexual encounters that young people would start breaking the Islamic law and then 
experiment with alcohol and drugs. At other times, through the consumption of 
drugs and alcohol. young people would agree to have sex and therefore, in his 
opinion, it was difficult to separate sexuality from drugs. Again, if drugs were 
connected to promiscuity, it was obvious that they were threatening the core 
structure of the community. 
Amongst the crimes mentioned most often as a cause of deep concern there 
was gun crime. borne, according to the respondents, from drums related activities. 
This may have been due to the location of a big part of interviews and participant 
observation on the Leeds Road area, where in 12 months there had been a few 
shootings, sonic not reported by the press but known to the participants: 
I myself went to an MP (... ) and I said 'OK it is gun crime but has 
anyone tackled why they are using the guns, getting to the point 
whv'... 1 even said to this MP, one of those kids will get killed, that 
Idrugs)is what it gets down [to)... and what happens? Three weeks 
later someone is killed and I could say that to him, it happened 
because the : ommunity won't tackle the problem, they don't get to the 
core of the problem. Ok, it's gun crime, but what is related to gun 
crime'' (Adam') 
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FG2I. I don't know if they [my parents] are scared, but there was like 
that shooting on Leeds Road, a couple of minutes from our houses... 
FG2A. But it is not like we go out and they shoot us, they don't just 
shoot you... 
FG2C. It is their enemies... 
FG2A. If you've got a problem with someone they'll sort it out that way. 
In January 2005 a video was publicly presented by Age Concern about safety in 
the Asian Community of Barkerend Road (parallel to Leeds Road). In the video, a 
Muslim woman complained that the area was affected by burglaries, car theft and 
fights, all related to the drug business. On top of that, a new concern was 
emerging: some of the more established drug dealers had taken the law in their 
hands, and with the excuse of helping acquaintances to sort out their grievances, 
they managed a system of revenge that was growing in popularity. The fear 
expressed in the video was that this would soon become a vicious circle of 
violence. 
7.4 Women as an indicator of the level of deviance in the community 
In the panorama of crime a particular position seemed to be held by women, as 
described by a young female student: 
Me: What about drug taking? 
FG2A: I don't know because like the female in the Pakistani culture is 
like.. . even if... a boy was defined as a drug taker he won't be seen as so bad... because it will be seen like 'this is just what boys do'... like 'he will 
grow out of it, forget it... but if a girl did it, it will be just too bad for the 
girl. 
Afshar (1989: 215; 1994: 134) has observed how in West Yorkshire Pakistani 
women are considered to carry a double moral burden: an individual one based on 
their conduct as thought appropriate to their gender, and a family one, based on 
their successful maintenance of the family honour (izzat). 
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While existing literature on deviance refer mainly to men as perpetrators 
(Alexander 2000,2004; Wardak 2000; Goodey 2001), female deviance or 
victimhood amongst Pakistani women has been overlooked (Macey 1999b). In the 
present research, however, data concerning women was crucial for two reasons: it 
showed the level of diffusion of deviance by erasing the stereotype that Pakistani 
women do not engage in crime, and confirmed the hypothesis developed during 
fieldwork that labelling is based on the degree of threat that an action poses to the 
community. Women in Pakistani cultures are in fact considered to be the core of 
the family life and therefore of community (Ali 2000: 118; Khanum 
2000: 132,133; Wardak 2000: 63). 
During fieldwork the more informed and `street wise' research participants 
communicated a growing awareness of issues starting to affect young women. 
This was seen by some as the horrendous but unavoidable stage for a shock that 
would raise self-criticism and change in the community: 
In Bradford they will only become the vehicle of change when the 
same epidemics [of drugs] will hit here because nobody really wants to 
know at the moment. They are quite happy with the flashy cars and the 
money coming in, but the vehicle of change will happen when the 
impact of drugs will hit their daughters. And that is when the 
community will start crying 'oh my God! ' It is still not enough for a 
change to happen, and this is what will happen-as soon as the honour 
of your family becomes.... you start looking for that change. (Ayesha) 
Once again, the factor of main concern was the consumption of drugs, but in this 
case the denomination of drugs was extended to prescription drugs. In fact it was 
reported that a growing number of women would `get on' anti-depressants. This 
attitude might be considered the equivalent of the above mentioned cases of young 
men smoking cannabis as a reaction to the stress derived by family problems: 
They get on drugs mainly because of family pressures, stress, to forget 
problems. They put eye drops and they go back home and are not 
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normally found out. If they are found out they get sent back to 
Pakistan. (Ameena) 
This does not exclude women, especially the youngest, from the use of cannabis, 
hard drugs and alcohol out of peer pressure, pleasure and escapist desires linked to 
tense family situations: 
Fatima: Because there is a problem now of girls taking drug within the 
Pakistani community. 
Me: Any drugs? 
Fatima: It is more ... I think, because of this face value of showing off 
or trying to look cool ... the kind of peer pressure that they have is 
more starting from spliffs and marijuana and when they are older like 
19, the girls I know now have moved into first class drugs and even 
drug dealing... so.. . because that problem hasn't been highlighted in 
the Pakistani community and gets brushed under the carpet and the 
girl gets sent back home, but when they come back here, when they 
come back from Pakistan, that problem still exists, it hasn't gone 
away, so the way the Pakistani community or the parents deal with it, 
is... I think it is not correct and it doesn't deal with the problem. 
Some community workers lamented a wide spread tendency amongst GPs of 
easily prescribing antidepressants to Asian women who have ended up being 
considered as a group with an endemic problem of depression and mental health; 
some women would become addicted to such prescription drugs and would take 
them for life. Although no statistical evidence was collected to triangulate 
community workers' perceptions, depression was a very well known and often 
spoken about problem by almost all research participants (cf. Pearson and Patel 
1998). 
The news of a recreational drugs phenomenon amongst women seemed, 
however, not to have become popular knowledge in the community, not even 
amongst the ones in their early thirties: 
Zameer: I have to say, but the issue predominantly is with males, isn't 
it? I think the indigenous white population, you have white women 
using drugs, but I think it is a lot less, far less in the Asian 
community... 
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Me. I have heard quite the opposite... 
Zameer: Depends what [drugs] you mean... 
Me. It is even hard drugs... 
Zameer: Right? I mean ... I am a bit away from... 
On the other hand, some parents are starting to hear frightening accounts of what 
happened at universities, for instance: 
I have very recently learnt that there are females taking or selling 
drugs, which was shocking, also when I am travelling in a taxi I talk 
with taxi drivers, and they tell you. (Tahir) 
I came across a woman whose daughter was at university and she 
became a heroin addict. Her daughter is 27 now and still an addict. 
She lives at home with them. And she [the mother] is part of an Asian 
women support group whose kids are on heroine. They are not very 
open and she was just telling me how horrendous it is. She is part of a 
mothers' group, they are meeting at each others' homes. Her daughter 
was in and out of home, she was on rehab, she lived on her own... 
(Ayesha) 
I have heard about [women taking drugs at University], but I did not 
know if it was only whites.. . and some parents don't want their kids to 
go [to university] and don't want to mix with people to do all 
this ... (Shamim) 
Shamim's preoccupation that this phenomenon might impact on the new positive 
rates of education of Pakistani young women is supported by the account of one 
university student: 
Jamal: I am at uni and I know about 5 girls from the top of my head 
who can drink a big bottle of vodka in one day... I mean, like them 
big bottles. I know about 5 from the top of my head, come in the 
morning, they won't go lectures, they'll go sitting in the car and buy a 
bottle of vodka and get pissed and get totally wasted and then they 
would sleep, wake up, sober up and then go home. And if they are 
still not sober before 4,5 o'clock, they'll ring home and say 'I am in 
the library doing work' and about 7,8,9 o'clock they will go home. 
Me. Why they do that? 
Jamal: They see it as... they enjoy it. 
Me. Don't parents find out eventually? 
Jamal: No. When exams come they'll probably won't go for a drink, 
they'll have a smoke of a joint to calm themselves down. 
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This account is somehow different from others where the research participants 
tended not to blame the girls for their use of drugs and somehow to deny them an 
agency. Young girls taking drugs tended to be seen more as victims rather than as 
individuals who made a choice in consuming certain substances. In the following 
conversation recorded during a focus group, some young girls discussed an 
imaginary scenario in which a Pakistani girl of their age was found consuming 
drugs by her family: 
FG2C: [People would say]: 'She is going down the wrong path' and 
stuff... 
FG2A: She would be looked down upon not just by her family, and 
there would be so much stigma attached to her, like probably nobody 
would want to get married to her or nothing, and then.. . that's why 
girls don't want to do it. 
FG2C. I think it would be difficult for girls to get hold of drugs... 
FG2B. (laughs) 
FG2I: You think that because you don't know how it works.. . you think like'where do you get drugs from? '... but someone comes to you 
and they give it to you. That's all it is. [These girls] probably want to 
get married as well. 
Here the imaginary girl was seen as `naturally' wanting to get married, but was 
corrupted by others to use drugs and her path to marriage was hijacked by her 
victimisers. The difference between the involvement in crime of men and women 
was explained by one of this focus group's participants in this way: 
I think boys get more attracted to go outside than girls do. (FC2C) 
As in the discussions about parental strategies (11.1.1 and 11.1.2) with the 
description of parental roles based on soft, passive and `domestic' mothers and 
authoritarian, active and `public' fathers, this dyadic gender perception affected 
representations of youth. If the popular conception was about girls who `naturally' 
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aspire to creating a home, it is evident that a greater threat was posed to the 
system if they were involved in deviant lifestyles. 
Western feminist criminology has been analysing the question of female 
deviance since the 1970s, basing its major findings on the argument that 
criminology had always tended to portray criminal women as pathological or 
double deviant (Rosenhan 1973; Carlen 1985: 2) as they not only were breaking 
the laws of the state but also what are believed to break the laws of a nature that 
`produce them' with `weak' attributes. 
Another example of the victimisation of women was given by linking drug 
consumption to `grooming' and prostitution: 
The Asian girls, now... I have seen myself they are all taking drugs 
and everything it is unbelievable. What happening at university now, 
4 years ago it wasn't like that, but the culture at university has 
completely changed it is unbelievable. You see, with me I have got 
friends in Manchester, people in Birmingham, London, when I go 
there, ah, it is just completely different culture shock they are 
smoking heroine, and spliffs and everything... but I am talking about 
the grooming... they will start with a cigarette and then the boy will 
say let's smoke a spliff, the spliff is like cannabis, and they put a line 
of heroine in it, and it is like a drink, if you have a drink and someone 
spikes it with a bit of vodka you don't realize they are doing it. That's 
what they do, they put a line of cocaine so it makes it stronger, so 
when you take it, you are put on it, so you will always take it more 
and more and everything. (Adam) 
The young women I work with do mostly cannabis but some are on 
heroine and cocaine, and end up in prostitution. Their boyfriends are 
their pimps. (Ameena) 
You can see it in town, I know so many people who have seen it, but 
it is just one of those things, it is really difficult to deal with it 
because the girls are thinking there are some guys who are paying 
attention to them. `I've got myself an older boyfriend and he's got a 
car and he's got money... ' So what can you say to those girls, 'No, 
you've been fooled'. They are not gonna believe you. (Ali) 
One imam was told by taxi drivers that Asian girls are to be found working in 
saunas as prostitutes in Bradford to pay for their drug habits. 
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While these taxi drivers' rumours were not corroborated by any direct 
experience, accounts about Pakistani girls ending up in prostitution had been 
circulating in the community at least since 2001, when a Pakistani female lawyer 
recounted to me of when she had been called in by the police when they had 
arrested a young Pakistani girl during a prostitution raid. 
Women were often also seen as the first victims of their partners' or 
husbands' criminal deeds. Aliya -an old lady to whom families in her 
neighbourhood refer as being believed to know special prayers and be very 
effective with them- recounted the tragic parable of a woman whose life had been 
destroyed by her marriage to a drug dealer: 
Aliya: When Salma at number 6, her husband [went] to jail, she [was] 
poorly, she [had] kidney problems. She [was] crying [a lot], the 
husband for two years [went] to jail, [and] she collapsed. 
Amir: She was so depressed, so she came to [Aliya]'s. She is only 24 
years old. Her mum said [to Aliya], 'Can you put a spell on her... 'not 
a spell, but sort of a pray for her, and shawal [literally `question', 
`demand'], [reading] certain passages of the Quran that [could] 
actually help her to get over her sorrow, so they [came to see Aliya]. 
Aliya: She [was] very tight [thin], not eating... 
Amir: [Aliya] cursed the parents... her uncle, his sons have gone to jail 
[too], and [Aliya] criticized them: `why didn't you show to your 
children the right way? ' (... ) Her husband has gone to jail, and his 
family are the ones who go to jail, but because she is an outsider, a 
young girl coming to this family, her husband is in jail for the next 10 
years, she is depressed, the family uses her as a slave, so it is the case 
of... [Aliya] feels very, very sorry for her and for example her brother 
in law has been to prison now and he got married and he is divorced 
now, or she has divorced him, but now the mother is saying [to Aliya] 
'why don't you pray, can you pray for him to get another wife? ' and 
[Aliya] quite obviously says 'no! he doesn't deserve another wife, he 
did not deserve a wife in the first place', so she is a very straight talker, 
she doesn't care who she is talking to. 
Drugs, either sold or consumed, were therefore perceived as the greatest threat to 
the community, with consequences that were trickling into the heart of family 
lives. 
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7.5 Poisoning the community 
While most of the press attention and moral panic about Bradford and its Pakistani 
community involved fear of terrorism and other rioting, these were topics rarely 
discussed by the respondents, unless openly asked to. Terrorism and rioting were 
considered extraordinary episodes that would not necessarily erode the core of the 
community, although there was awareness of the effects of terrorism-related 
Islamophobia and the strain on their reputation produced by past riots. Behaviours 
seen as having long term destabilising consequences, instead, were of greater 
concern. This was evident in conversations with shopkeepers on White Abbey 
Lane (where the 2001 riots started) and Leeds Road (once defined by the 
Telegraph and Argus as `Bronx' and now commonly referred to as such). The 
former were optimistic about the development of their business and were 
surprised that I mentioned the riots as a symptom of a general disadvantage of the 
area; they considered it an isolated episode that had nothing to do with the 
community, but rather with the reaction to an isolated event: the threat of the BNP 
marching on Bradford. By comparison the latter group, in spite of enjoying a 
renaissance of Leeds Road where many new shops had opened and the house 
prices had considerably gone up, tended to have deeper concerns about the future 
of their areas2. These, according to some parents, ranged from anti-social 
behaviour to drug dealing: 
Anti-social behaviour impacts on the community because we are 
living in the community, it impacts on me! (... ) we are Pakistani, 
yeah, and if you grow up in an area where there is quite a lot of your 
extended family there, you are very inter-linked, aren't you? One is 
doing it, potentially the other one is doing it, the third is doing it, the 
cousin is doing it, the nephew is doing it... they find it quite difficult to 
manage that... where... a son is going off the rails, and another son is 
going off the rails and they all seem to get off the rails, they are all 
2 Similar views seem to be expressed in Bradford amongst the white community (cf. Harrison and 
Phillips 2005: 183). 
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hanging around in gangs, they are not doing anything 
constructive... they are not going to school, they are not 
learning.. 
. they might not be selling drugs, but it may go on to that kind of behaviour and they are finding it very difficult (Zameer) 
One respondent defined the long term process of negative change with the 
evocative expression of `poisoning the community': 
They have poisoned the community. And you know, when you do 
well in the community, everyone wants a piece of that. If you've got a 
nice car outside your house, the next person will buy a nice car as 
well. If you buy nice clothes, [the] next person wants to wear it. This 
is what I am talking about. They are like sheep, they can't think for 
themselves. The thing is they can't think for themselves because they 
don't understand they are poisoning the community, their own family. 
Because they are all following their way (Abdul) 
Another seemed to express a similar concept with a religious metaphor: 
So for example the teachings of Prophet Mohammed. . . 
for example, 
he says that if you keep company with a blacksmith you will smell 
like a blacksmith afterwards. So you haven't done anything, you just 
kept company with him, but his type of job is very dirty, very smelly 
and if you keep company with him you'll smell like him after a while. 
But if you keep company with someone who sells perfumes you will 
smell like him afterwards, so we do believe that changing the 
atmosphere and the company makes a big difference (Imran) 
Pearson (1999: 401) has observed how modernity in its various forms can be seen 
as the cause of the `erosion of communities', especially when supposedly 
"rootless urban anonymity" destroys "social bonds of culture and tradition". Here, 
however, the poisoning had both this moral form and a more practical one: 
Jamil: Business wise we have been affected (... ) because a lot of 
people have [been] driven away from this area, so people.. . you 
know, 
we used to get a lot of the clientele from outside, to come to the area 
to buy. Now we don't get much of that. 
Me: And is that because of the reputation of the area? 
Jamil: Exactly. (... ) They [drug dealers] are not benefiting the 
community, they are making it worse because to be honest with you, 
if somebody hangs around, 16-17 years old, doing nothing and being 
better off than anybody else, they will want to do the same thing as 
him. That is why they don't go and work for somebody. They don't 
wanna work hard labour, they want it the easy way. 
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If they [criminals] had actually stopped and thought about it, they 
looked back at it, they would see how much impact it has on people 
who are stealing... they might steal from, let's say, a supermarket, and 
they might steal for years and years and years, what it comes down to 
at the end, it comes down to the taxpayers, that loss ... or even your local community such as in the riots when in my area... our taxes have 
been high. I couldn't actually get a credit card for two years because I 
lived in that area of Bradford. It was just my postcode that stopped 
me from getting a credit card. And I actually found this out when I 
spoke to someone about it 'cos I kept being refused. And I talked to 
someone and said? It must be your postcode' and I asked 'Why does 
that matter? ' They went: if there have been a lot of troubles in that 
area, if that area is black listed for some reason or the other and it is 
not a potential area where we can get profit from that area, so.. . things like that they have an impact (Zaara) 
The poisoning of the community was a practical and moral term also linked to 
`community breakdown'. Participants normally referred to a time when the 
community was very cohesive and the crime rate low, while at present the 
situation was the opposite. Sometimes, however, there were different positions on 
whether the breakdown was an effect of drugs and their string of deviant 
behaviours, or whether these had been generated by it: 
Akbar: Everybody now is [a] family man. Before they live[d] with 
15,20 people, not just by myself [oneself], it was too different [a] 
position [from what it is] now. Everybody [no is a] family man, the 
children are born, children grown, that is a problem, growing. When 
they grow it is problem, it is not all the time [the] same position (... ) 
everybody think of himself, [they are] not in the same position [to] 
help one another. 
Amir: I think because before they were only single males from 
different families, and then some brought the wives over, then they 
got their own families and the second generation, third generation, 
their families have got so big that they can only help themselves. 
If I am out for myself, who cares if I affect another 15 people.. . at 
last 
I have succeeded and this is the mentality we have been bred into. 
This is the mentality my father has been bred into, and this is the 
mentality the kids are growing into. (Imran) 
The idea of poisoning and contamination can help in understanding the managing 
of the classification of crime within the community. 
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7.5.1 Purity and Contamination: haram, halal and makkru 
Amongst the behaviours threatening to `poison the community', drug related 
issues were the one mentioned most often. The strings of their consequences were 
also considered as jeopardising community life. Moral fervour and ideas of order, 
of purity and non-purity3 in the community seemed to be underpinned by both a 
religious and a cultural discourse with blurring boundaries typical of the `religion 
vs. Culture' debate (see 6.3). Religious terms used to describe wrong doing were 
haram for the deeds (i. e. `drinking is haram') and the deeds' profit (i. e. `haram 
money through drug dealing') and hrami (also translated as `bastard') for the 
subjects involved in haram activities (i. e. `do not speak with that guy, he is 
hraini'). These religious terms seemed to bear a cultural connotation when they 
were used to increase negative labelling by quantifying their impact on the 
community networks: 
You know, a lot of businesses in Bradford, the ones who were really 
successful, when they came first over, they are the ones who brought 
3 Pollution as threat to society order is common coinage in anthropology. Douglas has argued that 
the fear of `dirt' is fear of 'disorder' (Douglas 1966/2002: 2): `eliminating it is not a negative 
moment but a positive effort to organise the environment' (ibid. ). And again: 'the ideas about 
separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions have as their main function to 
impose system on an inherently untidy experience. It is only by exaggerating the difference 
between within and without, about and below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance 
of order is created' (ibid: 4); 'disorder spoils pattern' (ibid: 95). Those are in fact dynamic 
features: 'there is every reason to believe that they are sensitive to change. The same impulse to 
impose order which brings them into existence can be supposed to be continually modifying or 
enriching them' (ibid: 5). The idea of dirt is not only to do with hygiene, but also with respect of 
conventions (ibid: 7). 'Propriety' (appropriateness, conformity with conventions, etc. ) may be a 
form of purity, as it seems relevant to this context. 
Society 'reward[s] conformity and repulse[s] attack' (ibid: 115). Ideas of purity and non-purity 
maintain the social structure (ibid: 132). However, as showed by the case study of the Nuer (ibid: 
133) when sense of outrage is 'adequately equipped with practical sanctions', 'pollution is not 
likely to rise' (ibid. ). Pollution is then clearly linked to the feelings of threat, of a perceived danger 
that arises frustration as society members recognise an incapability of practically sanctioning 
disorder: 'when moral indignation is not reinforced by practical sanctions, pollution beliefs can 
provide a deterrent to wrongdoers' (ibid: 134). In the case of pollution by drugs in the Pakistani 
community, the lack of practical sanction obviously does not refer to the inexistence of a legal 
system that rule on drug dealing and drug taking, but to the widespread frustrating feeling that 
there is not much that can be done about it. 
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the stuff over first and everything. I can quickly mention companies 
and names... (... ) because you know my mum, my family, you go to 
Mirpur and everybody knows everybody, it is a community where they 
know everything and it is like... my mum tells me stories that so and 
so, how they have done it. And we say halal or we say haram. Halal is 
when you are eating from your plate and you are sharing, and people 
do haram when they have got so much but they don't share from the 
same plate. (Adam) 
And again: 
If you feed harain to your family, it will grow haram. (Adam) 
In Islamic jurisprudence, haram is translated as `unlawful' or `forbidden'; halal is 
its opposite, while inakkru is the area in between where what is accepted but not 
encouraged lies. The most known side of this part of Islamic jurisprudence is 
related to food: alcohol is haram, meat butchered according to the Islamic way is 
halal and in absence of halal meat, any meat but pork may be consumed, as in that 
circumstance it would only be makkru. During fieldwork this terminology was 
much more widely deployed, as from Adam's example above. 
The definition of haram in fact seemed to include the potential of a 
contamination: money earned through criminal or non-Muslim activities (e. g. 
selling alcohol)'was seen as creating negative contamination. For any act of 
contamination, however, there seemed to be an act of purification that, however, 
would not necessarily happen without controversies. Some respondents, for 
instance, were aware of a highest form of money laundering, or money 
purification, that some drug dealers seemed to exert. Through donating part of 
their haram earnings to mosques or charity, the rest of the capital was by some 
believed to turn into halal as it had gone though purification. Henceforth: 
Amir: It is the case we have to have... and then the drug dealer in the 
community or the businessman will say'well, I will donate so much'... 
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Mahima: You are not allowed to accept that money because that money 
has killed and ruined families... 
Me: Is it haram money? 
Mahima: It does not belong anywhere. 
Amir: The number of mosques that are run with haram 
money... (sighs) 
Pakistani people believe that religion and business are one, unlike the 
Pathans, so the Pathans see nothing wrong in drug dealing. Ok, they 
see it as ' we are breaking the law, but we are not breaking Islamic law', 
you know what I mean? But they do, because it is not halal, it is haram 
(Jamal) 
Many respondents of Mirpuri origin held the belief (not corroborated by Pathan 
research participants) that Pathans would make allowances for themselves in 
doing Karam as they were living in a non-Muslim country and therefore they 
survived taking advantages of the corruption of the land. A similar view described 
with the concept of `ghanimat'4 was said to be circulating in groups such as Hizb- 
ut-Tahrir and referred to the idea of war booty, in the case of drug dealing in 
exploiting kuffars (infidels). One fifth of the war booty is supposed to `belong to 
Allah' and therefore may be used for zakkat5 related activities. 
Other comments about living in a kafir (singular of kuffar) land, although 
completely detached from war metaphors, were reflected in comments about 
living as good Muslims in such environment. Shaheen, whose two 15 years old 
nephews had been sponsored by a local mosque to go to India and become Quran 
hafiz6, believed that being away from any harain manifestation (from bad 
television programmes to drugs) was the only feasible way to pursue a karim 
(blessed) life. 
Thanks to Philip Lewis for alerting me to the concept of ghaninrat and to Mazhar Malik and 
Tajul Islam for their help in coming to terms with it. 
5 The annual amount of charity compulsory for all Muslims, one of the five pillars of Islam. 
6 Hafizs are those who have learnt the Quran by heart. 
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Some allowances for haram activities seemed to be made in an instance 
that seems to be consistent with the concept of makkru. For example, a rumour 
circulated in Bradford that a religious figure was willing to make taweez (amulets, 
see 11.3) for the success of businesses in spite of them selling alcohol. 
The extreme of the view about the dichotomy haram/halal was represented 
by Faisal, a young listener of a Sunrise Radio talk show at the end of February 
2005, who called the programme to complain about the views represented on air 
that tended to blame the parents for young Asians going astray. Faisal instead said 
that in a country where Muslims could hardly avoid haram substances hidden in 
food colorants etc. or were not bothered by eating halal meat, let alone drinking 
alcohol, these forms of intoxication could not help but develop bad behavioural 
patterns. The effectiveness of prayers would also be jeopardised by the presence 
of haram in the body. This view, however, never emerged during fieldwork. 
Research participants were instead concerned with a broader concept of 
haram/halal and pollution, strictly linked to the preservation and well-being of the 
social structure. Social structure, however, was considered positive only in its 
broadest connotation. Inward looking networks were in fact considered negative 
in the crime prevention economy (see 9.3). 
6. Crime as threat to the community stability 
This chapter has explored the main concerns about criminal activities from the 
Bradford Pakistani point of view. In the focus groups the initial brainstorming led 
to acknowledgement of drugs (smoking), rape, gun crime, street gangs, 
unprotected sex (AIDS), kidnap/abduction, joy-riders, mugging/stealing, racial 
abuse and drinking as their parents' concerns. Burglaries in some areas were also 
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described as a serious problem, and practitioners added domestic violence to the 
list. Anywhere, however, the greatest preoccupation emerged as drugs. Some were 
aware of what was considered a massive threat to the preservation of the 
community: the involvement of women in criminal activities, or their struggle in 
coping with families. where drugs had been taken up by the men of the family. In 
conversations, drugs were described as the source of a chain of deviant behaviours 
including all the ones mentioned in the focus groups, burglaries and domestic 
violence. Furthermore, drug addiction and the emulation of the dealers' life-style 
were considered as main causes of family and community breakdown, the 
"emptying-out of social structures, of the institutions of socio-economic and 
cultural regulation" (Collison 1999: 437) experimented by other urban 
communities. 
The Pakistani community was therefore confirmed as an important element 
in the study of deviance for three reasons: 
-community appeared to be the benchmark for the classification of crimes (the 
greater the threat to the community, the greater the crime) 
-the diffused panic about the `erosion of community' (cf. 9.2) 
-the community's distinctiveness in dealing with crime (cf. 11.8) 
A widespread necessity of self-preservation and stability of both families 
and the community is recurrent in other Bradford based research on Pakistanis 
(Harrison and Phillips 2005: 173,175) and here emerged from interviews across 
the sample groups: 
[Parents] are afraid they [sons] might just walk out of the house. This 
is what they are afraid of (Jamil) 
Me: I heard stories about families not really caring about their 
children dealing, but starting getting worried when they take it... 
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Zaara: [Because] it is gonna affect the balance of the family. 
Especially if it is girls. 
Although community was an endangered element, and its stability at stake, that 
very community was seen by many as the potential solution to the present 
problems: 
The first generation community is looking for stability; the second 
generation has lost its identity... how do we bring it back? Identity is 
brought back by longing to something, whether it is football club, or 
it is an association, by belonging to an association you need to have 
something in common (... ). You have to start initially to bring that 
stability back, some of these after schools mosques or Sunday 
schools, or after school hours, I would encourage anybody to send 
their child to go and learn the language of their mothers and fathers. 
(Iqbal) 
The vision that the community is at the centre of threat but will also provide the 
solutions to the problems was corroborated by a narrative of what in the analysis 
was called `putting things back in the community'. By reinvesting into one's 
community, both economically and personally, many research participants 
believed that the drift towards bad role models could be fought: 
So I joined the Public Services course and learnt everything from 
there and decided: `yes I want to go in'... for many reasons, such as 
putting back something in the community I grew up in, it sounds such 
a cliche... I'm sorry, but giving something back to the community you 
have lived in and helping someone, if you help one person it might be 
a minor difference to someone else (Zaara) 
I was kicked out of my school because I was always in fights with 
other girls and boys. I decide I would do something for people like 
me, people who did not get anything out of school. I decided to take 
up youth work, although I had been offered a job at the Inland 
Revenue and I would have been paid more. (Ameena) 
`Putting things back' appeared often as a criterion to address positive and negative 
role models: passivity towards the community was generally considered as much 
of a sin as being involved in illegal activities. A respondent, in spite of his being 
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very devout, accused some religious groups like Tableegh Jamaat (see 9.5 and 
11.1.2) of neglecting the community by employing their energies outside it: 
That's the other extreme, they don't work, they become very lazy, 
they give nothing back positively in the community (Imran) 
On the other hand, many interviewees defined `putting things back in the 
community' as a strategy to win if not consensus at least non opposition from their 
area: 
Some drug dealers sponsor good things in the community, they are 
saviour with one hand and instigator with the other (Kamran) 
Exceptions aside, the narrative of `putting things back in the community' seemed 
to identify a commonly shared moral value in the circulation of positive norms, 
models and finances. This seemed to suggest the positive connotation given to 
horizontal ties, a theme that will be dealt with in 9.2. 
Overall, the construction of a pathological Bradford Pakistani community 
was strongly challenged although very serious concerns about its future emerged. 
The solutions, however, were according to many lying within the community 
itself. At a conference organised by a grassroots organisation, one Pakistani man 
working for a local institution spoke in the plenary session in order to criticize the 
organisers. He argued that they were letting people leave the conference with a 
very damaging idea about the Pakistani community, thus contributing to diffuse 
the views that external commentators had created about Bradford. Instead of 
focusing on drug abuse, mental illness and forced marriage, he suggested the 
conference should have been about the potential of the Pakistani community who, 
according to him, happened to have more resources than other communities to 
fight these problems. As an example, he mentioned the role that the extended 
family could play in helping children in leaving drugs and getting employment 
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(cf. family as an agent of social control and reform in chapter Eleven). The 
community resources and networks (cf. 6.2.1) were described as essential to 
articulate discourses around crime, the same principles on which national 
community crime prevention strategies are based (Burnside and Baker 1994: 19). 
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Chapter Eight 
Attributions of blame: structural variables and the environment 
The previous chapter focused on the fact that the majority of research participants 
did not believe in crime as an `endemic' problem in the Pakistani community, as 
opposed to the national view tending to represent Bradford Pakistanis as 
dysfunctional (Imtiaz 2002: 11; Modood 2004: 101). Criminological studies that 
have tried to dispel the myth of some `racial' pathologies have however drawn 
attention to specific structural constraints affecting certain groups. 
Consequentially, it may seem that a group, although not criminogenic per se, 
could be criminogenic in virtue of the specific structural disadvantages affecting 
it, producing similar effects: its essential deviance (Tatum 2000: xi, 5, sees 2.5). 
Many accounts on the lives of Pakistanis in Britain have pointed at deprivation as 
the main factor leading to general disadvantage and social problems (Singh 
2001: 8; Bagguley and Hussain 2003c: 1; Jan-Khan 2003: 33, see 5.2). Pakistanis 
are also one of the poorest communities in Bradford (Ouseley, 2001). So far the 
tendency has seemed to be to research the community as a pathological context 
where economic struggle victimises the community. Some authors, on the other 
hand, have tried to balance this view by saying that focussing only on economic 
variables may be the equivalent of attaching to the community a passive character 
(Ballard 1992, see 2.8). Others have highlighted a series of questions that cannot 
necessarily be answered only by deprivationism, i. e. why some men of South 
Asian heritage are academically under-achievers and others over-achievers 
(Modood 2004: 95). We have already discussed how Ballard (1992, cf. 2.8) 
suggests that an analysis focussed mainly on external, structural factors tends to 
161 
convey the idea of a passive group incapable of reaction to contingencies. This 
approach can potentially produce a patronising attitude in the researcher and is 
usually constructed around Western benchmarks and values. In studies thus 
conducted there is little space for emie accounts, that is to say an approach that 
links evidence into the coherent complexity of a specific context, and 
consequently for the acknowledgement of agency. 
Some respondents seemed to agree: 
You know, there is that defective [sic] attitude where... you 
know... 'the world is against us'. The world is not against you! You 
can think like that and you will never get anywhere, right, and that 
doesn't mean that there is no discrimination, because there is, there is 
no doubt about it. You see it in the work place, and if you say there 
isn't, then there is something wrong. It is there, but you've got to make 
an effort and you've got to challenge it and things don't change without 
people doing something. You as a person, you as a community are not 
gonna change unless there is an effort made. So you can't blame all 
your problems on everybody else! You've got to take some 
responsibility! (... ) You know, humans have a choice between making 
right or wrong (Zameer) 
So I think the cause of the problems for drugs is not the area you live 
in, it is not if you live in a terraced house or a semi-detached house or 
a council estate area, because I know some Muslims who do live in [a] 
council estate area, but they... you know.. . nice family, there is no drugs in their house or anything like that. They are having no problems 
with their children, because the upbringing of their children has been 
Islamic. (Fatima) 
These views seemed to reflect the mentality that has been described in this way: 
"We as a group are striving and struggling to achieve higher status and prosperity, 
respectability, in this land where the dice is loaded against us but success is 
achievable, and you have to play your part"(Modood 2004: 100). Moved by the 
need of combining knowledge of agency, this study will consider both 
environmental and cultural variables that may share attribution of blame as far as 
crime is concerned from the study population. This chapter will focus on the data 
that refer to an environmental part played in the production of crime. 
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As environmental or structural factors we mean all those elements that are not 
internalised in the community or the individuals, but are objective existent 
variables that have to be accounted for in social life. Environmental or structural 
factors mentioned during the research were economic recession, discrimination, 
deprivation, demography and education, and the conclusion will evaluate their 
role in the production of crime as it was expressed by the research participants. 
8.1 The Asian Economic Niche 
Some authors have described ethnic entrepreneurship as the minorities' saviour 
from the harshest backlashes of the 1970s recession and the industrial crisis 
(Ballard 1990: 224; Basu 1998: 314,315,323; Singh 2001: 9) and some have 
referred to this stream of analysis as `ethnicity as a resource' (Modood 2004: 88). 
The conversion from textile mills to catering and taxi ranks (see 5.4), 
however, has only been partially investigated in its long term economic or social 
consequences in the lives of Pakistani communities in Britain (Kalra 2000). 
According to many research participants, some choices made by the pioneers of 
ethnic entrepreneurship led to some fundamental changes to family life and 
consequently the community. 
One of the most popular views in this respect will be mentioned with 
regards to bad parenting (cf. 11.1): local politician Iqbal proffered a sort of mea 
culpa by saying that fathers who worked on multiple shifts day and night or for 
unsociable hours in take-aways or taxi ranks had unavoidably neglected their 
children who grew up without guidance. Community worker Kamran said that 
when the ones who were supposed to be role models were out working day and 
night, their sons could only find guidance amongst their peers, and that was when 
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everything went wrong in the community. Kamran also believed that the drug 
problem within the Pakistani community was something that came about not 
earlier than ten years ago. Many others, on the other hand, were ready to point at 
contiguity to drugs much older than that, and that had origins connected with the 
new `Asian economic niche'. They believed in fact that although the nature of the 
involvement in drugs was different at that time ('it wasn't a life-style like it is 
now', Kamran, interview with author) many of the older generations had been 
involved in the drug business as a sporadic activity in order to pay a mortgage, 
open a shop or start a restaurant (cf. also Pearson and Patel 1998: 220): 
Let me tell summat... you know, a lot of businesses in Bradford, the 
ones who were really successful, when they came first over, they are 
the ones who brought the stuff [drugs] over first and everything. I can 
quickly mention companies and names... (... ) because you know my 
mum, my family, you go to Mirpur and everybody knows everybody, 
it is a community where they know everything and it is like ... my mum 
tells me stories that so and so, how they have done it. (Adam) 
Amir: 99%, 99% of Asian businesses are from drug money, or... 
ME. I will have to write this, are you sure you want to say it? 
Amir: I am serious.. . or on crime related money, that is a fact. The 
only business I know that has not built upon in the whole Bradford it is 
my dad's business and it closed down because we couldn't survive. 
ME: What is your perception, Mahima ? 
Mahima: I am sure the majority is drug money. 
ME: But the drug business came along quite recently... 
Mahima: You can go back 20 years and you can look at one of the 
biggest companies around. . . can I mention people's names? ME: Yes, but I will delete the name in the transcription. 
Mahima: Ok, like (... ) for example. We all know that his wife went to 
jail because she was bringing drug over from Pakistan to start the 
business here. She got caught, but a lot of them... 
Amir: All gold shops are [built on drug money] as well... 
According to some, the new professions that come with the `Asian economic 
niche' brought with them an ideal flexibility for bigger illicit profits; for example, 
many believed that in taxi ranks the drug business had flourished due to the 
mobility implied in the job. Hence, many research participants refused to 
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introduce me to taxi drivers who often appeared as the `folk devils' of Bradford. 
Certain timetables typical of the catering business were seen as ideal to provide a 
suitable alibi in front of the parents (see also `double life' in 10.2): 
They [the parents] will worry, but now it has come to a stage where 
lads will say to mum and dad 'I am going to work, I am working in a 
restaurant or a take away somewhere' and they will be out dealing, 
rather than working in a restaurant from 5 till 3 in the morning and get 
£15,20 ... if you look at the small time dealers they can make a couple 
of hundred quid in a night, but then if you look at top end dealers, who 
are heroine dealers, you know... they can make... what? Sell a kilo of 
heroine for 90 grand and they get it for a third and they sell it 90 
(Jamal) 
Many respondents said that whenever people did not withdraw from the drug 
business after the alleged `one-off' paid costs of a mortgage or a shop off, drug- 
related fights or arson attacks between drug dealing clans (see 10.4) led to a 
vicious circle where crime started feeding more and more criminal activities. This 
was not only a case of `poisoning the community' (cf. 7.5) by creating bad role 
models, but also the cause of a more practical effect such as the discouragement 
of investments in the areas affected: 
You were destroying your own community because you know, (... )if 
people are gonna give investments to the Asians, it is not gonna 
happen, is it? (Zameer) 
So, if a certain area missed development opportunities as investors were 
discouraged to put money where there were so many troubles, the area would get 
more and more impoverished. 
8.2 Deprivation, discrimination and unemployment 
The concept of poverty or deprivation was described in this way: 
When someone is poor it means there are not enough jobs, not skills 
enough, the education attendance is poor (Kamran) 
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Shamim, who had been a health visitor and community worker for 20 years, 
recounted that when she started her home visits in the Pakistani community she 
would see families living below the breadline. Although she would no more see 
episodes of starvation, she still had to deal with overcrowded houses, poor health, 
lack of health sense and gender discrimination or even domestic violence all 
related, in her opinion, to ignorance and lack of education. The idea of the 
respondents employed within the social services or grass-roots organisations 
tended to be that it was too early to celebrate a success in the fight against 
deprivation although something had been achieved. Where social disadvantage 
was still present, they would expect criminal behaviours to develop, although 
dictated not by an economic necessity but by lack of education or even `greed'. 
Lack of education and opportunities were generally classified under 
deprivation, and the frustration about it appeared in the following words of a 
woman whose job is to organise training about equal opportunities. In her view, 
the attention of politics and the media was erroneously focussed on issues that 
were not the ones mainly affecting the youth: 
Across the border is discontent. I think for a lot of young people, for 
not being able to access jobs, career opportunities, schooling, they see 
the discontent in the way they are treated and they are not heard. You 
know, with me when people say 'oh this Asian youth are so aggressive 
and so loud', but when you go to a white council estate, what do you 
see? White aggressive youth, it doesn't matter what colour they are, 
and I think it is time that people stop seeing them as colour, as black 
and white, but see them as kids and young people. When we did our 
last conference we had the media ringing up 'we want to interview 
you, we know you do stuff on forced marriage and we want to speak 
with a young person' and this was like national media, but I said 'I am 
sorry, but I am not interested, this is not the only thing we work on. 
We do drugs, culture, truancy, substance misuse, we are doing it on 
issues that affect all young people and there is a bit on forced 
marriage, that is it'. (Ayesha) 
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Sometimes deprivation was seen as an act of denial of resources for what should 
be a right (to education, health, etc. ) by either the government or the council: 
The most common problem in Horton Grange is poverty. When 
someone is poor it means there are not enough jobs, not skills enough, 
the education attendance is poor. There are two or three schools in the 
area, but there is one teacher and one or two support workers for 30, 
40 students (it is because the government spends all the money on 
war). (Kamran) 
The council says for example: `We'll give you one to three grand but 
we want you to do this', but we don't necessarily agree with [what they 
want us to agree to]. (Imran) 
Ayesha: There was nothing, there is absolutely nothing. Bradford 
Council is the worst local authority when it came to South Asian 
women. I did a piece of work to look at allocation of funding and I 
compared the funding to an Asian women refuge and a White women 
refuge and the Asian women refuge would receive 42 grant a year, the 
white refuge over 150,000 a year. 
Me. Is it because of the numbers? 
Ayesha: Racism, right in your face! And the men in the community 
aren't going to support it, because they don't want women's refuges. 
Some, however, still saw the general lack of job opportunities as the cause of 
some young people turning to crime: 
Me. So do you think people turn to drugs because they don't have any 
other opportunities? 
Jamal: There is no other way out. I know a guy with a PhD who is 
dealing because he can't get a job. He has got a PhD and his friend has 
got a master in Philosophy or something and none of them can find a 
job, so they are dealing in drugs. That is what it has come to. I have 
got a cousin of mine who has got a master in chemistry and he can't 
find a job. 
Me. Why do you think they are not as law abiding as the first 
generation... is it because of unemployment? 
Jamal: Exactly, there is no industry around here, the mills are closed, 
so... 
Men in their thirties, however, would refer to the `laziness' of the younger men in 
comparison to their experience, and entrepreneur Jamil complained he struggled 
to find people to employ in his local shop: 
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It is hard at the moment, nobody wants to come into this trade, nobody 
wants to work now. (Jamil) 
It is not the case about making a quick fix, nobody wants to struggle 
now, nobody wants to say 'I've got to get up at 4 o'clock in the 
morning, go to the factory and walk there and come back at 5 in the 
afternoon'... [rather] 'son, forget that, just get a couple of kilos of 
heroin, go and sell it on the corner, come around in a nice Porsche'... it 
is accepted unfortunately. (Amir) 
Twenty-three years old drug dealer Azad admitted that after working hard in a 
local greengrocer's for six years he wanted to `chill out a bit' with a different life- 
style. On the other hand, some believed that laziness was not a character feature 
of drug dealers: 
Me. Other people would argue that if they really wanted a job they 
would have it, but they are lazy. 
Jamal: You know, drug dealers work hard for the money. It is not easy 
dealing with drugs. 
Although institutional racism (MacPherson 1999: 5,20-35) did appear in the 
interviews, mentioned by those who had familiarised with this terminology and 
theory through their job, many more views found that it was insufficient to justify 
the rise in criminal activities in the community: 
There is a lot-there is still a lot of stigma about racism and it does 
exist, there is no doubt about that, but ... 
it is up to you... my belief is, 
if I didn't get into a job that was the dream job I wanted, and even if I 
did believe and had solid proofs it was due to racism, I wouldn't turn to 
crime, I just got back and do something else until I knew that maybe 
there will be a chance to get this job in the future and tackle this 
racism head on if I can, and I will do it, but going into crime (... )You 
are not starving. You are choosing to be a criminal, it is not out of 
desperation. If for example... in Britain there is no reason why anyone 
should be a criminal, unless for very extreme reasons. For example if 
you.. . someone was 
in Iraq at the moment with all the situation going 
on now, someone was stealing, and you can't ... and you say to them 
'Why have you stolen? ' 'It is because I need food'. You can justify it. 
Not saying it's right, but you can justify why they have done it, you 
can sense a logic in that, but here you have every single benefit that 
you can possibly think of. (Zaara) 
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Some thought that mentioning racism was the `survival of the survival argument': 
[Some] people say, 'you know we are in an alien environment we've 
got to survive and survival is the highest priority, so can we really 
condemn? ' (Abdul) 
Hussain and Fozia, a married couple in their late twenties, had been looking for 
jobs for some time when they were interviewed. They did not believe in 
institutional racism, but Hussain was convinced that many employers had a 
problem in taking him up because of his beard and his Islamic tunic, a style he 
had slowly developed after abandoning the peers who had apparently introduced 
him to light drugs. This was one of the many cases encountered during research 
where Islamophobia was mentioned as one of the causes of frustration and 
discontent amongst the Pakistani youth. Islamophobia was mentioned more times 
than racism as a form of prejudice and discrimination. On the other hand, Hussain 
and Fozia who were also first cousins, said that they could rely on two sources for 
surviving: their extended family (cf. Mawby and Bhatta 1980: 26; Wardak 
2000: 72; Harrison and Phillips 2005: 181) and the welfare system. They did not 
perceive discrimination at a State level and praised the welfare state as many 
other informants did, although some worried that `signing on' would become a 
habit for many young men who had never seen their fathers working. 
8.3 'The lure of big things': opportunity theory 
If many participants agreed that in Bradford criminals did not become so out of 
necessity, thanks to the welfare state, on the other hand many could see a cause of 
an economic nature behind the rise in crime: 
I think a lot of it has to do with easy money. I think it is when the kids, 
they have got this head set, it is easy money, fast cars, fast life, and 
169 
they'll be the heroes... and for others it will be more putting food on 
the table, keeping the family together, because the responsibility of 
some young men who are forced to take for themselves, you know, as 
... you will grow up, get married, take responsibility of your parents, 
your family, and you will provide. Very, very big responsibility 
(Ayesha) 
It is like families from generations that they say 'don't do it' and then 
their kids are revolting against them you know, they want to make 
money really fast because they have seen their family poverty and they 
don't want to be in that, so to get money really fast, this is what people 
have done (Abdul) 
Some called it poverty, although they were not speaking of situations below the 
breadline, but of a relative deprivation: 
Young people commit crime because of poverty; if they like a pair of 
trainers and they can't afford it, they will use any means to get it. But 
they don't have to do that for food or accommodation, the parents 
provide for that. (... ) They also say: 'I am not gonna screw up with a 
degree and still [be] driving a cab' (Kamran) 
Young people tended to describe scenarios where other young people would be 
influenced by `the lure of big things' and aspired to a life-style that either for lack 
of education or alleged `laziness' was precluded to them: 
I think is the lure of big things, money, cars, nice clothes, status, 
recognition. I think it is the lure of those things why people do illegal 
things because then they become recognised (... ) in the community, 
[you] become highly respected if you've got money you've got clout. 
(Abdul) 
FC2 A: you've got the culture-like with [R'nB] music [videos] and 
stuff-and little kids wanna... and you see all these people make easy 
money, innit? And kids want that, they want them cars, they see that is 
the only way to get it that easy. 
FC2 B: They want a good life... everything. 
Discourses of relative deprivation and lack of opportunities to reach the goals that 
consumerist society promotes seemed to be compatible with Merton's opportunity 
theory (Merton 1938): individuals frustrated by the impossibility of achieving 
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what they aspire to due to society's `must-haves' are likely to by-pass orthodox 
ways and resort even to criminal activities (Braithwaite 1989: 31; Eadie and 
Morley 1999; Tatum 2000: 5) 
Older people, instead, tended to assume a more judgemental position 
labelling this attitude as `greed' (Abdul, interview with author): 
My reasoning for that is this came about because the whole mentality, 
whether it was Asian mentality whether the indigenous population 
mentality was actually changed during the Thatcher era, because the 
greed factor came in. Prior to that I remember as a child you know, we 
didn't have that greed factor. It was just... we got by, ok. But the greed 
factor came in where I noticed you know, being having been through 
that, instead of the intellectuals, the people with skills, being given, 
how should I say, the priority instead of accountants, the people who 
were high earners in those days. Priority wasn't given to the thinkers, 
the teachers, the people who do the very important jobs like 
electricians, plumbers, engineers and plus they were not paid 
accordingly to what accountants' pay was. And that's when things 
changed and accountants decided how many nurses should be working 
in this department instead of the person who was in charge of the 
nursing staff. So that's when the change came about and affected 
everybody, not just the Asian community. (Iqbal) 
8.3 Class and 'Sharifisation' 
Class and its relation to crime was rarely mentioned. Whether there was a belief 
that middle-class individuals were less likely to commit crime was therefore left 
unexplored, although comments on the positive relation between education and 
areas of residence and lawfulness may assume that working class people were 
more likely to engage in crime. However, comments seemed to be more 
concentrated around status, perhaps relying on the original importance of caste 
(zat) in rural Pakistan (Werbner 1990; Shaw 2000; Lyon 2004). 
Informants have suggested that back home, politics and social relations are 
still very strongly determined by caste and the fact was not really concealed as its 
practice was considered to be an indicator of decent morality, in spite of Islam's 
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egalitarian teachings (Werbner 1990). In vilayat, however, issues regarding caste 
as a hierarchical system were apparently sheepishly avoided. Changes in the 
perception of zat (caste) reportedly regard also Ashrafization' or enhancing the 
pride of one's caste independently of its traditional ranking. 
A similar process seemed to be in action amongst drug dealers. One 
interviewee interestingly pointed out how drug dealers enjoy all the commodities 
that originally people assumed were only owned by eminent figures of the 
community: `They live a life of log sharif (Fatima, interview with author). `Log 
sharif in Urdu means'respectable people'. This paradox is not due to the fact that 
drug dealers are treated as respectable people, but to the fact that they are able to 
share the same facade: 
I do believe that as a result of them becoming more affluent within the 
community because of the car, the nice house, when they see this is 
what they were, this is where they are now, nice house, nice car, you 
know.. . and the community although it knows that they have done this by these means, i. e. drugs.. . it is haram money.. . they 
know that, there 
is a certain eliteness, look, I don't care, I got here, this is what you 
wanna be anyway (Imran) 
This could suggest that the aspirational reference (cf. `opportunity theory' above) 
is similar for any subgroup, but the means to achieve it are different. This may be 
confusing: 
People who don't deal in drugs, but they have got a top end car, still 
dress well, they are labelled as drug dealers. A friend of mine has just 
spent £17,000 on car and he is not a drug dealer, but still he is labelled 
as a drug dealer wherever he goes. (Jamal) 
It is the case everybody knows what is going on, and there is 
something... people who have really worked hard all their lives, the 
ones who have worked their backsides off and then drive around a nice 
1 Ashrafisation (Werbner 1989: 100) is the process through which someone adopts a name and a 
way of life different from the original ones in order to be more cohesive with a caste that would be 
more similar to the status gained by a person through economic success. Islamisation, on the other 
hand, is the process of adoption of a puritan Islam that goes together with an improvement in 
economy and status. 
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car, unfortunately are labelled as drug dealers as well, due to the 
majority of lazy people. (Amir) 
Drug dealers therefore seemed to be engaged in a process of Sharifisation, by 
developing consumerist patterns and acquiring status indicators that once 
belonged to log sharif such as doctors, lawyers, etc. At the same time, however, 
the children of sharif families were developing the `bad boy fashion' (cf. 10.3), 
allegedly causing some confusion in bad stereotyping. One anecdote shows how 
this confusion may reflect on outsiders' perceptions. One evening the author was 
speaking with one lawyer and one former policeman in their BMW, parked on a 
cliff, eating a take away, as it is customary with many Asian young men2. The two 
men were dressed in casual designer clothes (style that may be adopted by some 
drug dealers, cf. 10.3). A police van stopped and questioned us, searched the car 
and caused some tension when one police officer seemed to make inappropriate 
remarks. 
10.4 Demography and education 
So far the discussion on the Asian economic niche and on opportunity theory has 
seemed to focus mainly on the experiences of young men3. The attention given by 
the community to them will be more thoroughly discussed in 10.1 when taking 
2 Cf. Hanif Kureishi's interview with the boxer Amir Khan, The Observer, 12"' February 2006 
3 It is clear that the Pakistani community has a very young population: 
Table 8.1 Population of Bradford District 1998 by Age and Ethnic Group. 
Ethnic Group Age 
0-15 
Age 
16-17 
Age 
18-24 
Age 
25+ 
Total 
African 
Caribbean 
1685 203 573 3751 6212 
Bangladeshi 2163 269 858 1901 5191 
Indian 3387 504 1430 8106 13427 
Pakistani 26166 3043 9426 26999 65634 
White 78375 9784 32734 268353 389246 
Other 2374 310 845 3162 6691 
TOTAL 114150 14113 45866 312272 486401 
Source: Bashford et al. 2004: 7 
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into consideration masculinity. Here the analysis will be limited to the 
demographic issue as one of the alleged causes of the rise in crime: 
Me: What changed from when people came here to open honest 
businesses, and now... 
Akbar: Most of families, Indian and Pakistani, they don't have children 
at that time. Because not lot of family. 
Amir: What he is trying to say is that in the 1960s if the children were 
growing up, there would have been something going on! (laugh) 
Many respondents believed that taking risks was a sort of rite of passage for 
young men in any society and therefore the demographic indicators specific to the 
Pakistani community would automatically mean a proportionally higher rate of 
crime. This was consistent with literature on youth and crime (Collison 
1999: 434). Social worker Abdul called it `the sense of invincibility' of the youth, 
and younger respondents agreed with this view: 
Mc. [Do you agree with the statement that] young people are believed 
to be more likely to commit offences much more than older people? 
Do you think this is the case in your community? 
FG2C. I think yes, probably it is. 
FG2A. yes. 
Me Why? 
FG2C. I think people grow out of it, don't they? The younger ones they 
just want to have fun, a bit of a laugh, then they grow out of it. 
Me. Do you think so too? 
FG2I. Yes.. . that is what it 
is, innit? It is that they are mates. This is 
what I think, it is all about your friends, people you hang about with, 
stealing and stuff is not a big thing in front of them and they do it. 
I think amongst crimes like car thefts and.. . things 
like that, they 
happen amongst teenagers. One of the reasons for that is they are 
bored, there is not enough to do in that community... I have not come 
across that, I have met people who were stealing especially when I was 
young but I never come across someone doing it just to feed 
themselves, to put something on their table. (... ) ... they should 
just 
realize that teenagers... it's not good to do crime, but they want to have 
fun. (Ali) 
This may be one of the reasons why some families may be lenient with their sons: 
We (parents) know it is harwn, but we say: `he is only young, he is 
only enjoying himself. (... )' (Sheikh Ahmed Ali) 
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If youth are more prone to commit crime as a characteristic of their age which 
they will grow out of, the educational system where they are supposed to spend a 
substantial part of their lives was bound to be scrutinised in its roles and duties in 
controlling potential deviants: 
And I think are schools which are failing all kids in Britain and that is 
why if you do a careful study of the statements we hear, we expect 
prisons to bring up our children, we have a solution: schools, and if 
not, they go to prison and we expect the prisons they are now doing 
their job (Tahir) 
I know courses in Bradford, Bradford college courses are full, 
University courses are full, so a lot of them don't think it is for 
them. . . there is not a role model 
for them. And they think to succeed in 
Bradford you have to do a business. You see, a lot of Muslim or Asian 
businesses have succeeded very well, from small to large.. . 
it seems 
that is the way to progress. Education doesn't seem to be the way 
forward, it is only with a few people who persevere and think 'that is 
what I want to do', education doesn't seem to be the way forward. (... )I 
don't feel there is hyper-activism from the Council to push education 
in these communities. A lot of the youth I talk to, they want to, but 
they feel there is not enough support for them, whether they ask from 
parents, whether they ask from Bradford college, there is not enough 
support out there to lure these young kids into education. I think there 
is that problem as well. (Imran) 
These views were consistent with much of literature on educational achievement 
of local young Muslims living in inner city areas (McLoughlin1998c: 222, Singh 
2001: 11) and with other research data that highlighted the fact that many parents 
would consider sending their children to Islamic schools because of the lack of 
trust in the educational system (Khanum 2000: 131). 
Some even thought that inner cities schools may become oppositional to the 
upbringing at home (see also 12.3.1): 
Eight hours the child spends in schools, you know the filth they teach 
you. Eight hours the child spends in these schools, they are attacking 
these imams in every direction, they are working that this child 
somehow becomes a kafir, if he doesn't become a kafir he accepts and 
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embraces the ways... they work on the child for 8 hours a day (Sheikh 
Ahmed Ali) 
In the interview with Umar, he explained that the educational system was so bad 
for Asian pupils that one may think that it was a strategy set up by White 
politicians in order to block the social ladder for minorities and guarantee cheap 
labour in the Capitalist society. He added that it once had been the same for the 
white working class (Irish and Polish people), but now it was easier to rely on 
what he defined as `the global underdogs': Muslims. Others, instead, argued that 
Muslims in Bradford happened to have a more business-oriented mentality than 
an education-oriented one: 
You see, with the Sikh community, their daughters, their sons, they all 
work, they are in a community where they all work, they get education 
and everything. Our community is following that but they are a 
bit.. . lack in mind.. . they don't thrive in education, they thrive 
in their 
own businesses, you see the take-aways, the restaurants, and when the 
father opens a restaurant, take-aways, taxi stands, and places like that, 
the extended family goes in there and works in there and they won't 
pursue a career in education and they find it more difficult because 
they follow their parents (Adam) 
More often, both pupils and practitioners lamented an institutional racism within 
the system that discriminated against Pakistanis who were believed to be less 
likely than other ethnic groups' students to rate education high in their 
aspirational frame (cf. Modood 2004: 93): 
I hated school, I think schools for me just didn't work, I think if I was 
let to my own devices I would have learnt more myself, because there 
was always this attitude 'she is an Asian girl, she will get married at 
15, so what's the point? '. Teachers used to tell us all the time, even the 
Asian teachers (Ayesha) 
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8.6 Conclusion: the emergence of agency within structural constraints 
While in the previous chapter the threat posed to the community was defined as 
the benchmark against which crimes were classified, here we have analysed views 
on the production, rather than the construction, of criminal activities. 
Commentaries reproduced here showed how although there seems to be a 
link between criminal activities and environmental factors, on the other hand 
participants were reluctant to consider them as the main causes of crime. They 
acknowledged, instead, a greater role of group and individual agency, 
"behavioural strategies" (Mamadouh 1999: 400) and moral beliefs: 
We don't believe that pumping money into community does anything. 
I absolutely, more than 100% disagree with that sort of mentality and I 
just think it is very short thinking... [if] you are pumping money, it is 
like saying crime does not exist in Westminster because there is a lot 
of money there, it is like saying that crime does not exist in white 
collar industries... it exists. Crime exists in all industries, whether you 
are a millionaire and you do fraud... but it just depends on what sort of 
crime you do. That's what matters. I don't believe by pumping in 
finance in a community is gonna sort out anything. What will sort 
anything is a common purpose in life. I know examples of people who 
have come off hardcore drugs because of women, because he is falling 
in love with a woman. (... )[My organisation4] believes that 
progression is not that you have a successful job, progression in the 
community is not that you have a big house or a nice car, or you are 
married to a beautiful woman or you are married to a large family, 
no... that's not progression. For us progression is how best have you 
lived your life in order to prepare for your next and that might sound a 
bit religious-type , but I do 
believe it is the spiritual education that is 
gonna remove the youth from the aspects of it... this is not to say that 
you don't aspire for these things ... I am an example of that: I 
have 
done my degree, I am moving into a nice comfortable career and yet I 
haven't compromised my identity, I haven't compromised who I am 
and am still able to contribute to these communities as well as anybody 
else and I do believe that there are role-models for the youth and they 
just haven't spoken yet, they do exist, it is just they haven't spoken yet. 
It is a matter of giving these people a vision, people who don't have a 
vision, role models of this particular type, and give them a strong 
identity and that strong identity I believe and [my organisation] 
believes has to be on the Islamic basis. (Imran) 
4 Imran's organisation is a non-profit cultural circle primarily concerned with youth and with a strong 
Islamic ethos. 
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Some participants tended to see a combination of structural and cultural factors as 
the most accurate aetiology of crime in the community, reproducing discourses 
that were more similar to recent New Labour agendas such as `Respect' (Knight 
2006) than to deprivationist views. Others seemed to refer to discourses of Islamic 
revivalism, like Imran. Similar attitudes in other studies (Tatum 2002: 16) have 
been described as a "postcolonial theory of crime violence and minority youth" as 
like other postcolonial theories accounts not only for structural constraints, but 
also for responses to oppression coming from the oppressed and their support 
systems5 (for example, in the case of Imran, from religion). Modood (2004: 99) 
has linked the agency in resisting society-wide oppressive socio-economic forces 
to the management of ethnic capital, emerging from the agents' combination of 
their cultural and social capitals (Ibid. 101; see also 5.2.1)6. The next chapter will 
analyse the role of ethnic resources and networks in the process of attribution of 
blame for crime. These appear to be more common explanations of the rise of 
crime in the community, recording a significant switch from 1980s deprivationist 
discourses (see Aldrich et al. 1981) to more `cultural' ones. 
5 At the same time Tatum argues that lack of expectations may lead young people form minority ethnic 
group to a stage where they struggle to recognise oppression (Tatum 2000: 23) 
While in American sociology the relation between social capital and ethnicity is nowadays an 
established field (Bankston and Zhou 2002: 289), it has been argued that in the UK this is still virtually 
unexplored (Modood 2004: 98), making the deprivationist analysis the most subscribed approach, in spite 
of the 1990s recommendations about what has been called `ethnicity as a resource' (Werbner 1990; 
Ballard 1996). Combining environmental constraints with social and cultural capitals, therefore, has been 
perceived by some as the only answer to empirical questions that still have counter intuitive answers for 
many, for instance why in the same originally economically disadvantaged group there are both a high 
concentration of high achievers and a high concentration of underachievers (Modood 2004: 88). 
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Chapter Nine 
Attributions of blame: ethnic variables (resources and networks) 
Chapter Seven discussed the process of construction of crime in the community. It 
emerged that crime seemed to be classified in relation to its moral and practical effects 
on the community and the narratives of contamination and `putting things back in the 
community' were analysed. Chapter Eight investigated how the environment was seen 
by many research participants as contributing to the rise of crime in the community. 
This chapter will examine how some ethnic resources and networks (cf. 6.2.1) were 
seen as interacting with environmental agents in producing crime in the community. 
Overall, research respondents across generations were not reluctant to think of 
the rise in crime by establishing a link between some environmental factors and specific 
ethnic resources and networks, in particular when referring to family structure and 
traditional sets of values. This is not in contradiction with the claim made in chapter 
Seven of this part that crime was not seen by participants as endemic to Bradford 
Pakistani cultures; the interaction of certain ethnic elements with the environment, 
however, was indeed considered as problematic. 
Respondents described the interaction between the environment and their ethnic 
resources and networks according to four discourses that will be here denominated as: 
4 out of place' Culture, erosion of ethnic networks, biraderism and fatalism. 
9.1 The `out of place' Culture 
Family, attachment to it and its function in regulating behaviour in society has not only 
been a popular feature of recent New Labour policies (Knight 2006) but has been a 
popular object of criminological analysis of the causes of crime (cf. Hirschi 1971: 95; 
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Wardak 2000: 167,178). In the context of British Pakistani studies, particular attention 
has always been given to family (Saifullah Khan: 1979; Shaw: 2000). Two aspects of 
family life seemed to be very important in the discussions of the attributions of blame: 
the culture transmitted by the parents (discussed in this section) and the forms of 
relations and reciprocity embedded in such culture (discussed in 9.2). 
What will be called here Culture represents the traditional custom that young 
informants perceived as consciously or unconsciously passed on by their parents'. For 
older research participants, Culture was a set of values and behaviours that differed 
both from Islamic practice (see `religion vs. Culture debate' in 6.3) and from white 
people's traditions 2. 
In the course of the research many young respondents argued that Culture was 
either obsolete or not appropriate for dealing with the problems of urban Britain: 
I don't have high regard for the first generation, I think they are really 
stuck in their old ways and they haven't really moved with the time, 
they really haven't and they don't want either. (... ) Part of the 
problems the youth are facing [is that] the first generation, their 
parents, they are not moving, they are not willing to compromise, not 
willing to change, not willing to look at the same circumstance from a 
different reality, they are stuck. (Imran) 
The youngsters are more aware (... ) [the elders] are like my dad: he 
doesn't understand the broader picture, he can't see what can be good 
for my development. They don't realize there is a world outside 
Manningham (Malik) 
This was also the argument of the Muslim chaplain of Armley prison who disagreed 
with the notion of bad parenting put forward by some interviewees and preferred 
describing it as parenting `inadequate to the environment'. This definition seemed to 
include the lack of knowledge about the problems affecting youth, as exemplified 
through other data: 
1 This perception is consistent with Bourdieu's definition of cultural capital and has been widely used 
in ethnic studies, cf. Modood 2004: 88. 
2 See footnote 8 in 6.3. 
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Me. Do you think in general parents know what goes on exactly as far 
as drugs are concerned, and drug crimes and other things? 
(... ) 
FG2C. They don't know how harm they can really be. 
FG2A. Like if somebody gets addicted... they wouldn't know... we see 
it from the streets, but they wouldn't know. 
Many of our parents came here 30,40 years ago, they came here to 
work, earn money, and to be honest I don't think they are really aware 
of the amount of drugs and crime that is going on within society. As 
people get older they get older they get to know people, like us young 
people we are growing up in this society, we get to school, we get to 
college and university, and you get to know people who are associated 
with things like this, but I don't think our parents know about this, I 
don't think so. I would personally say-speaking on a personal level, I 
wouldn't say my mum knows about all this ... my dad he owns his business and stuff and he is probably aware, but speaking towards 
perhaps female members of the family, perhaps my mum, I don't think 
she is aware of the vast majority of crime going on in Bradford society 
(Yousef) 
The "inappropriateness" of family transmitted beliefs, priorities, aspirations, however, 
seemed to be a particularly popular subject when intergenerational communication was 
discussed. Some informants described how the family is supposed to take up the burden 
of any problem affecting any of its members (see chapter Six and 8.2). Children 
brought up in this context should see members of their families (normally uncles and 
aunts) as confidantes. Yet, some problems could not be told even to the more 
sympathetic relatives, and in those cases, young people would feel lost. The thoughts of 
a teenager who does not know whom to turn to when facing a problem was described 
by Fatima who, by her own definition, used to live "a life at odds with Islam", until she 
went on Umra: 
Before, when I was 16, I was really confused. I had this Pakistani 
traditional values to be held at home, outside I used to be a different 
person. So I did not know how to deal with my problems because I 
could not turn to my parents because I know what they would say, I 
couldn't turn to my grandparents, because I know what they would 
say, and I wouldn't have liked to hear what they wanted to say. But I 
still knew, even if I turned to my friends they wouldn't tell me 
something that is correct as well, so I could only trust the one thing, 
which is my religion, my Islam (... )(Fatima) 
181 
The respondents emphasised the inadequacy of Culture in relating to the environment. 
Some informants seemed to perceive that crime would have been manageable and 
preventable had the individuals been able to draw from knowledge and well defined 
norms that at the moment seemed to be lacking in the community3. Others, like Fatima, 
seemed to think that a certain tradition within Islam could provide families with 
aspirations and values that would be a very efficient crime prevention strategy. 
However some could see a resource in Culture. This was not related to its 
`contents' or practices (the "cultural stuff', Barth 1969) but rather to its form and 
articulation, the ethnic networks. The loosening of community ties was considered by 
some as one of the causes of the recent crime rate. 
9.2 The erosion of ethnic networks: generation4 gap, vertical and horizontal ties 
and khidmat 
According to the above quotes, Culture seemed to be a dominium of the community 
elders who were failing to adapt it to present day necessities5. At the same time, many 
preferred to criticise the elders for lacking rapport with the younger generation rather 
than for failing to adapt Culture to the environment: 
The parents don't have that interaction with their child (FG2A) 
Parents, obviously there is a communication problem, that's why the 
problem has risen in the first place (Iqbal) 
3Most informants complained that in the community there was a widespread ignorance of drugs and 
their effects (see 11.8 and 12.1.2). 
4 It has proved impossible to construct a consistent use of a time or culturally uniform unit called 
`generation'. For this reason, this term is used by different respondents in different ways, and the 
author will prefer to use `younger' and `older'. In this instance the term is used to describe the general 
divide between parents and their children. 
s Alexander (2000: 240) has argued that the essentialisation of `first generation' and discourses based on 
the dichotomy traditional/non- traditional are paramount in contemporary ethnic studies. 
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Both outsider (Webster 1996: 11,1997: 67, Archer 2001: 82; Kundnani 2002) and insider 
(Imtiaz 2002: 11; Malik 2004) commentators have viewed `generation gap' as one of the 
main problems of some ethnic minorities' youth, impacting on their sense of identity 
and belonging. 
`Gap' in the context of this research means the distance between members of 
different generations (when they do not spend time together or scarcely interact) and the 
differences separating the two (when they do not share the same expectations, values 
and sometimes language). In this research such a view was widely shared across sample 
groups and the issue was believed to have very practical consequences that went much 
beyond the more abstract questions of identity and heritage that ethnicity scholars 
usually draw upon. The gap between a stereotypically law abiding first generation and 
one that does anything "hardly by the books" (Jamal, interview with author) meant that 
there may be a real obstacle in fully developing parents' potential as agents of crime 
prevention (see 11.1.1). 
An example of a generational overview of the community was given to me by 
Jamil, 36, businessman : 
The old generation was nothing else but work, work, work, and then 
take the money back home and that's it. But the new generation they 
are not bothered by work, they are getting money, they live. (Jamil) 
Jamal, 22, student, instead, tried to challenge such absolute comments: 
The first generation in them days were worse than the second 
generation now. When it comes to drugs and stuff, plenty of people 
from the first generation they did it (... ). Majority of the first 
generation was good and minority of the first generation was bad. 
Second generation seems as the other way round. The majority of the 
second generation is socially excluded or whatever you want to put it 
and there is a minority who does everything by the system, go to 
school, get GCSEs, do A levels, go to Uni, get into debt, get a degree 
and work the rest of your life to pay Uni fees off. That is the system. 
Then you have people who are out of the system , don't 
bother with 
GCSEs, don't bother with A levels, leave school at 16, get a job, work 
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for a couple of years, buy a car... got a car, what shall I do? `I am 
driving around anyway, so I might as well sell drugs while I am 
driving'. (Jamal) 
Some respondents narrated episodes from their childhood when visitors from Pakistan 
would come hiding drugs for personal use in their clothes. The view that drug 
consumption was not extraordinary amongst the older generation is backed by other 
Bradford based research (Pearson and Patel 1998: 213,218). Some, however, argued that 
drug smuggling beyond personal use had happened as well (Ibid: 220). Amir, 35, 
unemployed, in conversation with his father Akbar, seemed convinced that the 
community had always been contiguous to drugs, but for the elders this was a side- 
business linked to survival or economic development (see 8.1), while for the younger 
generation it had become a life-style (see 10.3). Still, once the myth of the `perfect' first 
generation was dispelled, the model of the old generation as "grafters" and young 
generation as "screwed up" (Kamran, interview with author) survived. The difference 
seemed to be in the horizon in which even illegal activities were put by the older 
generation: the community". 
I think that the current generation they are lacking or are deficient in 
the knowledge that reliance, dependence on each other, discipline and 
sacrifice of the individuality, what it means it gives you protection, it 
gives you security means that your needs are much better met and we 
all have needs. We have emotional, psychological needs (Abdul) 
In the generation gap, there seemed to be a loss for the young people who missed out on 
a system that provided `reliance, dependence, discipline'. While during fieldwork a 
strong criticism towards an obsolete Culture emerged from some, the loosening of the 
G For some informants the level of toleration of illegal activities would be affected by the potential 
positive side effects for the community (i. e. when drug dealers invested in charity or created legal 
employment). So, if somebody seemed to carry out illegal activities keeping the welfare of the 
community in sight, some may forgive such `short-cuts', as it seemed it had happened at some stage 
during the settlement process. This notion may be related to the concept of khidmat, or service to the 
community (cf. Werbner 1997: 238). See also `putting things back in the community', in 7.5). 
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traditional community ties was regretted by others. Igbal criticised the transformation in 
the nature of support networks by placing attention within the family: 
Why should they [young people] need them, mothers and fathers? I 
was talking to somebody from India, (... ) and I put the question to 
him and I said `What about these relationships' and he said `Every 
relationship is based on need... and when you have the welfare state, 
what does a wife need you for, as a husband? What does the husband 
need a wife for? '. I mean, (Laughs) there is plenty of restaurants and 
takeaways and launderettes and vice versa, and the welfare state is 
there. Same with the child, what does he need the mother and father 
for? As soon as he is 16,17 does he need the mother and father? 
There is no need for that, he is independent. The welfare state itself 
creates a problem. . .1 mean, 
it solves a lot of problems, but it creates a 
lot of problems as well ... I am not saying that we should 
do without 
welfare state, because I believe in Welfare State, but it does create 
that problem, somehow, because we have to put that structure back 
in... how do we put it back in, I don't know. (Iqbal) 
According to Iqbal, unless young people felt part of a system, they would not abide by 
any rule apart from their own interest. 
In Bradford, it seemed that there had been a general weakening of these ties. 
Fatima, although only 19, was able to compare the situation of today to the supportive 
networks of her father's accounts: 
So say for example in a community there should be this sense of trust 
the sense that we can go and talk to each other about it (... ) when it 
comes to these problems and these matters [talking about young 
women taking drugs and running away from home], basically, we 
leave your own family to deal with it, there is no sense of help to each 
other, so I think that is a great loss within the community. Because in 
the past, my dad, you know when they used to have a problem and 
stuff?, they all used to get together and deal with it, you know, in the 
correct way, but nowadays... (Fatima) 
One statement by the oldest respondent in the research, however, seemed to cast light 
on the process of the weakening of the wider community networks, not by blaming 
external factors such as Western socialisation (see below) but by simply acknowledging 
what naturally happened in the course of settlement: 
Akbar: Because everybody now is family man. Before they live with 
15,20 people, not just by myself, too different position now. 
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Everybody family man, the children are born, children grown, that is a 
problem, growing. When they grow it is problem, it is not all the time 
same position. 
Amir: I think [he means] because before they were only single males 
from different families, and then some brought the wives over, then 
they got their own families and the second generation, third generation, 
their families have got so big that they can only help themselves. 
It almost seemed that due to the growing family concerns less priority was given to the 
well-being of the collective sphere. Or, without making a causal correlation, less people 
practically adhered to the ideology of "putting things back into the community". Wider 
horizontal ties were therefore weakened together with the vertical generational 
hierarchy that gives a sense of belonging and duty to the community (khidrnat). The 
families' inward cohesiveness, instead, seemed to resist more successfully than the 
community's. However, some research participants argued that this was the result of 
`keeping up appearances' in spite of multiple threats to the family system and that 
sometimes the strive for such preservation may be counterproductive for the community 
at large (see biraderism below and in 6.4). 
9.3 The risks of excessive bonding and biraderism 
Whilst rapport was considered a very positive feature and individuals and families 
interactions with the rest of the community for the common good were generally 
considered crucial (see again the concept of khidmat), the particularisation of bonding 
within one's biraderi was believed to have many negative effects. Akbar's description 
of a society that would strive for one's family rather than for the wider common good 
could be seen as the first step towards complacency about deviance. When the good 
name of the family was at stake the struggle to protect it and therefore the denial of the 
problem was believed to have repercussions on the rest of the community. 
7 For similar more theoretical findings cf. Bankston and Zhou 2002: 290. 
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According to Akbar, parents were bound to keep quiet in the face of children's 
misdeeds as they were under threat of being left by their children: 
If anybody has the problem and they put pressure too much on 
children, now they will [have] lost the children because they leave the 
home. If you have a problem with children you [`d] better keep quiet 
(Akbar) 
Even worse, some respondents thought that some parents had transformed the 
traditional struggle over status competition of different biraderis into something that 
belonged to a culture 8 where different `clans' measured themselves in this way: 
Me: Parents must be worried for what is going on... what do you think 
they think the solution is? 
Zaara: You see, they are proud. They are proud of the fact, like I said 
earlier, `My son is a drug dealer, nobody will touch me because... they 
won't start with me, that's it... my son is gonna go and sort them out'. 
Me: But don't the parents question their kids when they see their kids 
not working and buying big cars? 
Jamil (Laughs) No, they don't care: they have a nice car outside! 
Even parents who may not encourage criminal activities were considered complacent 
when withdrawing from the responsibility of delivering appropriate guidance or at least 
checking on their children's networks and behaviours. This attitude was often linked to 
the alleged habit of some young dealers to `treat' the parents to jewellery, plane tickets 
to Pakistan and even cars, in order to make them turn a blind eye to their illegal 
activities: 
I know a guy on our street and he deals in heroin and his family and 
friends are not bothered, he says: 'here you are mum, five grand, you 
go and do yourself shopping'. To the dad 'here you are twenty grand 
go and buy yourself a car', his sister'take a couple of grand go and buy 
some jewellery and clothes'. They aren't bothered, money is money 
for them. (Jamal) 
8 The expressions 'mafia culture' or `gangster culture' were widely utilised during the research, maybe 
also because of my Italian identity, see 10.4. 
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Who is the one who turned a blind eye when his son had a £40,000 
[car] outside his house and he knew that his son did not work. Who is 
the one who did not question his son when he put £1,000 on the table 
when he knows that he doesn't work? (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, from the 
tape `Muslim youth') 
Funny thing is, these days I see fathers, five-times-a-day people with 
beards, the prayer beads and the tickets to paradise, knowing damn 
well what their sons are up to and not doing a thing about it. Matter of 
fact, as long as the sons bring in a few hundred notes every week to go 
towards the mansions in Pakistan, or the upkeep of the family four 
wheel drive, there's no problem (Alam 2002: 150) 
The reasons behind parents turning a blind eye were described either as because of 
being keen on a series of `treats' or as being. motivated by the preservation of the family 
izzat: 
The Asian community is a very tight community so (... ) if anybody 
else in the community finds out it just looks bad on them, so that's why 
they don't want anybody else to find out. (... ) They've got this ... izzat, like that, so (... ) when they do[find out].. . rather than dealing with it 
they just push it away. (Ali) 
Because my experience is that the elders are not addressing the issues, 
they are only waffling basically to protect the honour of the family 
(Alina) 
It is about the whole family.. . if you deal with drugs it affects the family izzat... if my son is doing it, my brother will be ashamed in 
introducing me thinking of my son... (Shamim) 
The Muslim chaplain of Armley prison recounted some cases where young men had 
been protected by their parents until they were arrested and their names were published 
in newspapers. Then, in order to protect their standing in the biraderi, parents had not 
accepted them back in their home. Some thought that parents had a further reason to 
conceal their children's misdeeds: apart from the threat to the whole family's izzat there 
seemed to be a tendency to blame the parents before blaming anything or anyone else: 
[If you imagine a situation where somebody is taken to prison] I think 
the neighbours will start blaming the parents, they will say, you 
know, perhaps 'if he had been brought up in the right way he wouldn't 
have done such a crime', but then I think, they will start talking and 
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they would actually start blaming the parents 'so and so's son'... you 
know, they won't even mention the person's name, you know, they 
wouldn't say my name, you know, they would say the parent's name, 
'so and so's son', they actually put more blame onto the parents 
(laughs) (Yousef) 
If you have just come out of jail people will say `So's and So's son', 
they will never mention your name, they will always mention your 
father's name. `So and So's son has come out of jail, he went in for 
drugs. (Jamal) 
Some participants, therefore, seemed to perceive a parallel decline of wider community 
relations alongside the growth of a negative exclusivism of family ties. Criminology has 
debated whether relational proximity, the closeness of a group, may be considered an 
advantage for reciprocal social control. In fact some studies have emphasised the 
deterrent role of shame in front of close acquaintances (Goffman 1968: 43,49; Burnside 
and Baker 1994: 21), while others have shown how close relations tend to be more 
forgiving (Erickson 1977: 6,8; Braithwaite 1989: 87). The perceptions reported in this 
section seem to be consistent with the latter criminological hypothesis. The situation 
was explained in an account of the exclusive bonding inside the family or extended 
family that was detrimental to society, both for its protection of the criminals and its 
causational link to the diminishing of interrelations with the wider community: 
There are a lot of people from Mirpur and a lot of people from 
Attock, they are Chachch ... 
from Campbellpur area. Quite a large 
community both of them. I know, a lot of people from Mirpur won't 
mix, would not intermarry outside their biraderis... it is true... they 
marry in the family, they keep it very close knit, and what you find is 
that when people are so insular and keep themselves to themselves, 
their mentality doesn't change, and their behaviour within their family 
structure, their biraderis or whatever you wanna call it, their clan, it 
stays very sort... within themselves, and the same with the Chachch 
community, they are very sort of insular as well, they very rarely 
marry out, even though things are changing slightly( ... 
)(Zameer) 
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9.4 Competing Sources: Culture, Islam and the West. 
So far three different discourses on blame attribution have been discussed: `out of 
place' Culture (1), the erosion of ethnic networks (2) and excessive bonding or 
biraderism (3). What has not been described yet is what generates different positions 
and whether these produce alternative choices that may be presented to an individual 
once he/she feels let down by his/her community in its cultural or social forms. An 
example of a strategy to find an alternative has already been presented in the person of 
Fatima who described her frustration in being unable to seek help either from elders 
(with inadequate knowledge) or from the community (deprived of its collective focus). 
Fatima's choice of an alternative source of guidance and support had been religion. Her 
adherence to a form of `de-culturised' or `re-culturised' Islam (cf. McLoughlin 2006a) 
made her a supporter of the first discourse. 
The `religion versus Culture' debate has been recently the focus of many 
discussions in Islamic revivalism (Cesari 2004: 54). Although Muslim and non Muslim 
scholars (El-Zein 1977: 240; McLoughlin 1998a: 106,2006a; Ramadan 2004: 9) have 
talked about the natural adaptation of Islam through local identities and environmental 
circumstances, revivalist discourses tend to refer to an orthodox Islam in opposition to 
its mediation through any cultural capital alien to the Arabic matrix (Cesari 2004: 153; 
Ramadan 2004: 6). In the research data, whenever the word `culture' was presented, it 
seemed to have a negative connotation: 
Most families are uneducated or too cultural (... )What parents still do 
is tell the children, the male, the boys [against the Islamic principle of 
equal inheritance amongst brothers and sisters], that when they die 
they will inherit all their money, all their wealth, this is through their 
house, their car, their properties, their businesses, the money in the 
bank, everything... nothing to the daughters (... )This has an effect on 
the education, or on crime as well, because I think that once the sons 
become street wise at the age of 16, because they are out of school, if 
they are gonna inherit their parents wealth or live off their parents 
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throughout their life, they are gonna play truant as well and miss their 
classes, and that's where crime starts . (Mahima) 
From your parents you find that you get culture and from the mosque 
you get religion. (... )so what you find is that religion is just mixed 
with different cultures to make one and I think that this is where the 
mistakes are because what's wrong in culture they say it's wrong in 
religion but in a lot of cases it is not. So that's why when I see people 
studying Islam and stuff, they study it and then they realize that they 
made a big mistake here, mixing the two, they are very different and 
they should separate them (Ali) 
The opposition seen between culture and religion further undermined the role of 
Culture in maintaining stability and sustaining progress in the community. Often 
Culture represented the rural and uneducated background where most of the migration 
pioneers in the 1960s came from (cf. 5.3): 
Because a lot of the Asian community in Bradford are from Mirpur 
and they are not educated, they lack the parental skills to build a 
relation with their children and they raise their children to place their 
beliefs on culture rather than religion, when the sons do commit 
crime, the Asian males of community commit crime, it is not looked 
down [on] as bad ... 
(Mahima, herself of Mirpuri heritage) 
Young people tended not only to claim that Culture might be co-responsible for crime 
in the community, when in the name of `reputation' illegal activities were hidden 
instead of being dealt with, but also that it was an obstacle for the development of `true' 
Islam: 
[Traditional culture] is more [about] giving Islam in a secular way, it 
is just personalised in your own home, it is praying your salat -your 
obligatory prayers- and respecting your elders, it is just picking certain 
things that are taught, and that doesn't equip you with problems that 
you will face in the wider society. As Muslims we should accept Islam 
in its totality so we shouldn't be knit picking so you are going to find 
at home somebody who is totally different, but when you are outside 
in the wider society, if you've got drugs problems, girlfriend-boyfriend 
problems, society problems, free mixing problems, you know, all this 
type of different problems, we are not gonna see them, we are not 
gonna see Islam dealing with these problems because our institutions 
like madrasas or these mosques are little study circles that... they 
haven't taught, they haven't equipped us with the true Islamic ideas to 
deal with those problems because it has been given in a very secular 
way. (Fatima) 
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`Supporters' of both Islam and revival of khidinat as a solution, however, often seemed 
to have to fight the same `demon': Western culture. Participants who prioritised Islam 
as their main point of reference may criticise those who relied on Culture. Those who 
privileged the system provided by the traditional community networks as the supportive 
system generating common good may accuse certain interpretations of Islam as being 
too exclusive and not concerned with the community at large9. Both positions, however, 
seemed to fear a vision of life that was coming from the present environment: 
Fatima: Ideas like freedom and individualism, that (... ) is where 
Islam or religion (... ) basically doesn't start to play that major role... 
Me: So you think Western culture actually prevents the Pakistani 
youth from being close to religion, Islam? 
Fatima: Yeah. 
Me: And where do you think the young Pakistanis have picked up 
Western culture? 
Fatima: I think... (... ) firstly they get these ideas from obviously the 
people they have grown up with and the way society pushes certain 
things, say for example freedom and individualism (... ) 
Me: And you think this detachment from religion or otherwise this 
kind of proximity with Western culture is giving the Pakistani 
community some problems? 
Fatima: I think it is giving problems to the Pakistani Muslim 
community because you find that the way they would idealise the 
ideas of freedom and idealism.. . 
it is not handed out on a plate 'this is 
freedom, this is individualism', is covered up with so many attractions 
so many illusions that the youth have been given, so it is through the 
role models, like the media industry, you know, the pop stars and 
rock stars, whatever, this kind of mentality of Bollywood, even, so 
the way they take in this culture or these ideas of freedom and 
individualism is a very disillusioned way.. . they think they will get 
this freedom and you know get what they want out of it and you 
understand the way this affects the Muslim community or the 
Pakistani community is in a negative way, so now you have seen that 
the parents have taught them in one way and they are going in another 
way which is away from their parents' culture and the way parents 
think. So this creates quite a lot of family problems in itself because 
9 The example of people belonging to Tableegh Jamaat was put to my attention many times, see for 
example 11.1.2. 
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the parents are not willing to accept their values and nor the children 
to accept their parents' values... (... ) we are still humans at the end of 
the day, there will be problems, but equipping the youth, taking their 
disgusting Western ideas out of them, you know the idea of freedom, 
that they are free to do whatever they like, this is all... 
Let me just call you an incident. There was a trouble in a street and the 
police contacted the mosque. I don't know how it happened, there was 
[a] representative of the mosque, [a] police person and there were 
youth, so the police said to the mosque chairperson, 'you need to look 
after your lot', and what the response from the mosque chair person 
was -I found it amazing-, 'this is not our lot. This is your lot. It comes 
from your schooling system, from your system, from your society, it is 
not my lot, it is your lot. My lot is me, my age group. We came, we 
never went into crime, so don't tell me this is my lot, this is your lot. 
You have done this'. So it was very interesting, I just happened to 
hear. Do you understand'it is not my lot, it is your lot', because `this is 
the product of this system, I haven't agreed to this system'. (Tahir) 
The position critical of `the West', on the other hand, was heavily criticised by the 
majority as a "cop out" (Zameer, interview with author): 
That is... total nonsense in my opinion. If it is all down to the Western 
culture, then the West don't believe in honour killings which the 
Eastern culture believes in, so they have found their roots and said the 
Western made them into gangsters, so when they came to the eastern 
culture side, and they decided to do... my sister ran away with so and 
so, I believe this deserves to be called honour killing, that's also like a 
gangster act as well-so it is not the Eastern, it is not the western, it is 
what they believe in. (Zaara) 
Even more interestingly perhaps, some supporters of the `out of place' Culture 
discourse believed that Western knowledge would be positive in helping their 
community to deal with crime problems: 
In the communities where I work (mainly white and black) where 
they have centres where there are print-outs of places where you can 
have.. . drugs [treatments] ... HIV projects and stuff, 
they are doing 
that in their own community day in day out. That's why I have 
worked in that community, I have learnt so much from the white 
community it is unbelievable. If I was in the Asian 
community... nobody is there to put these protocols forward for me to 
learn all this (Adam) 
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A further group of individuals who do not believe that any of these sources (Islam, 
Culture or the West) have anything to do with crime can be represented by Akbar, 
whose point of view will be described in the conclusions as `fatalism': 
Me: When your children were growing up were you worried that they 
would lose their tradition or religion? 
Akbar: I really not, I don't think that, because the children are like 
lottery ticket, you don't know what will be their position when they 
grow. If it growing right ok, if not, not. It is a free country, otherwise 
if I worry if they grow what they do and I take them to my country and 
grow there, I don't know what they can do there. (... ) All over the 
world something is wrong. In one country one thing is good, another 
country another thing is bad, you can't decide, but I think England is 
better. 
9.5 Conclusion: theories of community criminologies 
This chapter has compared the different discourses that combine cultural and social 
aspects with environmental factors in the search for attribution of blame for crime. 
The first position (1) referred to Culture (see Table 9.1 below). Participants who 
supported this view argued that norms inherited by parents were insufficient for helping 
young people in dealing with the risk of deviance in Bradford. This group was formed 
mainly by young people and was divided into two. The first subgroup (la) claimed that 
adopting a set of norms which claimed universality (such as Islam) instead of the 
particularity of the Pakistani ethnic resources would be a solution. The second subgroup 
(lb) believed that enhancing parents' awareness about specific risks through Western 
knowledge would be sufficient. 
The second position (2) referred to a very wide sense of ethnic networks. Those 
sharing this standpoint pointed to the erosion of the organisation of the community and 
the dynamics of passing values on, rather than to the content of what was passed on. 
This group was formed mainly by older people or individuals who had a very good 
relationship with the elders. In this discourse both Western individualism (2a) and 
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certain religious traditions (2b) that neglected community concerns (such as Tableegh 
Jamaat) were blamed. 
The third position (3) referred to a particular aspect and degeneration of Culture: 
biraderism. Almost all of the interviewees agreed that this was a very popular trend in 
the community. Those who would put their biraderi before of anything else, even at the 
cost of turning a blind eye to illegal activities, were the focus of blame in this discourse. 
A fourth position (4) of those resigned to fate (kismat) was also identifiable. 
However, the reticence of these respondents raises the doubt whether their standpoint 
may have been dictated by their attempt to avoid attributing blame to any specific set of 
values or behaviours. 
These discourses are summarised in the following table: 
Table 9.1 Theories of community criminology 
(1) `Out of Place' Culture (2) Erosion of ethnic networks 
Focus: Culture Focus: interrelations, from intergenerational t 
Attribution of blame: immobility of cultural intracommunal, khidmat 
capital Attribution of blame: erosion of wider than 
Supporters: la) believers of the religion v biraderi intracommunal ties and dismissal of 
culture argument (Islam as positive solution) the `common good' 
lb) most young people and practitioner Supporters: 2a) critics of some aspect of 
('Western knowledge can help') Western individualism; 
2b) critics of exclusive religious groups such 
as Tableegh Jamaat. 
(3) Biraderism (4) Fatalism 
Focus: biraderi Focus: kisntat 
Attribution of blame: excessive intra familial Attribution of blame: none, resigned to fate 
bonding Supporters: individuals who do not believ 
Supporters: almost all interviewees who look Culture, Islam or the West have anything to d 
down on `cultural Muslims'; the West does with crime 
not impact on this discourse. 
195 
These typologies do not always exclude one another, as proven by reactions against 
biraderism that were shared across supporters of different theories. 
These different discourses seem to add an important element to what will be discussed 
in thesis as the core of community criminologies: the threat to the community itself. 
This element is the consideration of a split between biraderism and community, where 
families appear to be not necessarily functional to the stability of the community 
anymore, but the exclusiveness of intra-familial bonding may jeopardise the 
collectivity. Families' strong ties ('a combination of the amount of time, intimacy and 
reciprocal services', Granovetter 1973: 1361) once perceived as being the pillar of 
internal cohesion may now be an agent of fragmentation wherever the particular interest 
of a family is in conflict with the community common good: 
Community, I don't think they are united, so it doesn't really make a 
difference, it takes a big thing to happen to remark their presence, 
which is negative sometimes. Then personally I do not feel that a lot 
of community activities take place or a lot of discussion takes place 
(... )You are already a small community and if you differ because of 
religious sectarianism, language, ethnicity, geographical orientation, 
then obviously your voice will be difficult to... you are not Mirpuri, 
Chachchis... (Tahir) 
This would add a variable to Hirschi's social control theory according to which 
delinquents acts occur when individuals' bonds to society are weak or broken (Hirschi 
1971: 16). In this emic study the theory must acknowledge all the levels of ties, intra- 
communal and inter-communal, vertical and horizontal, and the specific biraderi 
variable gives an insight that might have fooled an etic analysis that, for example, tried 
to impose universal notions of Putnam's social capital to this context. 
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Chapter 10 
Labelling and male subcultures 
The previous chapter analysed competing discourses in the community in order 
to shed some light on the processes of attribution of blame for the rise in crime. 
This chapter will provide a description of the groups and the areas at risk. If the 
views in the preceding chapter implied that erosion of ethnic resources and 
networks was impending on many young people, widespread internal (see 
below) and external (Webster 1997: 65; Kundnani 2002; Alexander 2004; 
Burdsey 2004: 764) moral panic about young men seemed to reveal that they 
were more at risk of crime than young women (see also 7.4). 
This chapter will analyse the data relevant to the correlation between young 
men, competing cultural capitals, and deviance. 8.5 already tackled the allegedly 
demographic explanation of the relation between Pakistani men and crime, but 
ignored its interaction with cultures and masculinity that has been considered by 
other writers as an essential point in the creation of subcultures (Goodey 
2001: 434). In this context it will be highlighted how some young Pakistani male 
subcultures are not considered to be deviant per se, but are described as `grey 
areas' between good and evil, where young men are more likely to be lured to 
criminal activities. In certain descriptions it will emerge that subcultures may be 
a product of environmental and cultural interaction. This may be one of the 
reasons why the concerns surrounding young women and crime produce a 
different kind of moral panic, based on more `cultural' notions such as gender 
roles in the community (see 7.4). As far as men are concerned, competing 
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resources and networks seem to co-exist in their choices in how to relate to the 
local social environment (see for example vigilantism in Webster 1997). 
10.1 Pathologizing young men: subcultural studies in the British Pakistani 
context 
Traditionally (see 6.1), men in the Pakistani community of Bradford are 
considered the main breadwinners. This expectation is considered to be an 
essential part of their gender, and therefore they may be considered the 
economic pillar of their families. In spite of this, many young men nowadays are 
considered to be a liability as destabilising agents for their families and the 
whole community (cf. 7.3.1 and 7.5). 
The extent of the state of wariness surrounding young men is reflected in 
a series of conversations on their characters recorded during the field and 
through literature review of Bradford based research. These views go from the 
brief theorization of three categories of young men by Umar, a research 
participant, to the academic work written by Bradford born Dr. Imtiaz and echo 
in works of white academics such as Webster (1997) on the Bradford district 
(see 3.5). 
Views emerged during the present research were very similar to Imtiaz's 
model analysed in 3.5, although tending to emphasize that categories were very 
fluid and could only delineate a potential of deviance or adherence to norms. In 
particular, one respondent, who sometimes writes for a local newspaper, 
combined the categorization of youth with an historical and gendered 
perspective. Umar believed in fact that twenty years ago there was `only one 
type of Pakistanis', now there were three: category 1 (educated, middle class), 
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category 2 (religious, all the range from liberal to fanatics) and category 3 
(described as street yobs or criminals and `lafanga' who wore chains around 
their wrist and chest and spoke `like Afro Caribbeans'). Lafanga is a Punjabi 
term that was explained to me in this way: 
Lafanga is somebody who is not pursuing an education just messing 
about, it is not a term for someone who is a drug dealer. There is not 
like a certain word for someone who deals and stuff like that. 
Lafanga is someone who is lazy and just messing about (Adam) 
Lafanga I would say it is someone who is always around the streets, 
you know, not taking care of anything, they say lafanga... (Jamil) 
For Umar, lafangas were also those young men who took advantage of the 2001 
riots to go looting. Lafangas' lifestyle was also blamed for the bad stereotypes 
outside the community: 
You see some of the youngsters and their behaviour is very 
disrespectful you know, and it is very... and sometimes the way they 
would park up in cars... and... they might not do anything wrong, but 
it is just what they portray to people... and particularly to the white 
community, the sense I get is that they are quite wary of Asian kids, 
Asian teenagers and youngsters, you know when there are three or 
four in car, they may not be doing anything wrong, but it is just 
that... maybe it is sometimes the thing that we portray ... 
(Zameer) 
Lafangas, otherwise described as `screwed up', or `lazy', resulted in being the 
folk devils of the community. Although only Umar presented a full system of 
classification of youth subcultures, almost all interviewees spoke about an 
equivalent of his `category 3'. According to Umar, 9/11 had been a catalyst for 
the proliferation of category 2, but category 3 was the one `to be worried about' 
and had been the result of bad schools (see also 8.5 and 12.3.1) and lack of 
discipline at home (see also 11.1). The proof of the latter would be in the 
comparison of female and male siblings: the girl would always be `better', as she 
would be more likely to have grown up disciplined. Girls would be respectful, 
do housework, and even be explicitly told `not to behave like boys'. The boys, 
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instead, would become `ladla' (favourite) and the parents would not check what 
they would do with their money. Most of the responsibility would be on the 
mothers (cf. 11.1.3), as fathers would be too busy with work (cf. 8.1) and would 
only intervene if something major happened. According to Umar, children 
socialised in a family with strict norms would end up in category 1, where it was 
required to be either `in or out', and there were no chances to lead a `double 
life'. The idea of bouncing in and out and to live a double life has been 
expressed also by Webster (1997) as discussed in 3.5. 
It may be interesting to the purposes of this chapter and the study of 
labelling processes to compare existing literature on male subcultures in British 
Pakistani diasporal with the research data (see table 10.1). These analyses tend to 
overlap in their acknowledgement of different dynamics in combining diverse 
sets of resources and networks, while disagree in some instances in their 
identification. The first striking difference is that only in Umar's labelling a 
`good', role-model eligible sub-group is present, category 1. Members of such 
group would disenfranchise themselves from any specific set of resources and 
networks in order to pursue a perceived universal `common good'. Although in 
Imtiaz's classification coconuts2 are seen as law abiding, that very label suggests 
a derogatory sentiment and this category is not perceived as a good role model 
because of its perceived detachment from its own community. In Wardak and 
Webster's studies there is reference to a positive, trouble-free "public propriety" 
as "appropriateness, seemliness, decency, conformity with good manners, 
1 Recently, a growing number of pieces of research about Muslim male subcultures seem to have 
developed in the UK. Amongst these, Archer's research on Muslim boys and education (2003) 
and Shah and Dwyer's Leverhulme funded research in Slough (2006). However, for the purposes 
of this thesis and word length constraints only a selection of studies could be reviewed. 
2 The label `coconut' describes an individual who is brown outside and white inside (Asian in 
appearance but English in life-style), cf. Imtiaz (2002: 125). 
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conformity with convention of language and behaviour" (Cohen 1979: 124, 
quoted in Webster 1997: 74). However, this propriety is adherence to family 
tradition, and is not independently forged by young men. In Wardak's Edinburgh 
study the positioning in a cultural vacuum/ universal ground that was positive 
for Umar is seen as negative, as this is the attitude of those rebelling to 
everything and therefore may undermine community stability. Wardak is also 
striking for the absence of an Islamist sub-group in his study (see 3.5). While in 
Bradford-based accounts the combination of different sets of resources and 
networks is seen as negative (see next section), Wardak does not seem to register 
a negative view in his sample with regard to this process. Imtiaz's and Umar's 
emic views, together with Webster's etic account, depict a negative picture of 
individuals or groups that try to combine cultural capitals. 
The table below summarises the views discussed above. 
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Table 10.1 Comparison of British Pakistani male subcultural models 
Adherence Combination of Adherence to exclusivist Reference to Do not ascribe to any 
to resources and resources and networks alternative specific resources or 
traditional networks resources and networks 
resources networks 
and 
networks 
Imtiaz (2002) Rude Boys (mix Extremists (reject Coconuts (ascribe 
'religion' and traditional culture, to alternative 
'culture', capitalise resources and networks in resources and 
on their difference favour of one vision of networks, while 
within mainstream Islam) detaching 
society) themselves from 
traditional ones) 
Umar Category 3 (mix Category 2 (described as Category I (ascribe to the 
(present Asian and "religious", "all the way idea of a universal 
research African/Caribbean from liberal to fanatics") common good above 
interviewee) culture, lack competing sets of 
adherence to norms) resources and networks in 
the community) 
Webster Conformists Experimenters Islamists ("non-cultural" h"_ u.: ,;. (1997) (passive (defend what used to Muslims) 
guardians of be racialised 
"public tcrritorialism and 
propriety"; now is control over 
blame youth drugs) and Go- 
and may enveens (occasional 
rewarded by criminals) 
integration 
within white 
society) and 
Vigilantes 
(active 
guardians of 
"public 
propriety", 
use improper 
means for 
the white 
society's 
standards) 
Wardak Confornrists Part time Rebels (violate and 
(2000) (full-time conformists (stick to challenge all norms) 
followers of a few 'token' " -' -- - 
social norms: activities to avoid 
no separation being labelled 
between real 'deviant' for family 
and ideal). sake) and 
accomodationists 
(more like 
conformists but allow 
for some 
compromise) 
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10.2 `Double consciousness' or `torn between two cultures'? 
Negative comments about those who try to juggle different sets of behaviours 
are easily predicted as the boundaries between propriety and impropriety (see 
above) may blur. 
In a community where for many it still seems so important to have a 
widely recognised social standing in front of others (see 11.1), it seemed to be 
natural to question how it was possible for lafangas to conduct their alleged life 
of `chilling' (Azad and Khalil, interviews with author) without being restricted 
or sanctioned by their families. A common answer to this question was a 
criticism against their `double life': 
Me: But the children [who are involved in crime] don't actually get to 
the point of leaving the house... 
Fatima: That's right. Because (... ) they were still brought up with 
those values or some values or morals towards their parents, so they 
are totally different outside the home than they are at home. 
Me: But they would want to move somewhere else away from the 
parents? 
Fatima: No, they would still... because for example the values they 
have been given by their parents when they were small, this idea of 
being good Pakistani children living with your parents ... that's the 
way of tradition, you know, the boy and the girl.. . the children live at 
home and if they do, when they do get married they can still stay at 
home if they want, so this view, this concept ... but the 
Western 
values, they still have a dominance in the children's way of life 
because when they go outside the home, they act upon those western 
values. 
Khalil had even planned to go to Pakistan and get married to a cousin chosen by 
his parents, make them happy and at the same time put his conscience at rest. In 
this way he would provide them with a carer for their old age, and through this 
he would have enjoyed more freedom than now as this, according to him, was 
what really mattered to his parents: perpetuation of and stability in the biraderi 
(see 7.6). In some aspects, therefore, the traditional cultural capital was 
preserved, but room was made for the individual's choices. According to the 
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models above, Khalil could have been a rude boy, an experimenter or a Part- 
time conformist. In Imtiaz's thesis, however, a point was made that labelling in 
the research ignored women, thus responding to an external hegemonic 
representation of Muslim women that was not as threatening to wider social 
order as the men's was. 
In the course of the present research, however, some women could have 
been described as `rude girls', leading a double life and seriously, albeit not 
necessarily willingly (cf. 7.4), threatening the community stability: 
[Some girls start dealing] because I think... they have these two sets 
of... like identities. So when they are at home they have a different 
identity, when they are outside in the wider society, they act 
differently. It is the sense that you are free outside in the world but 
when you come home, your dress in a certain way, you speak in a 
certain way and them sort of girls that I have described... basically 
they haven't got the freedom from home so they leash out their 
freedom in that way. So you know.. . they have that sense of control, 
so if they have been controlled at home they want control outside. So 
this is the way they find their control, this is the way they experience 
their freedom. (... ) (Fatima) 
Hence, given the freedom, even girls could activate a double-life system. 
In Umar's opinion, there may be individuals who move from his 
category 1 to category 2 and vice-versa, but there were no hopes for category 
3's young men who combine `Mirpur with LA' (Imtiaz 2001: 127), although 
their parents might cultivate ambitions of seeing them in category I (their 
frustrated aspirational frame, see 8.3), they will never get the tools to shift there. 
One interesting comment made by Umar was that he would estimate that in 
Bradford only 100 girls would fit in category 3, which was an essentially male 
group, while many women would comfortably fit in category 2. Double lives 
regimes, therefore, appeared not as a positive resourceful dynamic to fit into any 
environment (Gilroy 1993), but rather as a strategy to maintain family stability 
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without missing out on individual desires and aspirations. This regime seemed 
however easier to be assumed by males. A reduced freedom of movement for 
girls, in fact, may push them towards looking for alternative set of resources and 
networks as they could not bounce in and out their family control with the same 
ease as boys. For this reason they may appear as more prominent agents of 
change. For instance, a girl who is not allowed enough freedom to lead a `double 
life' as many men appear to do, may be more motivated to fight for radical 
changes in her family norms that will allow her to have the life style she aspires 
to3. Young men, on the other hand, may be content to live their freedom in the 
space created by their `double life' regime. 
Although the numbers mentioned by Umar do not hold statistical reliability, 
his theory of young subcultures may be interesting for the analysis of the 
constructions around young men that are talked about in Bradford and are 
related to criminality. Category 3 was not described as necessarily made of 
criminals, but this would be the potential labour for criminal activities. Category 
3 seemed to equal other descriptions of youth by many other research 
participants: lazy, "hanging-out", and lafanga. Hirschi (1971: 22) had theorised 
that involvement in conventional activities prevents young people from 
committing crime for the simple reason that they would be too busy to do it. 
This attitude was shared in many portrayals of rude boys. 
10.3 Rude boys' lifestyles: appearances and locations 
The boys `on the edge' seemed to be one of the most popular topic recurring 
during interviews. Lafanga or rude boys may not be criminal, but they were 
3 Some girls may utilize their growing knowledge of Islam to convince their parents to change 
some traditional norms and expectations they do not feel are fair or even consistent with their 
religion (McLoughlin 1998a: 103) 
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dangerously living a life that in between switches of behaviours may produce 
deviance. Some description caused a certain deal of confusion. Sometimes it 
seemed that some rude boys were unfairly labelled as drug dealers. Some 
respondents argued in fact that drug dealers were known to the rest of the 
community, although the biggest deals happened at night. Even young teenagers 
were reported to know who the dealers were, and were supposedly going to ask 
for some work to share the drugs earnings. On the other hand, there seemed to be 
a spectrum of differences amongst drug dealers, their beliefs, life styles and 
whether they only dealt or were also consumers that made their recognition more 
difficult. One of the most surprising examples was told by Bano: 
Bano: (.. ) you know what a hafiz is? When you know the Quran by 
heart. A lot of Asian boys they are becoming hafiz, I know quite a lot 
[of them]. 
Me. Do you think that is going to keep them off [drugs]. 
Bano: Not really, it depends. Because I know a guy and he is a hafiz 
and on the side he is a bit of a drug dealer. How does he cope? I 
asked him that question. I actually get shocked 'cos it is like (... ) your 
religion... he is like 'I do it for a living', it is like 'you can't do it for a 
living'. Living is like a job, working for Morrisons part-timer is a job, 
not dealing in drugs, it is not a job. 
Me. Does he take drugs as well? 
Bano: No he does not take drugs. He only deals. 
Me. So he hasn't got another job... 
Bano: I think he's got a job, I am not too sure about the job... I think 
he does [dealing] for pleasure and as they say, one day you are gonna 
get banged up and that will be the end... 
Me. And has he got a beard [and dresses in the Muslim way]? 
Bano: Yes, he has a beard and he wears the traditional dress and all 
and it is actually quite shocking because when you look at him you 
think 'aaahhh', and when you hear about anything, you think 
'aaahhh'... 
Me. And do people around him know? 
Bano: I don't think so, I don't think his family know, but his friends 
know, because I am one of his friends and I know, but I always think 
'you can't do that, that is really bad', but he sees it as a way of living. 
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The creative use of religious set of resources as described by Bano was not 
presented in any explicit elaboration of subcultures (see table 10.1), although in 
Webster's data (1997) there is evidence of "public impropriety" colluded with 
certain interpretations of Islam in the Vigilantes' category. 
If outsiders may be preoccupied by certain traits of the youngest Pakistani 
generation, reinforced by theories of disaffection towards British society stirred 
by post-2001, many insiders showed similar concerns about the ramification that 
rude boys' lifestyle could have in the community. It seemed they were 
negatively seen as being perceived as `cool' by younger and younger boys (see 
`poisoning the community, 7.5): 
Young men do it because of easy, quick money, and there is also the 
fashion of the 'bad boy' (Ameena) 
Our friend who lives down the road, he has got a degree in... I can't 
remember, something to do with biology, genetics or something, and 
he can't find jobs and he turned to drug dealing. His younger brother 
knows, his older brother knows, but his mum and dad will never 
know. His younger brother is at that age when it is cool if your 
brother is a drug dealer.. . 
it is the 'in' thing to be a drug dealer, it is a 
fashion statement. (Jamal) 
Recurrent features describing rude boys were big cars and designer clothes, 
although this may be totally deceiving as in the case of a Quran hafiz with beard 
and tunic described above. On the other hand, integral to rude boys, and the ones 
amongst them who may be lured into drug dealing, was the status competition 
based on such goods (see also `sharifisation' in 8.4): 
'I am a drug dealer, let's see who's got the biggest car, who's got the 
best car, who spends most on the car, who's got the most jewellery 
on, who has the best clothes on', it is one big competition. People 
who are against it, they look down, but in the drug dealing 
community is a trend: I have just bought this car today, I have just 
spent 5 grand on car' 'I have just spent 20 grand on a car'. (Jamal) 
The people I know who were in the riots, they said 'we were just 
having a laugh'... their intentions was to get past the police, go into 
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town, break into shops, get all the design clothes for themselves, keep 
them or sell them , this is all they wanted to do. (Jamal) 
A couple of years back the coppers, the police were always stopping 
and search young Pakistani Asian lads with furry tops on, with trainers 
and track suit bottoms thinking 'these are the guys up to no good', but 
if you look at it, drug dealers are moving away from that... a drug 
dealer, for example, if he's got a hoodie top on, a track suit bottom and 
a pair of trainers you are attracted to think 'he is dealing in weed' and 
he is probably driving a Subaru sport car, dealing in skunk, with a 4,5 
grand car... fair enough, he is dressed like (not clear), but then if 
you've got somebody who is driving for example a Range Rover and 
the guy only dresses smart, he'll be the type of guy you presume he is 
dealing in top end drugs such as cocaine and heroine. So there is 
always a stigma, a label attached. (Jamal) 
Me: Don't you have an idea of people in the area who deal with drugs? 
Fatima: Yeah, you know for example, if you have like a boy who is 
like a drug dealer and he is making really good, quite a lot of money 
from it, and then they do the house [up] really nicely, they've got a 
nice car and all that, [you'll know]... 
They can get the cars and designer clothes so easily (FG2A) 
When the person next door has got a Porsche or a Ferrari, they say: 
'Hang on, if you can get a Porsche or Ferrari we can get something 
better'... and they don't work! They have got a 60,000 car parked 
outside a 40,000 pounds house. (Adam) 
The importance of consumerism in the rude boys' subculture may be a cultural 
extension of opportunity theory (see 8.3). Collison (1999: 432) in fact has 
described "unnecessary consumption" as a mean of constructing self-identity in 
front of others to enhance one's perception. Depending on the opportunities, the 
means at hand, then, such a process of identity construction can be more or less 
legal. 
A certain image, though, has begun to make some members of the 
community feel uncomfortable on the streets: 
It used to be guys hanging around street corners and even if they 
weren't doing anything wrong, just the walking past them, walking 
down the street and seeing 10,15 young lads with hoodie tops on and 
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trainers and stuff, smoking, you would feel intimidated by them, 
regardless whether they were being doing something or not (Jamal) 
"Keeping them off the streets" -an expression that often was used to describe the 
need for new youth or sport centres- seemed then to acquire a double meaning: 
not only would young men have needed a place where they could be involved in 
activities, but also a place that would attract them and leave the streets more 
secure (see also 12.1.2 and 12.3). Streets were widely seen almost as 
criminogenic: "hanging out" (as described by older people) and "chilling" (by 
rude boys themselves) might in fact lead to criminal activities, either out of 
boredom or observation of exciting but unaffordable lifestyles: 
When I first came over to Bradford I asked my sister in law's brother, 
where do your guys ... where 
is the most popular hang out place for 
Muslims? I think you know anyway for white communities there is 
your pub, your club, etc. etc., so there 's lot to do, but for Muslim 
communities... well, the answer I got when I went around and they 
showed me around, it's cars! You see a car there, and you see 5 guys 
sitting in a car, and some of them even have the portable televisions. 
Because for them that is their space, this is the space, this is the private 
space, they don't get that at home. They live at home, maybe someone 
is married, his wife lives at home, you know... maybe a brother, 
married, the other brother lives at home, the sister lives at home and 
you have got a two-bedrooms house. And that's what they do, drive 
around, sitting in cars, cup of coffee (Imran) 
Snooker centres were widely considered an unhealthy alternative to the streets: 
Imran: Snooker places, but ... I was recommended not to go there. (... )(laughs). 
Me: But there is no alcohol there, is there? 
Imran: No, but unfortunately a lot of drug dealing in those 
places... takes place in that environment. This is the reason why I was 
advised not to go. Because when someone is involved in drugs, to be 
honest, they don't see colours, they don't see loyalty, they just see a 
customer, benefits. When it comes to drugs there is no boundaries. 
ME: You mean these places are affected by drug taking as much as 
drug dealing? 
Imran: Drug dealing. 
ME: Not drug taking? 
Imran: Not drug taking. There are some places that I don't know of, 
but I have been told. But the snooker places I have been to they are 
more a mixture of whites and Pakistani community. If they are mixed 
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you tend to find there is not that much of drug taking in those places. 
So if it predominantly Pakistani area, you find there is something 
happening there. 
If streets were seen as almost criminogenic, at least they were safer than once for 
young men of Pakistani heritage who did not seem to have to face the racist 
attacks their fathers had to. 
10.4 From self defence to heroes: the growth of `mafia mentality' 
Some believed that the present subculture of rude boys was somehow connected 
with the era when self-defence had to be organised by young men against the 
fascists (see 5.5): 
I heard that a group of young men I was talking to they said they went 
to a pub the other night and there is a group of few white men there 
and said 'they dare not even start anything'. Once upon a time you 
walked into a pub one person or two people you get beaten up, but 
now we are sure that we are safe they didn't even lift their heads up. So 
those kinds of ideas have been reinforced that if you are strong if you 
can fight back you get respect and I think that's wrong. (... )That 
conflict has been there since I was very young in the Seventies... 
(Abdul) 
According to Abdul, this attitude that tends to show strength is a survival of a 
legitimate right and need of self defence that emerged when Pakistani men 
rebelled against the myth of the `white sahib' (sic) and discovered that if you hit 
a white person "their blood had the same colour" (a citation from the book 
`Hand on the Sun', by Tariq Mehmood, a member of the Bradford 12, see 5.5): 
So, once these people found was they were here, this was their home 
they had rights and the individuality that they developed at school is 
very much apparent and they have rights as individuals and eye for an 
eye and tooth for a tooth kind of thing, if you brought up with those 
values, these kids found that yes the myth of the invincible white 
master the 'sahib' that was shattered amongst kids. (Abdul) 
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Although interviewees denied that racist attacks would be a constant threat in 
Bradford nowadays, there is some evidence that this problem had survived in 
some areas in the 1990s: 
Bashir: When we were growing up in Bradford 3 we were different 
groups organised around friendship and the sort of locality... like your 
street. . .1 think it had to 
do with the fact that we were Asians and there 
was a few White people living close-by and they did not like us for 
some reasons. 
Me. So was it white groups and Asian groups? 
Bashir: Once they started playing with branches like weapons and then 
we would start ... and when we would go back home for dinner they 
would break the boughs in the garden... my mum encouraged us in a 
way to get sort of... 'if anyone puts you down you've got to teach them 
a lesson, if someone starts on you, you can't just back away and say "I 
don't wanna fight". But sometimes they would come up to us without 
any reasons, like one time we were just playing football in the field 
and one jumped (interruption) ... when 
I was there it was only between 
the whites and the Asians because within the Asians, your parents 
knew each other and you couldn't really get into fight with anyone 
because the parents would get involved and you would get into 
troubles.. . it is not worthy then.. . you just deal with your differences. 
One view was that emancipation from passivity might have led to the formation 
of groups that may have escalated to other kinds of mutual help and activities, 
with a sense of invincibility and competition, ascribable to youthfulness and 
masculinity: 
Currently they think they are invincible, all 18 years old think they 
think they can drive at 150 miles a hour on the motorway and nothing 
is gonna happen to them. At 18 you think like that, until something 
happens, of course. I just heard at the weekend a 15 years old stole a 
car wanted to impress his girlfriend and of course he was killed he had 
a crash . (Abdul) 
I don't know what goes on with many of these large families, my guess 
is that.. . they are looking at their children and they think 
if x can do it, 
and y can do it... (Zameer) 
Young lads growing up now, you know like gangs... ganging up and 
stuff like that (Jamil) 
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`Gangs', `gangsters', `mafia', were expressions often used to describe groups 
involved in criminal activities; often they were even described as belonging to 
the same biraderi (although not necessarily), but this would enhance the efficacy 
of the mafia metaphor, around which are written Bradford based crime novels by 
Bradford born author MY Alam (see also 6.2). 
This seems consistent with the fear of a negative impact from the excessive 
intra-familial bonding described in 9.3. Hence the popularity of the mafia 
scenarios: 
Bano: My little 9 years old brother (.. ) knows all the gangsters in West 
Bowling, and it is actually quite scary sometimes, because... 
Me. What do you mean by gangsters? 
Bano: There is like, you have got like ... 
in West Bowling you have got 
guys who are well, well, well known, they are really well known, 
maybe because they have got really good cars, or maybe because they 
are drug dealers, or just maybe because they have got older brothers 
who are really, really famous. I don't know, it is like being in 'pop 
stars' when you have got the really famous people that you can look up 
to. That [is] what it is like for youngsters in west Bowling. 
Strength amongst individuals and groups is feared by any community 
(... ). [The elders] have great contempt, but because they have money 
you don't know when they are gonna be able to do you a favour, so 
people again are very pragmatic. (Abdul) 
They are afraid because them people have got that.. . they've got that 
respect... basically they've got the car, the money, nobody can say 
anything to that because they have made it up there, whether it is by 
drugs whether it is by anything. (... ) It is like a gang culture, a mob 
culture.. . they are afraid of that type of people. 
They are not ostracised, 
but basically there is a sense of 'we can't tell them off because we 
might get into troubles ourselves'. (Fatima) 
Me. Were you saying you know somebody who got arrested? Did the 
people know he was dealing before he was actually caught? 
FG1B. Yes, because they've got that image, haven't they? 
Me. What image? 
FG1A: Like.. . where I live there 
is this guy and he deals drugs but no 
one... it is not a good thing, but the fact is that everyone is very scared 
about him and no one ever has the guts to... you know.. . like stand 
up-because he has got so much back up, so much people.. . even if 
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you say something, you get your head bashed and you know... that is 
like normal. 
Adding to the subcultural `mafia mentality', territorialism was mentioned as one 
of the concerns informing young men's behaviour. Graffiti used to be sprayed in 
the Leeds Road area before a council task force cancelled them. At the time of 
the research only a small one was still visible and it used the gangster lingo: 
`[Name], [Name], [Name], Lower Rushton Mafia'. Protection of the territory 
was also seen as one of the triggers for 2001 riots (see Bolognani 2007°, 
forthcoming). 
10.5 Conclusion: young men and moral panic 
Studies including subcultural models in the Bradford district (Webster 1997 and 
Imtiaz 2002) present some overlapping traits and are partially consistent with a 
similar theorisation made by research participant Umar. They differ from the etic 
system of classification of youth cultures elaborated through the Edinburgh 
based research amongst the young men attending the Pilrig mosque (Wardak 
2000). Although only one research participant articulated a subcultural grand 
system to apply to Bradford young men, most interviewees mentioned a male 
youth culture similar to Umar's category 3 (almost overlapping with Imtiaz's 
rude boys and Webster's go-betweens). 
Young men who combined sets of values and behaviours coming from family 
(for example "cultural Mirpuris"), television (for example through R `n B 
"gangsta videos") or other minority ethnic groups (for example reference to a 
stereotypical black "LA culture"), were largely considered the folk devils of the 
Pakistani community of Bradford. Far from being considered agents of a 
proactive process of combining local and global sets of values and behaviours 
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(multiple consciousness), they were considered `at risk'. Their "hanging out" on 
the streets, their material aspirational frame, their exposure to the deals of the 
established gangsters and the lack of control exercised by their parents was 
generally thought as easily pushing them into criminal careers. Additionally, 
activities such as sitting in cars in back alleyways and "hanging out" on street 
corners wearing hoodies were considered behaviours that would project a bad 
image of the community to outsiders and they were sometimes blamed for the 
bad reputation that Pakistanis had gained in Bradford. 
Although `mafia mentality' and `gangsters' culture' were often 
mentioned to describe deviant behaviours in the community, the networks and 
organisations of the allegedly existent gangs were still rather obscure to 
informants. One of the reasons for this lack of information may be that some of 
the dealers' networks were said to be mainly based on their biraderi or on their 
ethnic origin. We have mentioned above the rumours circulating about many 
Pathan and Mirpuri families. The knowledge about what were called gangs 
seemed to be still quite obscure, while generalisation and subcultural 
descriptions of individuals living in the grey area of rude boys resulted as much 
more articulated. Young men as folk devils seemed to be the subcultural 
definition resulting from a moral panic about male youth (see also 8.3 and 8.5) 
However, the anecdotes about the biggest drug dealers and their deeds that 
interviewees enjoyed recounting ('proper gangsta stuff, I tell ya! ', Adam, 
interview with author) were most regarding men in their 40s and 50s. This was 
somehow in contradiction with the views about the law abiding old generation 
and the deviant younger one (cf. 9.2), but the concerns about young rude boys 
seemed to be considered a priority by most of the interviewees. 
0 
214 
Chapter Eleven 
Internal evaluation of informal social control 
In the previous chapters of Part III it has been highlighted which problems seem 
more cogent to the community, and some discourses about the production and 
construction of crime have been analysed. This chapter will focus on the current 
informal devices of social control that the Pakistani community sees deployed in 
Bradford. In the following chapter the focus will then be on the formal devices. 
`Social control' will be broadly defined as `the set of rules, norms, obligations, 
reciprocity and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and society's 
institutional arrangements that enables members to achieve their individual and 
community objectives' (Lederman et al. 2002: 509) in preventative and 
correctional forms. In this concept of social control `softer' forms of control 
operating through the shaping of ideas, values, and attitudes (especially via faith) 
co-exist with more enforcing institutional systems such as policing. 
Studies on informal sanctions at informal levels such as those of family and 
friends, have been long considered as very important trigger mechanisms to 
reinforce normative climates in communities (Anderson et al 1977: 104; 
Braithwaithe 1989: 1,14), and human relationships are now considered an 
essential part of crime prevention strategies (Burnside and Baker 1994: 19; Hope 
2001: 430). Following this criminological interest, the chapter will open with an 
analysis of the evaluation of social control exercised by families that in chapter 
Nine was part of the attribution of blame system (see 9.5). However, in the emic 
analysis of present forms of social control it emerged that great attention was also 
paid to the system generated by formal institutions. The next chapter will 
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therefore be complementary to the present one. These findings will be particularly 
significant in the conclusion where the definition of `community criminology' 
will have to consider the enmeshing of formal and informal elements in the local 
criminological discourses. 
11.1 Social control through the family 
In chapter Nine it was argued by some that family may be problematic in terms of 
social control for two reasons: for the parents' "out of place" Culture and an 
internal exclusive bonding (see 9.3). This section will present the detailed 
evaluation of both the potential and the alleged inadequacies of many families in 
dealing with social control. Two main issues were highlighted. The first was that 
many parents would be keen in delegating moral education to others, and in 
particular mosques, as soon as the child comes of age to attend the madrasa. The 
second was that family upbringing was gender biased and ended up conceding too 
much freedom to boys. Views criticising the aspect of delegation to the mosque 
included: 
I think the first teachers are your parents, I mean, they actually bring 
you up in the norms and values that they share.. . they are supposed to 
teach you in the right way. There are certain things that your parents 
are supposed to do while you are small. They are supposed to teach 
you right and wrong, the difference between right and wrong and 
things like 'you shouldn't lie, you should go to the mosque, etc. ', but 
once the person reach[es] a certain age they will have their own 
understanding and they go to the mosque and then it is the duty of the 
imam of the mosque, the priest of the mosque to teach them norms 
and values... (Yousef) 
When you are little... you stop going to mosque when you are about 8 
or 9. Before that time you are not gonna. . . if you don't give your kids 
values and beliefs and... aspects of living your life, then.. . when your 
kids are like 8, they become total morons.. .1 am not being general, 
but.. . your parents start giving you off... they teach you stuff, they 
teach you manners, they teach you everything and when you are old 
enough to go to mosque [this is delegated to mosques] (Bano) 
216 
Views about a different exertion of social control on boys and girls included: 
A lot of issues that came up while visiting homes.. . you could tell 
there were problems they were reluctant to talk about, it showed 
whatever tension or... problems ... so we got involved to 
find out what 
the problem was and found out that they [some women] weren't 
allowed to go out and the family was afraid that they would mix in 
with the society and that would mean that they will misguide them 
(Shamim) 
I think it is different between boys and girls. I mentioned the situation 
where a girl was taking drugs and ran away, but with boys I think it is 
very different because first of all our upbringing has taught us that the 
boys can get away with anything really, and then the girls are the ones 
who... the kind of... we need to control them more than the boys. 
(Fatima) 
Social control exercised by families seemed to be mainly about prevention 
towards girls and retrieval towards boys, as it will be discussed in the next 
section. 
In general, however, evaluation of social control exercised by families 
tended to focus on one element: izzat. While preservation of the family honour 
(see 5.4) would in theory be a trigger for preventing deviance in one's children, 
many respondents described family social control as functional to the preservation 
of an honourable facade (see section on gossip and scandal below) rather than the 
uprooting of deviant behaviour (cf. family exclusivism in 9.3). Rather than 
tackling a problem, things may be `swept under the carpet': 
Our community. . .1 
don't know what to say, they don't want to open 
up, they don't want to talk about issues and things, and that word 
again, izzat, because they are scared, and what is happening in their 
family unit what their kids are doing and everything because they don't 
want other people to know their business. (Adam) 
One imam recounted that when he saw a member of a family he knew pictured in 
the Telegraph & Argus following their arrest for drugs related offences, he went 
to visit the family to offer emotional support, but he was called `maulana (maulvi) 
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bastard' on their doorstep and turned away as they despised his acknowledgement 
of the dishonour that had occurred to their family. 
As already discussed in 6.1.1, izzat has a special link to women and 
perhaps for this reason, respondents registered different articulations of social 
control for boys and girls. 
11.1.1 Prevention for girls and retrieval for boys: a case study 
Parents were generally seen as more lenient with sons than with daughters, and all 
the women interviewed felt that cultural traditions made men feel as if they were 
always forgivable. This supported the idea that social control was gendered: 
If the Asian males of the community commit crime, it is not looked 
down as bad as if it was a woman (Mahima) 
Considering the widespread belief that women are the carrier of the family izzat, 
the damage to reputation created by the bad behaviour of a son seemed to be 
retrievable, while the actions of a woman seemed to carry bigger consequences 
for her parents. This view was supported by an anecdote circulating during 
fieldwork: 
I know of this family. They don't live in our neighbourhood but people 
used to... the story used to circulate from Bradford 8 to Bradford 1, so 
you are bound to hear somewhere along the line. This family... they 
were an Asian family, they weren't very religious and they weren't 
really bothered about the way they were. A lot of people said they 
were westernised, but westernised is what you think it is westernised, 
not... so, they were just themselves, they were free people, they 
weren't eastern, they didn't have eastern values or culture, what our 
parents believe to be eastern. So they were just themselves, and... their 
sons started taking drugs, being smoking, they were very light, you 
know, `we need to do something about him, we need to make him get 
off this drug'. The daughter started to take the drugs as well. She was 
kicked out of the house, like you said you heard. She had nowhere to 
go, so she ended up with her drug dealer. They said this was her 
ultimate decision, this is what she wanted from day one, that's why she 
made us kick her out... and excuses for covering up why they kicked 
her out. ' This is what she wanted and that's why we've done it'. The 
son was continuing still taking the drugs, no matter what they would 
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do to stop him because it is very hard unless you get proper help, but 
the son was sort of... I don't know what it is with boys in Asian 
family... they are seen as better assets. And she was like... all her 
focus was on the son, but none on the daughter. The daughter was 
kicked out of the house, it doesn't matter about her, it doesn't matter. 
It is like she was replaced... they did not need her. She ended up with 
her drug dealer and she ended up in a very bad state. Had she got the 
help she needed from the family or whoever... she would have maybe 
you know.. . did something about 
it. She ended up with someone who 
wasn't going to really get her off it, because he needs her. In fact he 
made her go back home, steal gold, Asian gold is like... very valued in 
family... made her steal all the gold, everything so basically her life 
was.. . because to this 
day she isn't allowed to go to her family now. As 
far as they are concerned she is dead. 
This anecdote, recounted more or less in the same way by different sources, 
seems to convey the idea that rehabilitation of a daughter is more difficult than 
rehabilitation of a son. It may be for this reason that preventive social control 
appears to be stronger for girls who are generally more limited in their freedom of 
movement than their brothers. However, the expulsion of a daughter from a 
family seemed to be an extreme and rare resolution as it may be a very publicly 
recognisable sign of the breach of family izzat. For this reason, a family who had 
expelled their daughters might hide it in different ways: 
They say she is studying, she's gone to stay with an auntie somewhere. 
If she is in Bradford they say she's gone to London, if she is in London 
it will be Bradford (Ali) 
Other families may choose to send the daughter back to Pakistan for 
`rehabilitation' or ask for religious or magical help (see below). Parental strategies 
appeared to be varied, but dictated by the common concern of protecting izzat. 
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11.1.2 Three case studies of parental strategies 
Prompted by my questioning about parents' knowledge and parental resources, 
community worker Adam introduced me to three individuals to explain his view 
of parenting as potentially the main source of social control. 
The three men introduced belonged to well known local families who had 
developed businesses and achieved an economic status that was described as 
`middle class'. The first was Iqbal, a businessman and politician born in the 
Mirpur District who migrated to the UK as a child. According to Adam, he had 
managed to involve all his children in the family businesses (even the one who 
had graduated) and had always managed to stay close to them. None of them had 
ever been involved even in minor crimes, quite common amongst Pakistani 
teenagers in the area who wanted to have `a bit of fun' (sic). Indirectly, Igbal 
described his ethos as a parent in this way: 
I think that parents have to be strict and I think strictness is something 
that doesn't come about at the age of 16, it has to start at a very early 
age, but the problem that has been with.. . how shall I say-with the 
Muslim community was the father was too busy working, because the 
mother wasn't allowed to work, or the mother wasn't in the position to 
work, and ... 
but the basic education, where does that come from? 
How do you discipline the child... how does that come from? The 
mother wasn't able to do it, and the father was too busy working. I 
think the Asian community has come to thinking: `well, the Muslim 
community, we were too busy working and we neglected the children. 
(... ) I realised that when my son was born... and I realised that wasn't 
the way forward, I think my children have to come first, so I'd better 
be with him. But sometimes when you have like mother and father 
back home, your family here, so you are torn between those two 
things ... (Iqbal) 
In order to show me a comparative example to the idea of good parenting as the 
simple act of spending time with one's children (especially sons, according to the 
quote) from early childhood, Adam presented me with the example of 23 year old 
Azad, unemployed. At the time of the interview Azad was busy gathering his 
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friends (and personal driver) to arrange the Saturday night drug business. Azad's 
father was described by Adam as a famous mullah respected by the whole local 
community as somebody who had `made it big' at an international level and was 
very respected. According to Adam, Azad's father spent most of his time abroad, 
preaching from California to Malaysia, he earned a fortune, but completely 
neglected his sons who turned into drug dealers. Instead of completely rebelling 
against the family, Azad had decided to preserve the family izzat by 
accommodating the parents' desires such as going to Pakistan at least once a year 
to visit relatives'. During these absences, he would `sell up to a friend', that is to 
say he would rent his phone where he received the orders and would get the 
phone back once he returned to Bradford. 
Azad's brother had been arrested for an armed robbery before becoming a 
Quran hafiz2. Azad justified his new life style by saying that he had worked for 
too long for a local greengrocer's and now it was time `to chill'. Apparently, his 
father said to him that he could do whatever he wanted as long as he did not get to 
know about it. Adam's critical view of a parent who is too involved in religion to 
look after his children was mentioned also by a Londoner, a newcomer to 
Bradford: 
The other extreme dimension is when people have kids, I have a 
personal example, a very-very close friend of mine since uni, his father 
would go... Tableeghi Jamaat... (... ) He has got 4 kids, married man, 
who goes to Tableegh for 9-10 months a year. Two months he will 
come back and then he will go again to different countries, yet there is 
not father figure at home... (... )Tableegh is where people believe you 
have to dedicate at the minimum 30 days a year of your life to the 
Mosque, where you go... for example, you are in Bradford, you go to 
the mosque in London, in Malaysia, and you invite people from that 
1 Azad himself could have fitted in Wardak's category of `accommodationists' (2000: 156,157) 
described in 3.5. 
2 Quran hafizs are those who know the Quran by heart. 
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area to come to the Mosque. This is your top priority. Some people 
have taken it to such an extreme that they won't do 30 days, they'll do 
9-10 months a year, but they will only come back just to 
like... recuperate, and then go back again. That's the other extreme, 
they don't work, they become very lazy, they give nothing back 
positively in the community (Imran) 
The third example Adam presented in order to make his point about parenting 
concerned another local businessman who, according to local residents, had 
shared much of his good luck in business with the neighbourhood, providing jobs 
to many young people and improving the reputation of the area with a well 
established business venture. Although Jamil was only 36, he seemed to embody 
all the essential characteristics that people tend to ascribe to the `first generation': 
hard-working, not tempted by quick money and expensive commodities, and 
concerned about the well-being of his community (cf. concept of `putting things 
back into the community' in 7.5). Adam's view of the man as a businessman was 
very respectful: 
I think in the community at the moment everybody are driven by their 
own interest. They are not interested in what the community is doing. 
I have seen him [Jamil], he's got businesses and he's done a lot for the 
community, he has brought young lads from the community in here 
and he has helped them to gain that experience ... he educated them, 
gave them a chance to develop life skills! (.. ) He has been an 
inspiration for the young lads in the area, but then again [Jamil] has 
got his life, he can't be there for them all the time. He has been a role 
model for the young kids, he's done really well for himself, and he's 
got his business set up and everything. His brothers are all here, they 
are all working, like he was saying, 12-13 hours shift. He says he is 
here all the time, he only goes home to sleep. Then he comes back 
here (... ) it has a knock on effect on the community where people see 
that and they want to do better and go forward and open businesses 
(Adam) 
On the other hand, the view about the man as a parent was quite critical: Adam 
wondered whether his children would see enough of him. Again, as in the quotes 
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discussed above, the time spent with one's children became of major concern as 
one of the variables that would secure good parenting: 
A lot of things today [are] about bad parenting. No matter how good 
the parents are as people, if they don't spend enough time with 
children, they can't grow up straight (Adam) 
The lack of time spent with children was linked by one informant to the erosion of 
the family system: 
We have broken the family system, there is nobody in the family who 
is solely responsible for the upbringing of the child, we have created 
the stigma of one parent, if he or she says 'I look after children' we 
think he is- useless, or she is useless, wasting time, so you would not 
hear, maybe a very happy response to say 'I'm a housewife' or maybe 
'I'm a father, my wife works and I'm doing this' (Tahir) 
The position of Jamil himself on the matter was based on a belief that role models 
in the family, no matter how present they are in their lives, will automatically 
dictate the good path to their children: 
Me. So what do you think went right for you and wrong for the others 
who hang out on the road? Is it because you are assertive and they are 
not or... 
Jamil: There are two things. When I was at school, I was still at school, 
after school, go to the shop, help out in the shop. It just came, you 
know, just naturally came to me that we had to work for a living. And 
from that day on we just worked. Because our parents always worked, 
from day one. It just came from there, and then when I grew up I 
thought 'I have to work' and I just had to put the hours in, and not 
everybody wants to put them hours in. 
Overall, there seemed to be a popular understanding that the problem was the 
result of a very carefree upbringing and rooted in either the fathers' absence (cf. 
reference to the `Asian economic niche' in 8.1) the lack of discipline and norms, 
and often because of mothers' attitudes (see below) or erosion of ethnic networks 
(see 9.2). Such a `laid back' trend set in early childhood was considered difficult 
to reverse later in the teenage years,, especially for boys (see Iqbal's quote above). 
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Bad parenting was normally equated with giving too much freedom to children, 
whether examples referred to children running unsupervised in a shop, to children 
whose playmates were not controlled and were outside at all hours , or young 
boys who were allowed out for the whole night: 
I think the kids are out of control of the parents and I think it comes 
from when the child is very small, as a baby and when he is growing 
up, how the parents discipline the child and sometimes, 3-4 years old, 
he is ruling and he is the boss and they are just doing... it comes from 
an early age when parents should discipline them and keep an eye and 
give them a good atmosphere at home, good education and just work 
towards that, but I noticed that in some families they have kids and it is 
just normal, they get up in the morning and they do their routine... they 
are doing their own things and parents let them. So I blame the parents, 
who are not strict with them, they should discipline them so then they 
could avoid... (Shamim) 
This seemed to some as not being related to bad will, but rather to a lack of 
understanding of a different environment and its necessities3. This attitude could 
be labelled `passive bad parenting': 
I think it is just lack of education for parents, they have no knowledge. 
(... ) I will just tell .... you know, in Pakistan, in India... you know 
children can play out, and here the houses are all closed in and 
sometime people have like 6 kids in one room and for parents and for 
kids it is not good, not healthy, and therefore at an early age, parents 
will say, 'go on, play out', where in Pakistan they are not allowed to 
play out like that, you know, because the extended family is there, and 
they are safe there, but here, because they can't cope with so much, 
people just sitting in one room, so I think that is one of the reasons, 
that they don't have enough space to play with... a play area, and the 
weather as well, so parents are frustrated and they think 'well, let them 
go out and do what they can do, so at least I can get on with my house 
work' and therefore kids are left on their own for too long.. . they are left too long. In Pakistan, if a child stays out for more than half an 
hour, everybody will say 'oh, he hasn't come home yet', but here, 
because there is so much going on, so much on parents' mind as 
well ... (Shami m) 
Observations on very relaxed attitudes towards disciplining very young children in rural Punjab 
have been discussed by some anthropologists (Lyon 2004). Lyon recounted episodes when serious 
mischief by his hosts' youngest son was laughed at, and the guest was reprimanded for trying to 
stop the child touching his computer: the child was not believed to be capable of understanding 
(ibid: 75-78). 
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Some relevant observations were made by a woman in her forties who had 
attended a majority-white school in the years when the local `bussing' policies 
were in force, aimed at increasing ethnic interactions by sending students to 
schools in other wards. She stated that she realised how much less discipline she 
was subjected to, compared to her English counterparts: 
The school was very difficult because there seemed to be a sense 
of... you know for the white kids it was really different because their 
life used to be more structured than ours, in the sense they would go 
home, have tea, have supper, da -da-da, they were set into a routine 
and that was represented in the way they came across, for us there was 
nothing like that, it was sort of like... you went home, you didn't have 
tea, you had a cup of tea and biscuits and then you had your roti at 
half past seven, eight o'clock, that was our main meal. And instead of 
going to bed... you know... for my mum it was you go to bed when 
you are tired. You weren't sent to bed if you had school in the 
morning. So at half past nine, ten o'clock, my younger sister and my 
younger brother I would put them to sleep myself and then I would 
come down and watch telly till midnight and in them days everything 
switched off at half past eleven, twelve o'clock, you didn't have all 
night telly. (Ayesha) 
While the above views might be ascribed to a feeling of frustration promoted by 
the unused potential of social control within the traditional family structure, some 
respondents were inclined to blame a more `active' or `conscious' form of bad 
parenting, in their opinion produced by some features of rural Pakistani family 
structure: 
Zameer: I think we have to take some responsibility for ourselves on 
that, the way we portray ourselves, and the thing is, at the end of the 
day, we are a law abiding community, because if you look at the 
Indians, Indian Muslims, and the Indian Hindu population in West 
Yorkshire, you don't get to see many of them misbehaving, the way 
the Pakistanis do... they don't, do they? You don't see many of them 
involved in drugs. 
Me. Why? 
Zameer: That is a good question, why. That... because you see an 
Asian, physically, you are not gonna know if this guy is a Muslim or 
Hindu or Sikh, but why is it that the Muslim Pakistani kids may 
potentially misbehave much more than the Hindu or the Gujarati kid? 
It is a big question, because the Gujaratis, right, some of those are 
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Muslims, so there is something which is not right here ... if a Gujarati kid from India in general do much better than Pakistani kids .... is that 
something to do with the make-up of the families? Where your 
mentality, it is something to do with your clan, where you live ... I 
think it is, it is the way we may be behaving in our families, the way 
some of it is acceptable, some of that so called deviant behaviour is 
acceptable. 
Chapters Five and Six have already highlighted some perspectives extant in 
Bradford concerning the lack of education in the Mirpuri heritage and the 
prioritising of biraderi interests at the expense of the common good, and the 
`cultural' practice of Islam. Below we provide an analysis of what the gendered 
division of parental roles based on cultural tradition may mean for social control. 
11.1.2 The mothers' roles 
In Adam's examples given above, the point about good and bad parenting was 
made partly on the basis of reference to the fathers. In almost all interviews, 
however, respondents tended to talk about parents in general, and when 
questioned about the different roles of mothers and fathers in raising children 
there seemed to be unanimity in describing a division in parental roles. Mothers 
were the worrying, listening and forgiving part, and fathers more strict and 
inclined to produce chastisement in the form of physical punishment (cf. also 
Irfan and Cowburn 2004: 96): 
My mum (laughs), she always says, even if I am 18, what I should do 
or shouldn't do. Sometimes I go out and see my friends and if I am 
late she is always calling me 'where are you? ' in case I am in an 
accident somewhere, she is always worried. (... ) I think it is 
everybody, in the majority it is always mothers who get worried, you 
know. (Yousef) 
During participant observation I witnessed several arguments in which mothers 
were `told off' by husbands for being too lenient with the children, or even by 
daughters who argued with mothers who had lied to their husbands in order to 
protect their sons from chastisement. 
226 
Imran: You'll find that the mothers usually hide these issues and they 
are in more or less denial... 
Me: You mean they hide it from the fathers as well? 
Imran: From the fathers as well... you find fathers are at work, so they 
don't really know what is happening at home, it is the mothers who 
know the real happenings of the family. She knows what the daughter is 
getting up to, she knows what the son is getting up to, you know, she 
knows that. And a lot of the times you find that she hides it, keeps it 
secret from the father. Especially she feels that the father will be very 
heavy in dealing with it, you know, whereas on the father's side ... I 
mean, these are only general... general stuff... the family decides to deal 
with it. If it is the father who deals with it... the fathers I met, they aren't 
actually understanding to problems (... ) simply because they don't 
know problems or the pressures they have to face when they go to 
schools, colleges, on the streets... they don't understand the pressures 
they have actually been put... so you'll find that the fathers are very 
heavy handed in dealing with these issues. 
The widespread belief that in Pakistani culture, or even in Muslim cultures, the 
man has a more public role and the woman a private one, seemed to be backed up 
by many interviews in a way that is consistent with relevant literature (li-fan and 
Cowburn 2004). The mother represents a `softer' traditional culture, the father 
authority and prescription: 
My dad is more educated than my mum, and he has been brought up in 
England, that plays a big factor on my dad's character, my mum tends 
to have a big part in our culture, whereas my dad doesn't (Mahima) 
It was felt that while fathers might be more or less present in the upbringing of 
children (and their absence would create lack of discipline) the more stable 
presence of the mother may fail to provide the adequate upbringing either for her 
softness or her being unprepared to deal with the problems facing the youth. This 
may be related in the essentialised perceptions of gender characteristics as 
outlined in 7.4: women may be in fact considered softer, passive and passively 
involved in deviant behaviour. So women taking drugs may be seen as victims of 
a polluted society, and mothers who do not adequately discipline their sons are 
considered victims of their soft nature. 
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So far preventive social control has been discussed and we have only 
hinted at the actions that families may take once the children have already been 
involved in illegal activities. Some forms of retrieval strategies will be evaluated 
here below. 
11.1.4 `Home made rehabilitation': 'village rehab' and the `marriage cure' 
Some elders seemed to retain an idealised concept of `back home'. In many 
families it is still a custom to send children back home during their holidays in 
order to enhance their `real life' and show how `lucky they are' (Kalra and 
Mcloughlin 1999; Bolognani, 2007b forthcoming): 
At one time all the children were encouraged to go to Pakistan for a 
holiday, during the summer, but nowadays the tendency is getting less 
and less. (... ) It is because the children don't wanna go, but by not 
going they are missing out on something, like you know, (... ) I am 
sure it helps your education and it helps by understanding other 
people's problems, you know you understand how other people live, 
and it is not all the same. (Iqbal) 
Whether the idealised morality is supposed to simply rub off on the young 
vilayatis (foreigners), or there will be a rational realisation of their privileged 
condition in the UK, the results of these `travels of knowledge' are quite 
controversial. According to some young men who had recently been, such visits 
could become counterproductive and they believed that the idealisation of `back 
home' was misplaced: 
Me. (Pointing at his vodka and red bull) There's nothing like this in 
Pakistan, is it? 
Khalil: There is! A lot stronger than this! It is called kuppi... you know, 
if you had that much, you would not wake up for about 2-3 days. I've 
got 2 of my friends who have come back from Pakistan now, 2 weeks 
ago, one of them has been drinking and smoking so much.. . smoking 
that black... he's been smoking so much of that, he was taken to 
hospital. Because it is warm as well, innit? So you are always sweating 
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and stuff, and it dries you out, innit? I've never drank in Pakistan 
because I go with my uncle and with my family, do you know what I 
mean? But this time we go we are not gonna go home, we go home for 
the first week or somewhat, and then just stay out and enjoy, see places 
and everything, and have a good life. (... ) 
Azad recounted how much `chilling' he is used to doing in Lahore, where 
`everybody' (sic) is on drugs. Some literature on the subject refers to anecdotes 
about the development of a `holiday habit' (Pearson and Patel 1998: 218), an 
addiction developed during a sojourn in Pakistan. Hussain, when asked about 
drugs in the community, answered by saying that it is quite natural for Pakistani 
people to use drugs: evidence of that would lie in the natural and lush growth of 
marijuana in the Indian subcontinent. However, the practice of sending children 
back home to take them off drugs was still in use at the time of the fieldwork. Of 
particular interest was the news reported by some tabloids after 7/7 that one of the 
London bombers from Leeds had been sent to Pakistan by his family to take him 
off alcohol, but there he might have developed an interest for discourses that 
played a part in his terrorist action. During fieldwork, however, some respondents 
recounted stories of successful `village rehabilitated' acquaintances as well as 
failed ones. Interestingly, different strategies of rehabilitation seem to have grown 
out of the original one, including the use of clinics in Pakistani cities: 
Fatima: I have one cousin, not cousin, but like family cousin, who 
lives just a few streets away. I think he is in his thirties and something 
and he used to take drugs and he actually went to Pakistan to get rehab 
from there and I was there in Pakistan at the moment so... 
Me: Do you mean he went to a clinic? 
Fatima: Yes, in Pakistan. They have rehab there. Then... They sat him 
into a rehab clinic and stuff like that and I think the wider community, 
the elder generation they are aware that there is a problem with drugs, 
and that there are institutions to deal with it, but in the past, or even 
now in the present there has been this sense of hiding, put it under the 
carpet 'he'll be ok, we'll deal with it ourselves'. So say for example if 
you have been affected in a family with drugs, and you put it under the 
carpet and you see you know, two doors away from you, that the 
same. . . people 
from the same background, people have got the same 
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problem with drugs, that family... family A won't go to family B 
because first they will keep their problems to themselves so they don't 
want to go them people and help them, because this family has got this 
concept of 'we dealt with it ourselves, they can deal with it 
themselves'... do you get it? 
In this way the rehabilitation may be kept secret from the rest of the community 
who do not have contacts in Pakistani cities. 
Sometimes rehab back home may be paired with marriage: 
Me. What if parents found out about a son taking drugs? 
Jamal: I'll give you an example. I have got someone I know and he 
found out that his son was smoking cannabis when his son was only 
14, so he sent him off to Pakistan and got him married at the age of 14! 
This was years ago, we were kids, I was about 14, no 16, he was two 
years younger than me, that kid... he was smoking some weed and his 
dad saw him and he got his passport, took him to Pakistan, kept him 
there for 1 year, got him married, brought him back, set him to work in 
a restaurant, the guy is now about 20 now, he brought his Mrs 
over... and he's got a kid! He is a father by the age of 17. 
Me. Do you think it worked? 
Jamal: No, because he still does it. 
Me. What is the reasoning behind it? 
Jamal: Discipline. The eldest-for them, it is a real discipline 'oh well, 
if I give him some responsibility and get him married and having a 
family, he might just stop it because it is your responsibility'... it is 
about discipline. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't. I know 
people for whom it worked, man. I know people who were drunkies, I 
know one at the bottom of our street, my friend's older brother and he 
is a drunkie and heroine, cocaine and all sort and 
drinking... everything. Partying... going out every night not coming 
home for 3,4 days-his dad took him Pakistan, got him married, came 
back now and you won't believe he is the same person. He stopped 
drinking, stopped the drugs, stopped everything. (... )Yes. Sometimes it 
works.. . 
but at the age of 14, what do you know about life? You try to 
enjoy yourself. . .1 used to 
do all sorts that my mum and dad don't know 
about. 
Some would argue that there is a value of treatment attached to these types of 
marriage (cf. also Werbner 2004: 903): 
The mother is crying 'My son, why did you go to jail, come on, let's go 
to Pakistan and get you married', as if marriage is some miracle cure 
that suddenly the son becomes a doctor and goes to university when he 
comes back... I am sorry but it doesn't work like that (Mahima) 
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The wide-spread awareness of such custom is shown a literature example: 
At the first sign of trouble, the one word that gets mentioned is 
marriage. No shit, it really is the quickest thing going. Your son 
turning to petty crime? Want to stop mixing with white women? Think 
he is a serial killer? Then get him wed. If marriage won't sort it out, 
nothing will. (Alain 2002: 40) 
However, reflecting on Jamal's accounts, it is interesting to see how apart from 
giving responsibility to the `derailed' child, there are other advantages: the whole 
biraderi is kept happy and the `prodigal son' is, through the rite of marriage, 
reintegrated into his family of which he accepts the desires: 
I think parents, they feel they owe it to their family back home, that's 
sense of guilt, I think that is what it boils down to. Is the sense of 'we 
are here, you are there, so if we intermarry and your kids come 
over... ', and I think a lot has to do with that. (Ayesha) 
11.1.5 Word of mouth, role models, gossip and scandal 
Respondents often referred to sanctions that were activated against families whose 
members had been, for example, arrested. Some would not be invited to functions 
such as weddings and reciprocal visiting would be interrupted. When a reciprocity 
in invitations to weddings was interrupted, the sign of a breakdown in lena dena 
(taking giving, see 6.1.1) would be obvious. This, according to some respondents, 
would only happen when there was formal public evidence of the offences 
committed (i. e. incarceration or information published in the local papers). Where 
judgements were made according to rumours circulating in the community, 
sanctions would be less definite. Mothers would ask the children not to go out 
with members of the rumoured family, for instance, but no public shaming would 
take place. According to Bano, her parents would be very cautious as gossip may 
irreparably and unfairly damage a whole family: 
When my mum and dad say that they would think about it one hundred 
times, because in my family it is wrong to talk about people, because if 
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they talk of so and so's daughter, they've got a daughter at home and if 
they talk of so and so's son they have got two sons at home, so that is 
why they don't tend to talk about things because anything could 
happen. (Bano) 
Rumours were considered a form of envy too and therefore not always accurate. 
As Alexander noted in the Bangladeshi community in London, the ubiquity of 
gossip may make it void (Alexander 2000: 128). When during fieldwork rumours 
about well-known entrepreneurs doing money laundering were compared, it was 
sometimes argued that this was malicious information spread by competitors : 
Jamil: [Here there is] too much gossip! If you can get to the izzat of 
any family, you'll just go for it, innit? 
Adam: Yeah, you'll go all the way to Pakistan to find out! (Laughs) 
Perhaps it may be interesting to note that the crime committed may be of 
relevance to the intensity of community sanctions. For example, as hinted in 4.7, 
riots were not generally considered a major law infringement: 
Obviously there is the sense of this person being in the riot and it was 
quite bad at the beginning. But people keep quiet about it; they might 
talk about it behind our backs [but will not shame us in 
public]. (Fatima) 
In the process of public shaming therefore, a form of collaboration between 
institutional sanctions (i. e. arrest and prison) and informal sanctions seemed to be 
vital as the former triggered the latter (cf. Braithwaithe 1989: 97). 
Word of mouth could assume the form of negative gossip, but also the form 
of an informal source of knowledge and support (see also media and the word of 
mouth in 12.2). This seemed particularly developed amongst women who seemed 
to have less access to imams and may be less likely to consult practitioners and 
privileged informal support networks (cf. Orford et al. 2004: 25): 
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Me. Do you think who the ones who have got a doubt will feel 
comfortable and close enough to the imam to ask about these 
questions? 
FG2C. I am not really sure. 
Me. Do you think they'll ask somebody else? 
FG2C. I don't think they will go to the imam because they don't wanna 
tell them that they are doing it, but I think they will ask people, so 
somebody else, yeah. 
Me. Are there any religious people you can speak about these issues? 
FG2C: yeah. 
Me: So if you had a doubt, would you go to the imam and discuss 
these thins? 
FG2A. I wouldn't personally go to the imam and discuss these things. I 
would ask my parents... my mum and then she would look into it for 
me. She can ask other women as well, you know.. . who know more 
about Islam. 
11.2 Importing a communal system of social control 
In 6.2.1 the particularity of biraderi as an institution that is half way between 
family and community was discussed. While in the preceding section we have 
focused on the more familial aspect of social control, here we will concentrate on 
its community aspects. 
While in chapter Seven we have highlighted how respondents tended to 
agree on the fact that the Pakistani community had the same problems as any 
other, we have also seen that some aspects of Pakistani culture (such as. izzat) 
may play a role in social control. Cultural features of this kind appear in some 
literature as advantages in crime prevention: 
Studies from Europe, Israel and America all suggest that the strength 
of the culture of the migrant group has an important impact on social 
control and crime. This is not necessarily the case where a criminal 
tradition is imported, as in the case of the Mafia. But where a culture is 
able to provide a cushion against difficulties experienced in migration, 
or where the social structure of the country of origin is retained by the 
migrant group in the new society, a degree of insularity may `protect' 
the migrants for a not inconsiderable time (... ) where an immigrant 
group maintains its ethnic identity, for example through its religion, or 
where migration is seen as temporary and social control is imposed by 
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the homeland is a meaningful reality crime rates may remain low 
(Mawby and Batta 1980: 18) 
How biraderi can be seen as providing a `cushion against difficulties 
experienced' has been discussed in 8.2. Here we will focus on how the `social 
structure of the country of origin (... ) may protect' the community. 
A different form of collaboration between informal and institutional 
sanctions was also cited in the case of `mediation'. With `mediation' it is possible 
to define an informal system of restorative justice bearing similarities to an 
institutional practice in the Indian subcontinent, the panchayyat (Chaudhary 
1999: 85). Whilst restoring a right or order in general may be considered a form 
of social control, as it prevents the development of further feuds, it is not so much 
about resolution but about `group harmony' (Lyon 2004: 185). And while in the 
Indian subcontinent the village panchayyat is made up of a group of elders, and 
both victim and perpetrator appear in front of them to have to give evidence and 
discuss what will make amendment for the contentious deed, mediation in the 
diaspora is less formally organised: 
Mediation is somebody just sitting between parties and trying to 
resolve it (Ayesha) 
If something big comes up normally my mum gets called as a 
mediator because she is neutral so people get her to sit down and kind 
of keep the diplomacy... but in general it is elder figures like grandma, 
grandpa... because they will have more authority over everyone 
(Bashir) 
It is the pain of out life. . . 
because our granddad says: `So and so came, 
they respect me, they have come to see me, they respect my opinion, 
my own children and my own grandchildren won't take me-they'll 
take me for granted and you don't respect me'. But it is not that, 
sometimes it is just wrong. It happens quite a lot. I can't say-but I 
would say, it is 99% I bet every Asian family has got someone who is 
a mediator. Someone to look to if something goes wrong. (Zaara) 
I think it is less now, but mediation used to take place when there was 
a break down in marriage relationships. It did work, but now with the 
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third generation, kids don't want that mediation, they don't wanna 
know. I don't think that goes on a lot now. But mediation does take 
place, but obviously on smaller issues, where there is 
misunderstandings between two or three parties... (... ) it is only for 
minor cases. Cases where... murder and attempted murder, I think it 
would be unwise to get involved with that sort of things.. . it is better to 
let the police to deal with it. (Iqbal) 
Anecdotes reported during the research referred to episodes of mediation only in 
conjunction with the formal criminal justice system. For example, the potentially 
violent confrontation between two families who both wanted to sell ice creams in 
the same area was dealt with through the mediation of an elder who was 
considered wise and neutral but during the mediation a legal discussion of what 
the law implied took place. 
Sometimes mediation was the name given to the help given by a third party 
in dealing with the police: 
In the summer, a particular family approached me because I am an 
educated person so maybe I could help, I think it was a mother who 
was feeling very vulnerable, teenagers were playing football, throwing 
the ball on the walls... white teenagers, I think... there was one Asian 
as well. (... ) again she is very unhappy with the police, they haven't 
helped her and haven't responded to her calls. She is highly educated 
but her English is not as fluent as maybe required to persuade the 
police (laughs) (Tahir) 
At other times, mediation is a corollary to a case dealt with by the police: 
The person who threatened to shoot my brother in the head, my 
grandfather knew his father from Pakistan as well (my granddad is 
from Pakistan), he is a Raja4, [Rajas] they are perceived high in 
Pakistan. So as a Raja, in Pakistan he had a lot of say.. . 
like here, well, 
here it is not as much, but in Pakistan is unbelievable, so... he called 
that boy's father to his house, after the police had gone, and he made 
that boy, drug dealer, apologize because he was rude to my mother as 
well, so he called my mother, my brother, apologised to them and he 
actually apologised saying 'I didn't know whose daughter you were', he 
said to my mum, and his dad was there, and he said to his son 'you 
don't know but this man in his time, he has knocked a few heads 
together as well' and everyone ... 
it came to an end. He said 'In the 
future do not be rude to this family' (Zaara) 
a Rajas or Rajputs are one of the zamindaar (landowner) castes. 
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Mediation, however, seemed to be used more in marriage matters than in anything 
else. Some mediation would take place while a divorce was already being 
discussed in court, with sudden reconciliations when one of the parties accepted 
the others' conditions (for instance the newly wed couple would buy a house by 
themselves and stop living with the in-laws). In cases of domestic violence, 
mediation seemed to be considered more a patriarchal feature rather than a useful 
instrument, unless accompanied by the law in the form of social services' action 
or the presence of a police officer: 
Me. Is mediation successful to any extent? 
Alina: Unfortunately not. It is not mediation, I would not call it 
mediation, it is sheer blackmail, emotional blackmail by the elders. 
Obviously they are not worried about the woman, how this violence is 
emotionally or psychologically impacting on the woman or the 
children, all they are worried about is honour, what people would 
think. Obviously emotional blackmail can't work together and there is 
a time when the woman says, 'Enough is enough, I have to do 
something about it now'. Because my experience is that the elders are 
not addressing the issues, they are only waffling basically to protect 
the honour of the family. Also the majority of women who come over 
from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, they want to take some steps, but 
they have this immigration threat over their heads, the family uses it as 
a threat and the majority of them don't know what their tights are, they 
only know what they are told by the partners' families. They don't even 
have their passport, they are kept in custody. (... ) Sometimes women 
who know these are their options, they are too scared to do that on 
their own so they need somebody to guide them through the whole 
process. (... ). It is very hard and unfortunately in the Asian 
community.. . we 
have had some success stories, but when a woman 
lives in an extended family, for her to go down this route is highly 
difficult and her options are that she either moves into a refuge or goes 
to a separate property. But women who live in a nuclear family, for 
them is much easier. That is where we have some success, where 
women live in a nuclear family. 
Ayesha: It is really difficult because for some women.. . one woman for instance, she said 'I don't wanna leave my home', I just want the 
beating to stop. I have got two kids, I live with my husband and my 
father in law and both beat me, I just don't want to leave my home, go 
and talk to them'( ... 
) and in this case I said, 'what do you want me to 
do' and she said 'go and talk to him'. 
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Me. Was it a kind of mediation? 
Ayesha: Mediation is just something I don't believe in, I am not really 
interested in it. Mediation is somebody just sitting between parties and 
trying to resolve it. But I remember what the Southall Black Sisters 
said, they said mediation does not work, because when she comes to 
you, she has already passed all them stages, she has tried to resolve it 
and because it is not resolved is the reason why she has come to you 
and the family might force mediation to get her to come back home. 
So anyway I went, I said 'go on then, pick up your stuff and we'll see'. 
I went. The police officer who used to work with, very close, I told 
him.... he said 'I'll come with you', so they came with me. But the main 
thing was, I knew the woman, I knew the family and they knew me. 
(... ) so I went to their house, and the father in law was there and the 
husband and me and the police officer went in and she goes to me in 
our language ' talk to them first see what they've got to say' (... ) I says 
`you know what? If she wants to, she can have you outside of this 
bloody house and she can live here on her own until her kids are 16,17 
and you'll have to pay the mortgage and the maintenance. We can do 
that. I can do that within days. Give me a week and I will have you out 
of here', because she was bruised, because he had pushed her 
downstairs. So I said `you know what? You really have to re-decide 
what you want, because I am not here to sweet talk anybody' I was 
really furious and my temper was... mmmhhh... and he looked and 
goes `No, no, putter [child], I am really sorry' ... I said `don't apologize to me, you haven't done anything wrong to me, I am doing my job, but 
when I am doing my job I see what you are doing and what effect do 
you think that has on the kids? ' 15 years down the line, this woman 
still lives in the house, she has still got the kids. 
Involving an authority may be the only guarantee of fairness: 
Me: So let's say something happens in your family... 
FG2A: It depends what kind of problem it is. If it is a problem that can 
be solved without the police getting involved... otherwise you don't 
have a choice. 
FG2C. If there is a rape you don't wanna call the police because you 
are gonna be put in papers and stuff. 
FG2A: But then if you want to have justice, you've got to call the 
police. 
11.3 Between Culture and religion: taweez 
Religion may be an effective means of social control. Aware of the debate that 
has been labelled `Culture vs. religion' (cf. 6.3) before analysing the real impact 
of faith we will describe a feature of social control that rests between the two: 
237 
taweez or, as some would call it, `black magic' (Mcloughlin 1998a: 99). Taweez 
literally means amulet, but by extension a number of practices that have to do 
with the alleged healing power of Quranic verses are grouped under it. The 
following quotation seems to embody the blurring boundaries between magic and 
religion implied by taweez: 
I cannot really explain because it is weird and wonderful, it is one of 
those magical things that happen and make you believe in religion. 
(Amir) 
Some respondents were aware of the practice of having a taweez made for 
children who were on drugs, but also for depression, relationship problems, 
illnesses, exams and in one case even to try to break a love marriage that had 
taken place against the will of a family. 
In Islam there is a tradition of spiritual healing (rukhia) through the reading 
of the Quran, as Shamim says: 
God has said that if you... for every bad thing or illness if you read it 
properly and follow those things, there is a cure, there is a cure for 
everything in Quran, is a complete book (Shamim) 
The difference between rukhia and taweez lies in the different use of the Quranic 
verses; while in rukhia the Quran is read by or to the person to be healed, taweez 
may consist of the action of wearing, hanging on a wall or even swallowing some 
verses. Scholars are divided about what is to be considered consistent with the 
religious teachings, and many consider taweez as it is practiced by many in 
Bradford as jaddu (magic). 
Many anecdotes gathered during fieldwork include parents who as soon as 
they found out about their children's drug habit consulted mullahs in order to 
have prayers read or taweez made. Often the request for amulets implies the belief 
that a jinn (spirit) has been the cause of the problem: 
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For good health they use taweez, for anything that is going wrong they 
will try to sort out through taweez and somebody who is on drugs they 
will say 'it is not his fault, it is somebody who has done something to 
him' (laughs) (Shamim) 
They may look to that thing, ' somebody has put them up to it, or some 
bad thing has happened and they are taking drugs'. They will look at 
an excuse, put it in that way, and taweez is one thing, the jinn, and this 
and the other, something has got hold of this individual and that's why 
he is taking drugs (Zameer) 
[The reason why people take drugs is] mostly because they are weak 
and the parents have not been teaching how to do correctly. What you 
normally find is people possessed by jinns are normally the good, law 
abiding, religiously (interrupted) (Amir) 
Two imams said that they would not make amulets but would agree to do special 
prayers for the young men in trouble; this would be used as a strategy to get to 
speak with the family and the person in question and start suggesting other means 
of dealing with the problems. 
11.4 Religion as a protective factor 
If the deep albeit controversial faith in taweez was certainly popular, faith itself 
was another element of potential control. Religion and religious institutions were 
often mentioned as one of the variables of social control. Elders would recall the 
role that mosques played in `keeping the community disciplined' in the first years 
of migration, when `young men at the time were wild, with all the gores5' and 
needed the `discipline Islam provides' (Umar). Younger respondents instead 
would be familiar with narratives of `redemption' (see below) through the re- 
discovery of faith. For example, in 2003 a youth centre in Girlington staged a play 
written by local members about a drug dealer who discovered religion after his 
father's death and repented and became a very observant Muslim. A similar 
5 Gore is the singular for `white woman', while the plural should be `gorian'. `Gores' is the 
anglicised plural. 
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paradigm of sin and potential redemption was narrated in the Keighley based film 
`Yasmin6' where the protagonist's brother is a dealer but gives it up once he is 
involved in an extremist Muslim organisation (although he ends up going to 
Afghanistan to join jihadists). 
Although it was clear that religion was widely considered as a "protective 
factor" (Orford et al. 2004: 23), how this worked was rather obscure. The views 
about what religion is and what it prescribed were very varied. Interviewees 
disagreed on many aspects of religion; from the possibility of enforcing religious 
practice to matters like `is marijuana allowed in Islam? '. The way madrasas were 
organised was blamed by some for the failure of mosques' to effect social control 
on youth, something which will be discussed in the next chapter. However, here 
it is important to point out that the idea that a better understanding of the Quran or 
a higher attendance at the mosque would make youth more law-abiding was 
controversial: 
I think it is true in some of the cases. I think the issue you are 
presenting is brought up by the Edge of the City programme because a 
lot of madrasas and community leaders then came out and said 'these 
kids need to learn these things from the mosque', some sort of values 
have to be instilled in these people. And then other said well these kids 
were involved in paedophilia, they will never gonna go near a mosque 
anyway so... (... )Marta, one of the biggest misconception amongst the 
Pakistani Community is that Islam is a very forgiving religion. A lot of 
people are out drinking, they would commit adultery, they will commit 
illegal acts on the basis 'I am fallible, I make mistakes, and God will 
forgive me'. So religion is very conveniently put aside especially 
among people who are gonna go out and break law so they will use 
religion when it suits them, they will put it aside when it does not suit 
them. Religion, I believe, plays very little part. I think is the lure of big 
things, money, cars, nice clothes, status, recognition. I think it is the 
lure of those things why people do illegal things because then they 
become recognised (... ) of the community, become highly respected if 
you've got money you've got clout. (Abdul) 
6 `Yasmin' is based on a screenplay written during a workshop organised by the film director with 
local members of the Pakistani community. 
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While faith might help individuals who had gone onto a wrong path, it was 
generally considered a variable independent from humans' will and therefore 
could not directly be used in crime prevention. Humans cannot control faith. 
However, many believed that an upbringing that emphasised Muslim identity may 
lead to some positive results. 
11.5 Social control through transmission of values and identity 
Although they may wish for more investments in their areas and "pumping more 
money into the community" (see Imran's statements in 8.6) interviewees generally 
related crime to the lack of moral values and the prominence of individualism and 
avidity. Iqbal theorised this by mentioning the cross-cultural effect of Thatcherism 
which affected youth in terms of aspirational frame (as they shared the same 
aspirations of higher classes but had not been given the means to achieve them, see 
`opportunity theory' in 8.3). Respondents engaged in revivalist Islamic groups also 
referred to `moral values' and identified the need for them to be `pumped into the 
community': 
I am a Muslim, I am aware of whom I am, my identity is either 
Muslim or Pakistani, or as an Arab, and Muslim is my identity and I 
haven't adopted my identity from my fathers as my father is Pakistani. 
My identity is Muslim. So it gives me the confidence of a Muslim. I 
don't want to succeed in life, my success is my progression... how well 
do I do in pleasing my creator. And part of that pleasing is that you 
have to be successful in this life and the one after. So you do whatever 
you can in the best way, for example my belief encourages me, 
whatever I do, to do it best, so if I am cleaning the roads I should do it 
as best as I can, there is no shame in cleaning roads or cleaning toilets, 
that's my job and I should do it the best as I can, so it really gives you 
comfort in that way. So really it is a combination of both and at the 
same time I should actively interact with the community I live in, 
because I believe there are common problems which in a community 
(... ) I do believe that that is the right direction to go towards, rather 
than isolation in both ways. (Imran) 
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Moral values had often a religious connotation and the ideas of good and bad 
seemed directly derived from one's knowledge of what Islam said. Most of the 
time this would overlap with Christian or even secular values, but the language in 
which they were expressed was of clear Islamic derivation (see discussion of the 
haram/halal dichotomy in 7. x. 1). 
Prayers are considered a protective factor too: 
The reason for 5 times prayers... they are not all at one time, there is a 
reason. One in the morning, one in the afternoon, one in the late 
afternoon, one in early evening, one last thing at night. Human beings 
are weak. We tend to do things because we are mischievous and the 
devil-if we do it at those five equal points a day, this sort of reminds 
us... remembering God. (Amir) 
11.6 Purification, reintegration and `reconversions' 
Reintegration into the family and community life, as we have already seen with 
examples of 'home-made rehabilitation', appeared to be possible even after major 
harem deeds. Purification could be exercised through religious pilgrimages (i. e. 
Urara or Hajj), or even by `visible' conversions: for example, girls may start 
wcaring the hijab and boys would perform daily prayers, attend mosque and even 
grow a beard. These processes were commonly called `reconversions', a term that 
alludes to the common belief that every human being is born as a Muslim but may 
abandon the Muslim ethos or belief's. In some cases prison sentences triggered 
reconversion (see next chapter), but in others, individuals narrated an epiphany, a 
sudden enlightenment: 
My cousin, when he trot caught doing something he started getting into 
religion and stuff ... they made him go to mosque and things... and then 
stopped it bccuuse he got into religion (... )[There is another case of a) 
guy (... ). but that was murder. What happened was that this... I can't 
remember actually if it was a Pakistani guy or a white guy, he came to 
his house and threatened his mother, and he came out and he stabbed 
him and then he was in prison for a while. When he came out, he 
embraced Islam. (Ali) 
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I have got a very close friend who is actually. I think he is about 25 
now, but he has only come to Islam recently, I tend to go to Mosque 
myself and I have started talking to him, etc. and he was involved in 
this kind of stuff, if you know what I mean, but at a young age he 
actually got involved in a wrong group of people and he got involved 
in drugs and crime and he has only recently started to get away from it 
all and he has started coming to the mosque etc. and he says the 
majority, they do actually come to the mosque, it is only for the Friday 
prayers, etc, they do tend to come to the mosque but I mean, it is no 
use. if you know what I mean, if you are gonna go, if you are gonna 
conic to the mosque and ask for forgiveness for your sins, but if you 
are gonna get out there and do the same thing again, there is no point 
for it(... )lie actually went to an Islamic talk and he heard the speaker 
in English. I mean, I think the thing with our mosques is 
that... especially for the young people, for the young generation, they'll 
.; o for Friday prayers and you have the imam and you'll have them 
talking in Urdu if you know what I mean and it is a very strong Urdu 
that they are using, they use.. . they tend to use the slang amongst 
themselves (... )I think what we need is we need some English 
speakers... and like this friend of mine, he actually went to this talk 
and he heard a very good English talk and afterwards he got together 
with that English talker, the speaker, and he actually got a one to one 
with him. and he got him thinking and he got... and after that he started 
coming to the mosque slowly-slowly (... ) it was actually that talk that 
changed him... and it is actually pretty amazing, some of the stories 
that he tells but what he has told me is that it is very tempting, you 
know... there are always temptations out there, to go and do the wrong 
thing. but you know ... if you've got what 
it takes... (... ) he used to say, 
when he goes out there, the world. .. 
his mates are gonna come back to 
him and say 'let's go for a night out and this, that and the other' and it's 
gonna be really hard for him to see, and stay away from it all ... 
but if 
you come to Islam then what we believe in, is God is gonna help you, 
you know, and he is actually making an effort, and he is actually ok, 
he makes time to come to the mosque every so often and he is actually 
away from the wrong path and it is actually helping him. (Yousef) 
I don't know 
... a 
lot is... when I turned 17,1 started looking at things in 
a different view and... because I have got like 2 other brothers and they 
respect me so much for what I do and it is... when you are an Asian 
girl and you have family traditions and family values, people look at 
you in a lot of ways, and I realised... obviously what I wear (a hijab) 
(13ano) 
Before when I was 16,1 was really confused. (... ) I think... my 
experience, especially with ... because 
I went through, even after Umra, 
after basically becoming more religious and practicing... (Fatinma) 
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Some respondents argued that some religious groups deliberately target young 
drug addicts as they are perceived as more easily involved in their doctrines. This 
appeared to informants to be the case of Hizb-ut-Tahrir. On the other hand, some 
imams who believed more in prevention than rehabilitation seemed to have 
acquired great popularity. Hussain, himself redeemed from a cannabis habit while 
developing a deep reconversion that took him to Hajj, introduced me to the work 
of a very popular Bradford based imam: Sheikh Ahmed Ali. 
11.7 Popular preaching as social control: Sheikh Ahmed Ali's case study 
Sheikh Ahmed Ali is a British Muslim who was religiously educated in Bury dar- 
ul-oom7 and in Cairo. He has founded the Islamic academy in Bradford and is not 
associated with the conservative approach of elder local Muslim leaders (Lewis 
forthcoming). The aims of the Islamic Academy are to convey much of religious 
education in English, and engage youth with their faith through a number of 
activities such as summer camps, day trips and sports tournaments (ibid. ) 
Ahmed's tapes sell worldwide and are particularly concerned with youth (two 
popular titles are: `Muslim youth' and `Drugs, the mother of all evils'). Ahmed's 
approach is not institutional: his tapes are heard in cars or at home and his 
speeches are informal gatherings not necessarily occurring in mosques. However, 
the messages conveyed are not as liberal. They tend to reproduce the criticism of 
bad parenting (see above) and family exclusive bonding (see 9.3), and the praise 
for a strict adherence to the Quran and the hadiths is supported by detailed 
description of punishments in hell. His speeches, however, represent an attempt to 
talk with youth, albeit in a controversial way that sometimes stirs juxtaposition 
between Muslims and the West, and refer to real life situations. His knowledge of 
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urban British life and young people's aspirations is conveyed through vivid 
language, a diffusion facilitated by means such as CDs and internet marketing. 
Local contemporary knowledge is reinterpreted through Islamic tradition, as 
appears in the following extract from `Muslim Youth': 
There was a time when every Muslim child was a gem. (... ) Every 
child that a Muslim mother gave birth to was unique because behind 
the making of these children there were mothers and fathers even 
greater. The only concern of a mother was to preserve the child from 
the fire of hell. But now things have changed and in the last 15,20 
years things have changed drastically. Muslim mothers are giving birth 
to drug pushers, Muslim mothers are now giving birth to drug takers; 
Muslim mothers are now giving birth to smugglers; Muslim mothers 
are now giving birth to car thieves and children who would still the 
shoes of the worshippers. Muslim mothers are now giving birth to 
stealers, shooters, killers, and we have fallen so low that Muslim 
mothers are now giving birth to children who are living on the dirty 
earnings of bad women. (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, `Muslim Youth') 
Sheikh Ahmed Ali repeats themes that we have analysed in Chapter Nine, such as 
the alleged helplessness of parents and the generational gap. On top of that he 
shows a deep knowledge of a variety of activities young Muslim men are said to 
be engaging with. As we have previously highlighted in 7.4, women are thought 
to be of increasing concern for the community: 
Muslim mothers are now giving birth to daughters who are walking 
hand in hand with a kafir8 without nikkah9. Muslim mothers are now 
giving birth to daughters who roam in around the streets with the latest 
GTI without hijjab, purdah, with the latest glasses. (... ) (Sheikh Ahmed 
Ali, `Muslim Youth') 
The main culprits of a `gangster' culture (see 10.4) seem to be the parents, either 
passive or complacent: 
Who is to blame? Who is responsible? Who has made this children 
drug pushers, thieves and gangsters, who is the one who taught them to 
7 `Seminar' of the Deobandi tradition, see Gilliat-Ray 2005 and Lewis forthcoming. 
8 Kafir (sing. ) or Kuffar (plur. ) refer to non Muslims. Increasingly they have been used by some 
preachers such as members of Hib-ut-Tahrir in a derogative way. 
Nikkah is the religious wedding ceremony. 
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break the laws of Allah? Who is the one who turned a blind eye when 
his son had a £40,000 outside his house and he knew that his son did 
not work. Who is the one who did not question his son when he put 
£1,000 on the table when he knows that he doesn't work? (... ) And the 
truth is that nobody is to blame for this outcome except for you and I, 
the mother and father. (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, `Muslim Youth') 
The contrast between a `Pakistani culture' and Islam (cf. `Culture vs. religion' in 
6.3) is one of the main points of Sheikh Ahmed Ali's preaching: 
Why? Because we are the ones who neglected these children, the ones 
who taught them how to break the laws of Allah and his message, the 
lesson of disobedience. (... ) Many of us are from Pakistani 
background. In this background the child is only six months and you 
will see a golden ring on his finger, a golden chain around his neck. 
This child did not purchase it! (... ) It was mother, father or one of the 
relatives. (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, `Muslim Youth') 
Religious expressions such as `haram' become the pivots of labelling: 
You know, I know that gold is haram with a male. It will become a 
means to him to go to hell. (... ) We say: `he is only a child, when he 
grows up he will realize'. This is the first time we tell this child that 
we break the laws of Allah. (... ) Now it is time for the child hair cut. 
We know this modern day style hair cuts are haram (... ). Who pays for 
these haircuts? Who goes with his child to the barber's? It is the father 
(... ). And what do we say? `It is only a child, when he grows up he 
will stop doing this'(... ) The kid wants his ears pierced. (... ) We teach 
him this lesson so well that he breaks the rules of Allah by taking 
intoxicants, by selling drugs.. . he begins to break the law of Allah with fornication, he begins to commit adultery, he begins to break the law 
of Allah with regard to interest, he begins to wheel and deal. (... ) 
(Sheikh Ahmed Ali, `Muslim Youth') 
However, the final and greatest condemnation is for the phenomenon that we have 
seen described as biraderism (see 9.3): 
When do we realize that our child is out of control? When do we start 
teaching him the lesson of obedience? When there is the million dollar 
question. And what is the million dollar question? `Son, now you are 
20, the time has come for you to marry. Your uncle's daughter is good 
looking, she will make you a good wife'. The child turns around and 
says `Abba, no thanks, not for me'. Now we begin to teach him the 
lesson of obedience. Not because he does something which displease 
Allah and his messenger, but because he has done something that 
displeases me. Because he won't agree to marry the uncle's daughter 
now, we will begin to teach him the lesson of obedience and we will 
say `Do you know what the Quran says about respecting the mother 
and father? ' (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, `Muslim Youth') 
11.8 Conclusion: informal control as partial solution 
This chapter has looked at how informal social control is exercised through 
family, community and certain interpretations of religion. These three elements 
seemed to be perceived as having the potential to help both in terms of prevention 
of crime and reintegration of criminals. However, all three elements seemed to be 
insufficient by themselves in fully assisting youth. As previously observed in 
other chapters, family carries the risk of biraderism (cf. 9.3), religion of 
exclusivism (cf. 9.5) and the community is in constant threat of erosion of its 
ethnic ties (cf. 9.2). 
Families could benefit from a traditional family structure which 
supposedly provides for all the needs of its members (cf. 8.2); however, as seen 
already in 9.3, the exclusiveness of family bonding and the fear of the publicity of 
the breach of izzat might be counterproductive. Parenting was considered as a 
problem given some inadequacies (cf. `out of place Culture', in 9.1) in parental 
skills. Interventions of `home-made' rehabilitation such as `village rehabilitation' 
or the `marriage cure' were sometimes successful, but at other times were 
perceived to have reintegrated the deviant individual without having completely 
rehabilitated him/her. 
Community mediation was considered by some to be flawed, but others 
agreed that in a pluralistic approach where it was combined with formal and legal 
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aids, it could be successful in resettling peace, order and stability and prevent 
vicious circles of family feuds. 
Common practices such as taweez were also used in conjunction with other 
interventions, as two imams reported: amulets could be the first step towards 
approaching a person in trouble who might be eventually convinced to seek 
professional help. 
Faith was a source from which many of the notions of good and evil were 
drawn. Proximity with pious environments was generally considered a `protective 
factor' in terms of crime, but not even this was deemed as a completely safe path 
for the exertion of crime prevention. In fact faith was considered somehow 
independent from the will of human beings as accounts of epiphanies confirmed. 
However, religious practice through English as a medium was generally evaluated 
as a safer strategy as it was the conveyor of universal Islamic moral values that 
would benefit the community through encouraging the inner change of 
individuals. 
The next chapter will analyse how formal institutions are evaluated by the 
community in terms of their role in crime prevention and control. 
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Chapter Twelve 
Evaluation of formal social control 
In the previous chapter informal means of social control exercised by family, 
community and faith appeared to be considered not completely effective by 
themselves, and many respondents pointed out how their potential was only fully 
developed when combined with formal devices. 
This chapter will focus on the role that both formal religious and state 
institutions play in the community. Attention will also be given to the media as 
`instigator and saviour'. We will open with an overview of the present activities of 
the formal community religious institutions (mosques and madrasas) and evaluate 
their differences, as seen by informants, in tackling crime problems. Perceptions of 
the role of policing and other formal systems will be scrutinised through the 
fieldwork data. 
12.1 Mosques: caught between the Local and the Global 
Faith communities are increasingly being considered at a social policy level as one 
of the agents that can help community cohesion and the development of 
communities (Furbey and Macey 2005). The idea behind it would seem to be that: 
Our major faith traditions- all of them more historic and rooted than 
any political party or ideology- play a fundamental role in supporting 
and propagating values which bind us together as a nation (Blair 2001, 
quoted in Furbey and Macey 2005: 97) 
Some informants believed that Islam in particular had a structural organisation that 
may be ideal for the policy needs of the State: 
I think Islam has got very strong influence or infrastructure in place to 
tackle these kinds of [criminal] things. And again Friday is an 
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institution, I would not say that in other religions it doesn't happen, but 
it is heavily attended, maybe 4,500 people attending, so if mosques 
want to do something they can play a very positive role in educating, 
tackling these things. I would say it is very complex, actually. You 
have people who are really doing their reciting and here, yes, kids are 
not on the streets, they are not involved in any other activities, police is 
very pleased with that, I have discussed this with some people, because 
for 2 hours they are not on the streets, so they are doing a great job in 
terms of keeping kids off the streets, and not only that, the whole ethos, 
it is a religious place, and there is very strong discipline (Tahir) 
Mosques' activities that may be linked to social control are principally organised in 
two parts: through the preaching (especially on Fridays during the sermon) and 
through religious education in the madrasas. 
Friday prayers and the Friday speech have lately been in the limelight as a 
possible means for the glorification of terrorism, such as the sermons of Abou 
Hamza who was on trial in February 2006. According to interviewees, mosques in 
Bradford differ a great deal in how the Friday speeches are organised and in the last 
twenty years the themes tackled by the prayers leaders have significantly changed. 
Some pointed at the detachment of the preaching in the mosque from local issues, 
while more and more attention is paid to the Umnza (the virtual Muslim global 
nation): 
I know some mosques when for example in the Eighties there was the 
AIDS campaign, they were telling about the disease that was 
discovered. This was in the Eighties. If you go to Mosques especially 
nowadays I think they have much more discussions than they had in the 
past, I can't remember in the Eighties that many discussions... there was 
the occasion of the Eighties, but... everything that was going on outside 
the world-there will always be 'Oh, the West is gonna corrupt you... ' 
`Don't drink, don't take drugs, Don't do this, don't look at white women' 
and then.. . but nowadays, especially in the Nineties I realised there was 
much more talks, much more... and more people were going there to 
watch videos and things, or having people who talks about Americans 
and stuff... (... )they scare people, just like Fox News scares the 
Americans in a very extreme way, you get some mosques will scare the 
local members of the community on the opposite really. And then I 
think, when these things like that... especially very right wing news 
channels, they will say 'we are right, look what they are doing, look 
what they are preaching' (Ali) 
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You will find it surprising, they don't mention about drugs and what is 
going on in the community and everything... they will give a speech on 
what is happening in Israel, Palestine and places like that, but they 
don't address the community, the problems facing the community. So 
they don't mention in duah, in the prayer, people who are poor, people 
who are going the wrong way. But like I said, in mosques they don't 
know how to address that (Zaara) 
Some respondents believed that in many cases mosques failed to address local 
issues, not out of ignorance but out of fear: 
Akbar: Maulvis try to [make] people to come to mosque and pray, try 
to [make people to] remember God, bring the children for pray, 
reading Quran, the maulvis cannot do more than that. If they do 
anything strict maybe they [will be] kick[ed] off from the mosque. 
Amir: That is true, they will get kicked out and also the 
parents... because there are so many mosques around.. . they will go 
to another mosque. "This maulvis is harassing us, we don't want to 
go there, everybody's children are dealing with drugs, we don't want 
him to preach to us, we will go to another mosque". 
Some mosques are concerned with the well-being of their community: 
our treasurer [reference to a grass roots organisation] is the secretary 
of the local mosque. But also the imams are scared to say things in the 
mosque because they don't want bricks through the window. (Kamran) 
Me: But who decides who is going to be the maulvi of the mosque? 
Amir: There is a committee... for example there is one here ... I have 
seen them fighting in the street over it.. . control of the mosque. People's legs have been broken, stuff like that. So this is control of the 
mosque? So you think at that level.. . how the hell are they gonna be 
able to control... 
Me: But what do they gain... 
Amir: It is prestige, the name, it is 'our mosque'. We do what we want 
to do in our mosque. If we say you can't have a chat afterwards, read 
the hadith afterwards, you've got to get out. So they have full control 
of the mosque. Ridiculous. If the mosques are in that state, if we 
cannot sort the mosques out, what chance have we got to sort out the 
community? It is very difficult. 
Sometimes imams would mention local problems in very general terms so as not to 
upset any members who might be involved: 
When I go to mosque on Friday the mufti, the imam at the mosque 
tends to mention it: 'young lads now are turning to self employment' 
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and self employment meaning drugs, working for themselves, selling 
drugs... (Jamal) 
I am quoting spider man here (Laughs) but with great power comes 
great responsibility and it [is] the case that they've got to be very- 
very careful because they are in a position where they are talking 
through the whole of the community (Amir in conversation with 
Mahima) 
In these cases, mosques may be a comfortable space for drug dealers too, as one 
recounted: 
I go mosque when I wanna go mosque (to be honest with you I haven't 
been for a long time.. . once a year, do you get what I mean? On Eid 
only. I know I should, but what can you do, innit? Everyone is 
different, innit? )Well, it's alright [when you go to mosque] it's a good 
atmosphere, innit? Everyone who is gonna be there is who you know 
or from your area, do you get what I mean, so you don't have no 
problems, everyone you know go there, you look, "Alright?, Alright?, 
Alright? " safe, you know what I mean? Ten minutes and you are out 
of there. Think about it, it is ten minutes, so it doesn't really matter. 
(Khalil, previous study) 
In some mosques, allegedly, local drug dealers were involved in their 
administration and this had a definite consequence on what themes would be 
discussed: 
When I go there [to the mosque down the road]... I haven't gone to the 
mosque again. Shall I tell you why? Because I don't like seeing what 
I see when I go there. I go in there, I have a wash, I look around, and 
there are the thugs... giving you dirty looks, talking during the hazan, 
while you have to keep your mouth shut. And they are talking and 
talking. No one tells them to shut up, not even... these groups are 
getting bigger and bigger, they've found the place where the police 
can't come in and they don't come in because if they do it will be all 
over papers. But they are dealing drugs in mosque. No one is gonna 
question them. (... )I know for example some mullahs whose sons are 
all criminals. Do you know why? Because they are known, they think 
they can't be touched. They think the people respect the mullahs and 
their sons can get away with anything, so they remember them days 
when there was a set of patterns going on even them... again we are 
generalising again, but the ones I know, their sons are all criminals. 
So who are they to talk and tell other people how to run their lives if 
they can't control their own lives, just because they are mullahs it 
doesn't make a good parent. (... )People know the sons are drug 
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dealers. He loses his face. They won't say it in front of his face, they 
will say 'It's God's will, it is not your fault', but really, I am sorry, it is 
his fault. It really is. (Amir in conversation with Mahima) 
The closure of certain communities around their mosques, therefore, seemed to 
present a problem even for those maulvis who may be willing to tackle local 
problems but fear for the future of their mosque or live under pressure of the 
Mosque committees. This problem which may again be ascribed to the theme of 
excessive bonding (cf. 9.3) was, according to many interviewees, emphasised by 
the importing of imams who had privileged connections to some biraderi (cf. also 
McLoughlin 1998c: 222). In these cases, mosque policies were influenced by these: 
The Pakistani Community is very close knit you need to go back and 
look at how (... ) in Pakistan and that's based on the biraderi system, 
tribal (... ). That has very much continued I think that is breaking 
down radically but there is still a sense of 'blood is thicker than 
water' try to exploit (... ) There is no such thing as priesthood in Islam. 
You don't have to go through schools and qualify and sit exams as you 
do in Catholicism and other religions. Yes, a lot of times you have the 
Carlisle Mosque, the Manchester Road Mosque, these are village 
communities all made by biraderi groups so they are self managed, 
self financed so they will want to bring a maulvi from the village back 
home. (... )[In the same way]a lot of brothers, I am thinking of an 
example of three, four brothers who have got two sisters, they all 
married their children to each other so that would[n't] need anybody 
else. It is respectable for the drug dealer in his close group and 
everything is ok. (Abdul) 
Importing imams from `back home', then, may create mosques which cater only for 
small communities, and which may not be able to relate to current local issues, 
advise youth or even make their sermons understandable: 
I have been to quite a lot of Friday speeches and what I used 
to.. . basically I used to go to a local mosque, on Barkerend Road, and he used to speak in Urdu and I could understand but I am sure that a 
lot of the youth who used to go there, they probably did not 
understand. That's why there was a very low attendance from the 
youth themselves and with ... I think there is a majority of mosques 
who are like that and resemble that... you know, like, Urdu speaking 
and... you know, the secular Islam that they give, so it is always wish- 
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washy, it is always stories of the past. . . 
but how these stories affect 
you today! That is not given (Fatima) 
Me. Do you think the imams you know would accept [to discuss drugs 
and sex]? 
FG2A. No, because it is mainly because... the imam in my area is the 
language barrier, they don't understand. Most of them come from back 
home, innit? And it is like... 
FG2I. You know... it is mostly guys, if at all, speak to the imams, innit? 
Like the women ... I don't know, I think you've got a bit mixed up, 
like 
the actual mosque where the prayer is read, obviously only men are 
allowed to go there. 
It is a channel of communication, you know, and it is partly... have 
you got the right imam there? In the sense that... things are changing, 
but some of the imams, obviously, come from Pakistan and their 
command of the English language is non-existent' ... (Zameer) 
12.1.1 Madrasas and the understanding of Islam 
The problem of the teaching in madrasa was a very hot issue in Bradford (cf. Lewis 
forthcoming) and the mosques where the teaching is done in English currently have 
a long waiting list (for example Abu Bakr on Leeds Road). Preaching in English did 
not necessarily mean a more liberal approach to life (cf. case study of Sheikh 
Ahmed Ali in 11.7) but was widely considered an important variable in maximising 
the effect of Quranic teachings in everyday life. 
' Language was the same problem affecting some parents-children relations. The language used by 
the parents appeared sometimes as not completely intelligible for young people. Many younger 
respondents in fact said that they could speak Punjabi, but were not confident enough to have 
conversations that went beyond food, plans and inquiring around one's family's well-being. Some 
older people, instead, confessed that whenever they felt like having a heart to heart with a younger 
person, they would switch to English, no matter how proficient they were in it. The sudden switch 
to the language commonly perceived as informal would give out the sign to the younger person that 
the conversation did not have to be affected by rigid rules of respect of the elders or was supposed 
to encourage them to open up and liberally express their opinions. The existence of only one form 
to address a second person ('you') instead of the three in Urdu ('tu' for younger or subordinated 
individuals, 'turn' for people one may be intimate with and 'ap' for the elders or authorities), as 
well as the use of first names rather than titles, are all characteristics that contribute to the feeling 
that some conveyed to me by saying 'English is a very disrespectful language'. Communication in 
English based on parents' good will, however, was not always successful: some young men said 
that their parents would not be able to empathise with their problems, not even when they 
encouraged communication in English, and therefore there was no point in opening up. 
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None of the members of the sample who grew up in Bradford had had their 
religious teaching in English or had to learn the Quranic contents on top of learning 
how to read Arabic. The ones who had studied Islam in depth had all done so after 
leaving the madrasa. As one interviewee put it: 
Have you ever seen a parrot? They can talk... you can teach a parrot 
to talk and it will regurgitate whatever you taught it, but it doesn't 
understand a word of it. It is exactly how the youth are today... exactly 
the same way. They would know more of the Arabic language than I 
would. A9 years old in many cases that I know, knows more than 
what I do about the Arabic language and yet he doesn't understand 
nothing. I know people with big beards, you ask them why have you 
got a beard? 'That's because my religion wants me to', and yet that 
same individual deals in drugs, simply because he hasn't built a 
criteria that this is halal and this is haram, not allowed. Halal or not 
halal is restricted to what I can do in the mosque, or... 'I can't eat this 
chocolate because it has E45 number on it', or 'I'm not allowed to eat 
pork', that's it. This is the limitation of what I can or cannot do. 
Outside of that they've never been taught, they've never been cultured 
that you have dos and don'ts outside that environment. (Imran) 
Respondents who engaged with mosques for work affirmed that they were starting 
to see changes in some madrasas: 
In my work I had the opportunity to go out to a number of mosques and 
simply talked to maulvis about professional criteria for what is 
acceptable for example it is against the law to give corporal punishment 
to children. We were getting referrals by children who had been 
smacked on their hands with sticks and that is clearly against the law, it 
is a crime. Now, in a lot of instances the maulvi will want to learn 
about the law. Because they have actually no idea about child 
development, how children grow, how children learn..... different 
perspectives. (Abdul) 
At the same time, the theme of the delegation of moral teachings to mosques (cf. 
11.1) was reinforced by the lack of involvement of parents in the madrasas. The 
more conscientious parents, for instance, would organise private tuition rather than 
engage with changes in the local madrasa. Others emphasised how the average 
parent would keep sending children to the madrasa but would not follow their 
tuition: 
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Such is the concern we show to our children that the child will go to 
the madrasa when he is 5 he will remain there for ten years, and such 
is the love that we have for our child. In these ten years not once we 
will visit the madrasa to visit the teacher of our child and ask about the 
progress of our child. (... ) Never mind monitoring the child education 
on a daily basis, never mind on a weekly basis, we won't even walk in 
there in a period of ten years, so busy we are. And this is the love 
we've got for our child, such is the love we've got for Allah. (Sheikh 
Ahmed Ali, `Muslim Youth') 
But I think if in certain areas they are not discussing then it is up to 
parents, the parents go and raise... say 'we'd really like you to mention 
this because there is a problem in this area' and it is about people 
getting together and bringing it to the maulvi's attention (Shamim) 
For this reason, some argued, the responsibility was unfairly placed on maulvis; 
parents and the whole community were responsible too, as they did not encourage 
reform within mosques through the mosque committees. 
12.1.2 Mosques as community centres 
Mosques seem to be run by the Mosque committees rather than the imam's, the 
authority of which, in many cases, is strictly subordinated (cf. McLoughlin 
1998c: 215,2005: 1061): 
Some of the speakers from the mosques might not give interviews 
without permission of the committee, it happens all the time, and you 
can understand why as well. If I am interviewing any practitioners 
without permission of the line manager, it is exactly the same. (Tahir) 
The Mosque committees also seem to have control over the duties that mosques 
attend to, from the organisation of the life cycle rituals (McLoughlin 1998a: 99) to 
charity (Kalra and Rehman forthcoming). Many, however, complained that local 
mosques were not taking full advantage of their potential and were not developing 
their role as a point of reference for those seeking advice: 
It is more [about] giving Islam in a secular way, it is just personalised 
in your own home, it is praying your salat (your obligatory prayers) 
and respecting your elders, it is just picking certain things that are 
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taught, and that doesn't equip you with problems that you will face in 
the wider society. As Muslims we should accept Islam in its totality so 
we shouldn't be knit picking so you are going to find at home 
somebody who is totally different, but when you are outside in the 
wider society, if you've got drugs problems, girlfriend-boyfriend 
problems, society problems, free mixing problems, you know, all this 
type of different problems, we are not gonna see them, we are not 
gonna see Islam dealing with these problems because our institutions 
like madrasas or these mosques are little study circles that.. . they 
haven't taught, they haven't equipped us with the true Islamic ideas to 
deal with those problems because it has been given in a very secular 
way. (Fatima) 
Me. What do you think about the role of mosques? 
FG2A. In the Muslim community the mosque is meant to be the central 
and direct... nobody should feel like they can't go to the imam and ask 
him a question like you said before, and the mosque should be more 
open and open to everybody. 
This was especially cogent as some who had been in mosques outside Bradford had 
heard of or experienced a much more active approach that involved campaigns 
against drugs, domestic violence, etc.: 
Me. You think mosques can really be the agents of change? 
Ayesha: Of course they can, but you know what it is, the 
mosques... some of them they are doing absolutely an amazing job, 
some of the mosques down London, in Tower Hamlets. They say 
there one member every four household is a heroin user. So the 
mosques had to become the vehicle of change. In Bradford they will 
only become the vehicle of change when the same epidemics will hit 
here because nobody really wants to know at the moment. 
Given the lack of forums for discussion, consultations with imams who had a 
reputation for being able to address the needs of young people may be organised 
through email or by phone: 
I would speak with (... ) the imam's wife as well. We often go to her 
because I go to mosque a lot and we have classes on Wednesday for 
little girls... just starting... about 10 years old... Quranic classes. We 
teach the girls, but we are learning ourselves as well ... we need 
volunteers to help for little girls. So we go to the imam's wife 
because she's got a lot of knowledge because of her husband and you 
can ask her and she tends to know a lot more than we do. ( FG2D) 
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You know, normally women get to ring the imam at the mosque. Abu 
Bakr Mosque on Leeds Road, that's what happens, like after he's done 
his prayer, he just stays in that room for a few hours and he gets called. 
(FG2I) 
The ideal dimension of mosque, as a community centre providing for almost all 
community needs (McLoughlin 1998c: 21 1) was described in this way: 
Your masjid is not only a place to worship, is a community centre, it is 
where your affairs should be dealt with, and if there are issues, that is 
where it should be dealt.. . it is like your social club; it is a place for 
worship first, secondly it is a place where the imam on Friday should 
be giving the khuthba, the speech which tackles the problems in the 
streets, where issues should be resolved in the community, but I don't 
think this is happening personally, it is very easy to give a good 
speech by the imam, very easy for us to go on Friday, do our prayers 
and then come out again (Zameer) 
You know one of my ideologies, my ideas, my protocols was-these 
mosques they are building, they are spending thousands and thousands 
of pounds, if they had the education facilities, the computers there, 
where young kids could go in there and access.. . you 
know like the 
mosque is like the way to the future now, mosques with facilities like 
sport centres getting kids in there to do certain things, then they could 
pray, mosque is not just a place where you just go to pray, what 
counts-it is the place where you get knowledge and experience. This 
is how it was going back in history, so much people used to come 
from different countries to go to the mosques and there were books in 
different languages where you can learn certain subjects and 
everything, written in different languages, and this is how people got 
the knowledge from. (Adam) 
The fact that most mosques in Bradford do not have female spaces, however, 
reduced the feasibility of mosque-community centres that benefit women as much 
as men (cf. `word of mouth' and `network reliability' for women in 11.1.5): 
It is a problem, a lot of masjids [mosques] don't have access for 
women, which is not ideal, I have to say, but the issue predominantly 
is with male, isn't it? I think the indigenous white population, you 
have white women using drugs, but I think it is a lot less, far less in 
the Asian community... (Zameer) 
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Women cannot take advantage of the mosque centres, and must therefore rely either 
on a supporting network of acquaintances to improve their knowledge and seek 
advice, or look for help in the information industry. 
12.2 Media 
Some media have given explicit and public recognition to some problems and have 
upheld something of a mandate to provide instruments with which both parents 
and the youth themselves can deal with their problems. 
In the previous chapter it was pointed out how many women may find it 
difficult to break the ice and speak with professionals when they face a problem; 
they seem to be more likely to rely on their strong ties rather than dealing with 
practitioners (Orford, Johnson et al. 2004: 25). Above we have also seen how access 
to religious institutions and authorities may be problematic and sometimes is even 
bypassed by asking advice from the imam's wife. Other means of mustering 
information to exercise a better informed social control were radio and television: 
I think now the word is going around because they are discussing it on 
radio, you know like in Ramadan, in our fasting month, and the people 
listen more to the radio and this programme on Islam and religion and 
fasting and what God wants you to do, not just 'you have to be a good 
Muslim'... some people listen to it, and every day they do bring 
something like those issues and people would ring in.. . people who are 
doing the radio programmes are from Bradford and sometimes they 
invite certain persons, and sometimes it is somebody who knows more 
about certain issues.. .1 
don't know about the youngsters, but during 
Ramzan there is that sort of atmosphere where everybody is enjoying 
that more than television, so maybe I have noticed in that month 
people bring a lot of things up because the radio is on most of the time, 
so that is the best time, and now I am very happy that things have 
changed because now people are talking openly about it. Before they 
weren't. Because it is affecting everybody, so everybody is concerned, 
so everyday now... on television there is an Islamic channel on, where 
people can ring in and talk about any issue and people ring for 
different things 'oh, my son... ' there are different channels... and there 
are regular programmes every day, for women as well, there is a lady 
258 
who does all issues to do with.. . and it is in 
Urdu. And in different 
languages, you see it in Bengali as well ... (Shamim) 
The popular access to satellite programming did not only include Bollywood 
channels and Islamic channels, but an increasing number of families seemed to 
follow News channels. During interviews documentaries and TV programmes were 
often quoted as sources of knowledge and word of mouth was enhanced by 
summaries of what was being broadcast, watched by some members of the 
community and then recounted after mosque, in cars, in restaurants, or after football 
matches (see for example recurrent reference to the documentary `Edge of the City' 
in 7.1). 
Some TV programmes appeared to make up for deficiencies in madrasas: 
Now on television they do this programme where they teach children 
to learn Arabic and they go through one sentence and then they will 
explain in Urdu, they will explain in English, and it is like half a hour, 
teaching kids, so they are working towards it. I think people in the 
Pakistani community have realised there is a problem. (Shamim) 
While some respondents shared sociological criticism of television like Putnam's 
(Boggs 2001: 288; Field 2003: 31; Kivisto 2004: 16) and blamed TV for the erosion 
of networks (cf. 9.2), others saw it as an up-to-date device able to maximise the 
delivery of their cultural and religious messages. `Virtual' consultation through 
phone or email or messages from other continents seemed at first glance to be 
valued more than local institutions run by individuals who may be too young to 
bear much authority. 
12.3 Local institutions 
Some mosques in Bradford have now got facilities that include computers and 
libraries. In other areas, however, very similar `learning centres' are run by the 
council, but their popularity varies from ward to ward: 
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There is an Advice centre [in BD8], the youth club, hardly anyone 
goes there now, and the guys hang around on street corners. 11,12,1 
in the morning, you see them there hanging around smoking, 
drinking, dealing in drugs, or just hanging there doing nothing, 
because there is nowt there for them. (Jamal) 
Others suddenly become popular when day-trips or journeys to Europe are 
organised, according to Salman and Munir, 16 years old, who would attend one of 
the youth centres in Bradford 3 and who said that they spent most of their time 
either there or at mosque. 
According to some, one of the main benefits of youth centres was to `keep 
the kids off the streets', but nobody would rely on them for an active and strategic 
social control. Young men (for whom the majority of centres seemed to be catering) 
could be `kept off the streets' by other agents: 
There is a very nice snooker place they opened now... in West 
Bowling. 
. .1 think 
it is opened by a private person, I have never been 
myself, my brother is going to it, but they have opened that and it is 
really good because guys who used to hanging around on street 
corners they are actually going in there and just have a laugh. (Bano) 
People my age group, 19-20, especially the ones who are starting to 
practice Islam, we believe that ... 
I don't think even a greater police 
influence or setting up a youth centre down the road, they can actually. 
truly solve the problem. Yeah, you can have these institutions to get 
people off the street, but what is gonna stop them from taking drugs 
inside the centre itself... I don't think the centres work at all. I think it 
is a good tool that can be used, a good style that can be used, but if the 
youth are still having the ideas of having... if the youth don't need free 
time ... 
I mean, we don't need time to play pool or basket ball or 
tennis... yes, that's fun time, but what gonna stop that person from now 
after basket ball just taking the spliff or marijuana in the cloakroom? 
Unless that person is equipped with the correct ideas to solve these 
problems correctly, then he is not gonna basically see a problem. He is 
just gonna keep carrying on. He doesn't care. He will be good at 
basketball but he will be good at taking spliffs or whatever. (Fatima) 
The activities of one youth centre were described in this way: 
[The centre in BD8] did help a lot in keeping people off the 
street... first it used to be guys hanging around street corners and 
even if they weren't doing anything wrong, just the walking past 
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them, walking down the street and seeing 10,15 young lads with 
hoodie tops on and trainers and stuff, smoking, you would feel 
intimidated by them, regardless whether they were being doing 
something or not, and the youth club was open 6 till 9, so the lads 
would say, rather than hanging around, why don't we just go there 
and play football, basketball, pool, table tennis, just chill out, playing 
the computer, just doing some uni, college work, get some work 
upstairs because we had IT facilities and internet upstairs so people 
could come in on a night and do college work or school work. We 
had 3 workers at the youth club, employed by the council and then 
we had me and my friends who were volunteers. Some helped the 
lads out with their work. Tuesday nights were for girls only, then on 
weekend we would have a homework club for girls and boys, 10 to 
11 you do your homework, then 11 till 12 you do whatever you want: 
pool, football, whatever. (Jamal) 
If council run centres where mostly young youth workers were employed did not 
provide the assurance of formal social control, then the views about the roles of 
schools and teachers were just as controversial. 
12.3.1 Schools 
There was a widespread scepticism about the possibility of schools being able to 
exercise social control. Many parents seemed to believe that when schools did not 
teach discipline (and given the bad publicity for Bradford schools in national media 
it seemed evident they did not) then they could not rely on schools to promote 
moral values: 
I am not talking.. .1 
don't know generally, but my family-my 
parents.. . my parents wanted my 
brother to come out with a good 
education because they can get a better job and they can live the life 
they want. They don't rely on school and that, they rely on the person: 
they rely on me, they rely on my brothers to have that, because 
education is a gift and if you want to take that gift you can take 
it... (Bano) 
Kids will be brought up by schools, society, by media and that parents 
have no control on that, and I am not talking about Pakistani parents, I 
am talking about parents in general. And I think fit is] schools which 
are failing all kids in Britain and that is why if you do a careful study of 
the statements we hear, we expect prisons to bring up our children, we 
have a solution: schools, and if not, they go to prison and we expect the 
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prisons they are now doing their job: education, opportunities, 
employment, training, everything is taking place in prisons (... ) and 
our government proposal to extend school to 6 p. m., we will realise 
very soon it is wonderful experiment, it will bring its own problems, 
and children need love, care, people to show that they are caring for 
them, they care for them, they cook meals for them, and this is how 
children love the person who cares for them, and if they see that 
everybody is busy with their own... and 'we are not priority', they will 
find their recreational activities somewhere else. (Tahir) 
Much of the impact of school on young people seemed to be seen as dependent on 
how parents valued school: 
I think that because the parents don't have much interaction with the 
teachers.. . so the children 
don't take that notice as well. But I don't 
think that school has a big influence on them. (FG2C) 
I wanted to become parents' governor several months ago. That's the 
kind of thing, it is very easy for parents and stuff like that to say 
'schools don't do anything', but hang on, you've got responsibility as 
well to make contact with the school and do things at home with 
kids... if you are not approaching, you know, maybe the school should 
be also approaching the community and the parents and stuff like that, 
and providing information, but the question is, why don't you go and 
ask? Why don't you get involved? You don't have to become 
necessarily a parents' governor, but there is no reason, (... ) why not 
going and ask 'how is my child doing? ' 'what is his behaviour like? ' 
'who does he hang around with? ' because, you know, we come to work, 
we spend a lot of time with our colleagues at work, 7/8 hours a day, 
same thing kids spend a lot of time with teachers at school, don't they? 
That is a good place to know whether... hang on, is my kid at school 
first of all, is he there regular... is he... how is his conduct at school, is 
he studying, is he not studying, who does he hang around with, what 
influences are out there? Does it make sense? It is very easy to blame 
other people, but I think you have to take some of the responsibility for 
yourself as well... (Zameer) 
When Kamran was asked to comment on the paucity of Muslim governors, the 
reply was: `Now you show you are a gore', as if to imply that, traditionally, family 
focus would be on other matters, but not on interacting with their children's school. 
An interesting example was presented by Tahir who described how one mosque 
engaging with the school attended by its young students had triggered positive 
effects for both institutions: 
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There are excellent examples of Mosques which are doing very good 
jobs in Bradford and you can't get admission there, 300,400 people on 
the waiting list, you can't because these people are full time teachers 
and maulana as well, for example on Leeds Road there are two, one is 
the head teacher of Maths in a school, and in this they have a 
partnership with the school, so for example when children perform 
very well in the mosque, the school knows the result, so the teacher is 
praising them 'well done at the mosque' and at the same time, when 
they perform well at school, the imam knows as well. So they are 
working in partnership, this is what we want, whereas other than that, 
this is my very informed view, that a lot of head teachers, they [slag 
off] mosques in schools, they think that kids are wasting time, they 
have extra burden, you will come across all sorts of issues. And when 
you say, ok, extend the school hours for another hour, (unclear), then 
Mr Head teacher is lost again (Tahir) 
When social control failed to be an effective means of crime prevention, then the 
penal system would have to intervene. On this matter, views were quite surprising 
as they seemed to contradict previous research on minority ethnic groups and the 
criminal justice system. 
12.4. Prisons 
In one of the above quotations, Tahir indicated how he thought that society was 
requiring prisons to do the job of schools, implying that rehabilitation could have 
been avoided by a thorough process of prevention. 
Prison sentences, however, often appeared as an effective albeit not always 
durable way of changing matters. According to the Armley prison Muslim chaplain, 
many British Pakistanis `as prisoners find their identity as Muslims'. Sometimes a 
return to their religion by birth produced long lasting effects through the 
phenomenon previously called `reconversion' (11.6), but at other times did not 
survive their release. When the state shame of incarceration triggered community 
shame (Braithwaithe 1989: 97), families might not accept their children back and 
consequently they were pushed towards illegality as soon as they came out of jail. 
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Some families had been known to hide the prison sentences of their members 
by mentioning trips to Pakistan or work in London, but the growing interest of the 
local press in crime amongst Asians seemed to have made this strategy less feasible 
as photos and details of offenders were now often published: 
If I say, `where have you been all this time'... 'oh, I've been to 
Pakistan, I've been on holiday, I was working outside the country', 
stuff like that, this is what they will tell you. They won't tell you the 
truth. And you hear stuff like your next door's neighbour has been 
drinking and driving their car, they have been caught, before you did 
not know they had been drinking and driving, but now they have this 
crime column in the T&A, and the name is printed, how much fine 
they get, and they are like 'wow! ', do you know what I mean? People 
they don't expect their neighbour to do that. (Adam) 
Unless, while in prison, a reconversion took place, perception of the penal system 
was not very positive: 
[Going to prison] is more bad! Because they want holiday! They have 
. good 
food there, play football, watch television, they don't bother. In 
Pakistan, if you go to jail you'll never do it again because they start 
from morning work, and finish evening and they give dhal and just 
water for food, they never go there again.. . other people [first time 
offenders] yes, but them no. If anybody wants food they go to jail 
because it is more better (Akbar) 
FG1A: My uncle went to jail for beating someone up and he said you 
can get heroine, anything in jail. 
FG1C: Yes, there was that programme that came on BBC 4 with 
hidden video cameras and the person going undercover... and actually 
the police asked the prisoners to open the window while they were 
smoking the weed. The coppers can smell everything and they [only] 
told [the inmates to put it out]... 
Prison sentences therefore seem to be effective only given certain collaboration 
from the outside world: support, shame, etc: 
For people I know who went to prison, they do come out to a much 
more stronger family support, they will have.. . the Asian community 
is very strong in terms of family values anyway, they are a lot more 
closer... you know, there is no way I would put my mother in a 
nursing home, you know, that kind of mentality, we don't do things 
like that, so we... like, you mum looks after you, brings you up, your 
father... you do the same when you grow up, you look after them and 
the network, the family, what you call biraderis or your clan.. . they 
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are quite close, they will support each other... maybe if you commit an 
offence, some kind of a sexual offence, something very extreme, you 
can understand that, you will be stigmatised, shut on the side, but 
generally we will come out to much more support, to much more 
structure in terms of what is available for us. (Zameer) 
12.5. Policing 
The policing of minority ethnic communities in Bradford has generated a long 
history of grievances, from the rumours of mistreatment of females that led to the 
1995 riots (Macey 1999a, b) to complaints about stop and search policies extant up 
to the present time. For this reason, some commentaries by interviewees are 
surprising. For some, the police seemed to be considered as the only way forward 
for these communities, despite the acknowledgement of past conflicts between 
them. However, there was certainly a negative inheritance too: 
My dad is like second generation, while I am third, and people like 
my dad in their forties or thirties and everything, they have this sense 
that they can't rely on the police, or we can't rely on these other 
institutions. (Fatima) 
I strongly, personally, I can't say it is a fact, but from experience 
from living there 22 years of my life, is very close knit and any 
outsiders... and I don't mean as outsiders people who come to live in 
the neighbourhood, but I mean as outsiders the police... anything to 
do with the law is very unwelcome because maybe in the past the 
older generation have had problems with the police and they have 
been passed on these views and thoughts, have been passed on to the 
younger generation. (Zaara) 
Yet many respondents seemed to recognize the potential role that the police could 
have, although the majority complained that, at the present time, there was not 
enough patrolling in some areas and that police intervention was not always 
satisfactory. Although many complaints about stop and search policies were 
registered, there were as many complaints to do with the supposed lenience of the 
police: 
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I personally think, I know it is heavy-handidness, but the police need 
to make a stand. They promised they would after the riots and they 
haven't. (... ) I think they need to enforce, for example pulling cars 
over, punishing people, you are speeding, you have no insurance? 
Right, go to prison for 3 months, put points on your licence (Amir) 
[Police] is not racist, they are doing their jobs! Why are you doing 
bad sins? If you don' t, they stop. In 40 years nobody stopped me on 
this road or they never asked me 'why do you do that? '. If the police 
come, I am happy you know, but the people who don't want the 
police involved, they are drug dealer and all. Now they have let 
people, mostly in Bradford, the most people, now it is our people, 
you know, they do a lot of bad things. And if the police care, they 
just say 'oh, they are racist'... not true!, because they do bad things. If 
they never do anything.. . the police force in Bradford is not only 
English, they are Pakistani, Indian, Sikh, my son is a policeman 
(Akbar) 
Some were persuaded that sometimes police `turned a blind eye': 
The police aren't doing much, I think they are just ignoring some of 
the things (Shamim) 
The fact is a few years ago, if West Yorkshire police had reached their 
quota of arresting Asian people. . . 
if they had arrested any more people 
after reaching their quota, they would have been considered as a 
racist police force, and that is why they don't arrest anybody else 
(Amir) 
If the police actually try harder, and not just like... suspect certain 
people and they suspect everyone, maybe they can get something out 
of it. (... )They could [do more], because they are doing a lot, like 
night watches, cameras and CCTV everywhere, and that really helps 
but they could do more, they could do a lot more, `cos that is what the 
police are there for, this is what they are getting paid for. They are 
getting paid for looking after the community, not for sitting on their 
backs, not having a cup of coffee, they get paid so they can get look 
after the community and the community feel secure to live in their 
own houses. (Bano) 
You know sometimes I've heard many times many people saying that 
the police encourage it, but obviously I don't know how to believe that. 
But... sometimes it makes you wonder(. . . 
)There was a case... very 
serious case... it needed involvement of local councillors, local MP 
before the police came out, and when they came out they didn't do 
nothing (... ) it was a very serious case, the police was called and they 
never came around, very serious case where there was attempted 
murder and they never came round. And they came round after the 
local councillor and the local MP were involved and when they came 
out after 4 days they didn't do nothing and that was... I was very 
surprised. (Iqbal) 
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The idea that police would not deal properly with problems seemed to have more to 
do with a sort of perceived incapability rather than institutional racism or an unfair 
approach, but also some may fear repercussions as police intervention is perceived 
as the last resort, resorting to an extraneous force: 
In my own family, 3 months ago, my auntie was assaulted in her own 
home by someone in her neighbourhood and it started off really silly. 
It started off over their... these two people... my auntie's son and this 
other lady's son arguing.. . they are only 
5-6- years old, they had an 
argument, they hit one another... the lady came over to complain to 
my auntie. My auntie said to come inside and said 'they shouldn't do 
that, let's speak to them, listen to their parents'... she was trying to put 
some sense in their heads. When they came they had a bit of a dispute 
and started smacking my auntie so my auntie called my family. I was 
at work, I couldn't leave and so my auntie called my family, she didn't 
call the police. (... ) To be honest, as a family we have no problems 
calling the police. If we need the police, we'll be there to call them. A 
lot of people have problems, they are very afraid to call the police 
because they are scared of repercussions, not only in the sense of what 
will happen with the community, because the police have been called 
the community is gonna sort of stop talking to us 'cos we have got 
outside that boundary. The police are seen as the last resort, but the 
last resort that should never be taken.. . that step should never be taken. 
Then, there is also that sense that the police come and the Asian 
community feel that the police haven't done their job to the 
satisfaction of what the people should think the police should do. Then, 
they think it is a waste of time to call the police. There are many 
reasons why people won't call the police, but if they do and then don't 
get the right results they are hoping for, then that's it, from that 
experience the police won't be called again. (Zaara) 
Wherever the community felt that the police were engaging with them there seemed 
to be positive results. Officers on the beat with a will to get to know their culture 
seemed to be much appreciated: 
I think at the end of the day, what it boils down to is that there has to 
be more visible policing. (Iqbal) 
The particular policeman I dealt with I found him extremely helpful, 
not only that, he was learning Urdu, taking Urdu lessons, so I was 
really impressed. The thing is, he was from a business background, he 
had a very good customer focus, I asked him what was his reason. 
And he said that his learning Urdu was not really viewed as something 
267 
of a normal good thing, because he was on a customer relationship 
background, he thought he would be more able to talk with people and 
people would be more 'acceptive' if he spoke their language, which is 
sensible, very clever, so... (Tahir) 
In particular, the existence of the Minorities' Liaison Committee (Bradford and 
District Minority Ethnic Communities/Police Liaison Committee Constitution: 
1998) was generally positively acclaimed as an example of the police force 
engaging with and consulting the local communities, and acknowledging their 
needs. The Committee was founded in 1998 after recurrent episodes of violence had 
focussed the attention of the police on the frustration of minorities in Bradford, 
especially in 1995, first with vigilantism on Lumb Lane and then with the summer 
riots (see 5.6): 
Lumb Lane campaign was the result of frustration of non intervention 
of the police, people took action in their hands, so now the prostitutes 
are in an industrial area where they don't disturb families. Now the 
police is talking more to the community, but it is not sure if the relation 
between the two has improved. (Umar) 
12.6 Conclusion: complimentarity of formal and informal social control 
This chapter has looked at the relation between different structures of social control 
in the areas touched by the research. The analysis started from data regarding 
mosques, where according to many participants, messages are delivered often by 
ignoring local `hot' issues such as drugs. The potential enjoyed by such spaces was 
therefore often considered wasted in relation to prevention and discussion of the 
most preoccupying problems of the community. The lack of knowledge and skills 
in dealing with young people ascribed to many imams was also mentioned as a 
factor that kept many mosques alien to a process of change that instead seemed to 
be carried out by pilot projects like the one in Batley, where one madrasa is 
running a drug awareness course. The majority of madrasas in Bradford, instead, 
were thought to concentrate on a learning process based on memorising Quranic 
verses rather than discussing them. 
While the preoccupation about Muslim youth was measured by the increasing 
attention to drugs given by some Muslim media and by the increasing funding 
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given to youth centres, opinions about the effectiveness of many `topped down' 
social control strategies were controversial. In particular, a widespread mistrust of 
schools and teachers was recorded across the sample. Perhaps surprisingly, many 
research participants looked at the police as one of the most potentially effective 
means of social control, in spite of the history of mistrust between the Pakistani 
community and police officers. Prison sentences, on the other hand, often appeared 
as an effective albeit not always durable way of changing deviant individuals, for 
example through the phenomenon called `reconversion'. Overall, research 
informants seemed to see potential for change in both public and cultural 
institutions, but especially in the collaboration of the two. The complimentarity of 
the structures appeared to articulate a meaning of `community' that went beyond 
an ethnic projection, but included all the resources (public and cultural) available in 
one's area, as it will be discussed in the conclusions of the thesis. 
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Chapter Thirteen 
Conclusions: from biraderi to community: a Community Criminology 
The outline of the present thesis as illustrated in the introduction had four key 
aims. The first one was to investigate the salience of a study of minority ethnic 
perceptions about crime, given that their views seemed to have been relatively 
neglected (see Part I). The second aim was to follow a set of methodological 
approaches that would allow the researcher to prioritise local grassroots' views 
rather than deductive theoretical accounts (see Part II). The third aim was to 
analyse how practical concerns, cultural and religious beliefs and moral dilemmas 
play a part in the construction of the idea of crime (Part III). The fourth aim was 
to explore possibilities of the presence of a distinct community criminology (see 
Part III). 
Theoretically, the thesis has investigated two main concerns: a 
criminological and a diasporic one (see Part I). Methodologically the thesis has 
pursued the application of an emit and ethnographic strategy to the Bradford 
Pakistani context, and considered its effectiveness in terms of analysing 
knowledge of crime held by minority ethnic groups (see chapter Four). 
Empirically, the knowledge held by Bradford Pakistanis has been explored 
through the analysis of their views about crime construction (chapter Seven), 
crime production (chapters Eight and Nine), labelling (chapter Ten) and informal 
and formal social control (chapters Eleven and Twelve). This concluding chapter, 
therefore, will discuss theoretical, empirical and methodological outcomes and 
their relation to community criminology. 
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13.1 Theoretical and empirical conclusions 
In chapter Two we argued that in criminology there is a gap in the study of race 
and crime. While a substantial amount of literature has been written on 
discrimination against minority ethnic groups in the criminal justice system, there 
is still a need to incorporate (cultural) knowledge from minority ethnic groups 
(see 2.3). Some have argued that this deficiency may be traced back to the fear of 
pathologizing minority ethnic groups in relation to crime (see Phillips and 
Bowling 2003). While this debate can be compared to the one about essentialising 
and pathologizing minority ethnic groups that occurred in the 1990s (see 2.7), this 
thesis argues that academics should go beyond anti-essentialism. For example, 
neglecting the fact that minority ethnic groups have at their disposal internal 
shared similar experiences, throughout the stages of settlement, may be 
detrimental to the understanding of the dynamics of their engaging with crime. 
Although we have discussed evidence of the heterogeneity and fragmentation of 
Bradford Pakistanis (see 6.4), we still argue that the term `community' may be of 
use in this field. 
The discourse about community (Hoggett 1997: 3) has been very 
important in recent times in the Bradford context (see for example Ouseley: 
2001). This northern city has been considered an important place for 
implementation of community cohesion strategies, in the aftermath of the 2001 
riots (Pankhurst 2002). Nonetheless, community crime prevention has not 
received as much attention in the public agenda, perhaps because of fear about 
racialising boundaries that are at the same time ethnic and geographical (with 
most Pakistanis clustered in inner city areas), or maybe because of distrust 
apparently developed towards representatives of the community or community 
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leaders (Ouseley 2001, Kundnani 2002). Despite an interest in community 
discourse, community crime prevention strategies have not been openly discussed 
in relation to the potential of the local Muslim population. Studying specificities 
of a minority ethnic group does not necessarily arise from the will to `collude' 
with social control agencies (cf. Sharma et al. 1996 cited in 2.7). Instead, it 
follows from reviewing the general literature and the need to include more 
minority ethnic perspectives in this field. Analysing local history, and knowledge 
produced and re-invented in the community (practical concerns, cultural and 
religious beliefs and moral dilemmas), plays a crucial part in the study of the 
relations between Bradford groups and crime. It would be useful for policy- 
makers to see how these things work in local grassroots' organisations. 
The second part of the thesis was based on an analysis of the data collected 
during the fieldwork. The analysis developed through the concerns that emerged 
(chapter Seven and Ten), the views on the aetiologies expressed by the 
respondents (chapters Eight and Nine), an overview of how formal (chapter 
Twelve) and informal (chapter Eleven) control is currently working, and finally 
the supposed solutions to the crime problem (chapter Twelve). 
Labelling seemed to be based on a classification of potential dangers to the 
community: the higher threat seemed to be perceived as the one that was 
potentially more destabilising for the group. At the same time, community 
resources and networks (cf. 6.2.1) were described as essential to articulate 
discourses around crime, principles similar to the ones on which national 
community crime prevention strategies are based (Burnside and Baker 1994: 19). 
The social production of crime seemed to be discussed in either ecological 
or cultural terms. Some participants tended to see a combination of structural and 
277 
cultural factors as the most accurate aetiology of crime in the community, 
reproducing discourses that were more similar to recent New Labour agendas 
such as `Respect' (Knight 2006) than to deprivationist views. Others, like Imran, 
seemed to refer to discourses of Islamic revivalism. Similar attitudes of resistance 
through one's cultural background, in other studies (Tatum 2002: 16) have been 
described as a "postcolonial theory of crime violence and minority youth", as like 
other postcolonial theories, they account not only for structural constraints, but 
also for responses to oppression coming from the oppressed and their support 
systems' (for example, in the case of Imran, from religion). Ethnic resources and 
networks seemed the most common factors mentioned in the process of 
attribution of blame for crime. This may be a significant switch from 1980s 
deprivationist discourses (see Aldrich et al. 1981) to more `cultural' ones. Further 
research might complement these findings by investigating how far public policy 
discourses post-2001 may have influenced in a hegemonic way the preference 
given to culture and identity rather than objective structural disadvantage. 
Public discourses about `male youth as a problem' seemed another 
concern shared by `mainstream' British society or media and many Bradford 
Pakistanis. In certain descriptions it emerged that Bradford Pakistani male youth 
subcultures may be seen as a product of environmental and cultural interaction. 
Here competing resources and networks seem to co-exist in the choices of young 
men as to how to actively engage with the local social environment. 
In the last two chapters formal and informal social control were discussed 
in relation to potential solutions to crime. The solutions were grouped around four 
agents: the family (see 11.1), the mosque (see 12.1), the public institutions 
1 At the same time Tatum argues that lack of expectations may lead young people form minority ethnic 
groups to a stage where they struggle to recognise oppression (Tatum 2000: 23). 
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(services and educational systems, see 12.3 and 12.3.1) and the police (see 12.5). 
These elements had been mentioned in the previous chapters both as perceived 
causes of problems and as being faulty in exercising social control, but the 
research highlighted that by complementing each other they are believed to retain 
still some positive potential as agents of solutions to crime problems. 
Families were seen as closely tied to the main concerns around drugs; they 
were mentioned as the main target of drugs, whose ramifications in society would 
eventually undermine progress and their stability. At the same time, families were 
part of the aetiologies of the perceived rise in crime: they had been seen as 
passive in their omissions in upbringing, and in some cases as complacent of 
criminal activities in order to protect their izzat or improve their financial status. 
On the other hand, they were mentioned as agents of great potential in crime 
prevention, provided they would liaise with social services, mosques and schools. 
Mosques were also seen as part of the concerns related to criminal 
activities: some imams had been known to have been threatened by powerful drug 
dealers, and some mosques were said to be a safe place for selling drugs. Mosques 
were also seen as playing a part in the aetiologies of crime in the community. 
They were criticised to some degree as backward institutions that were putting 
their efforts into something that did not provide young people with the answers to 
their problems or their doubts, or that even preferred to draw their attention to 
international matters. The high percentage of madrasas that were delivering only 
reading classes, did not have English speaking imams, and cultivated boys more 
than girls, were compared to a few illuminating examples of mosques as 
community centres. These `modern', `Arab style' (Adam, interview with author), 
`community centres' (Amir, interview with author) types of mosques were 
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considered invaluable means of crime prevention. The elements that were judged 
positively were English-speaking imams, internet centres, and organised speeches 
about local problems relevant to youth. 
Public institutions such as schools were part of the concerns as they had 
been seen as lowering their expectations towards young Pakistanis (boys and 
girls) in a wave of pessimism about the situation of the community. They were 
also seen as part of the causes leading to crime, as the social control and the 
values passed on to students were not considered appropriate, and some 
respondents even thought of colleges and universities as places where young 
Pakistanis would familiarise themselves with drug culture, for instance. On the 
other hand, a reform of schools, an improvement of relations between teachers, 
students and families, and a penetration of cultural awareness in public services 
were seen as solutions to the current inefficiency of public institutions as agents 
of crime prevention. The police although possibly not being seen as part of the 
aetiologies of crime, were widely considered problematic in their relations to the 
local Pakistani community and their efficiency. On the other hand, many 
participants mentioned police as the main agent in helping with the improvement 
of the criminal situation locally, and therefore the potential of the police was 
marked as being of a very high level. 
These findings seemed significant for the definition of community 
criminology, while the alleged complementarity of formal and informal elements 
seen in the local criminological discourses shed a new light on the use of the term 
`community' with regard to Bradford Pakistanis. The views emerging from within 
seemed to point to solutions lying within a multi-agency effort or partnership able 
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to combine the cultural needs of families and mosques with the practical expertise 
of public services, and the objective and fair force of renewed policing. 
13.2 Methodological conclusions 
In chapter Four we argued that this doctoral research was made feasible by two 
methodological approaches: the epistemological emic and the practical 
ethnographic. 
The emic approach allowed the researcher to counteract the existing 
material on Pakistani diaspora and crime that tends to use universal categories to 
explain phenomena that may be specific to one group. Bearing in mind the 
concern that criminology has mostly neglected knowledge held by minorities (see 
above), the anthropologically grounded emic approach offered a potential solution 
to the problem. By the deployment of an emic standpoint, patterns of crime 
construction, crime production, labelling and informal and formal social control 
were analysed with reference to the way in which Bradford Pakistanis presented 
their perceptions of the various elements of their lifestyles as they are related to 
each other. No deductive framework was deployed. 
On a practical level, the emic research could only be conducted through 
ethnographic methods such as participant observation and in-depth interviews. 
Ethnographic fieldwork worked on a double level. Firstly, it allowed the 
researcher to progressively build trust through what has been called `reciprocal 
exposure' or the process of opening up oneself when asking others to do the same. 
In a moment when the crisis of trust between Muslims and white researchers was 
at its height (cf. 5.8), `reciprocal exposure' was the only possible and reliable way 
of securing access. Secondly, the triangulation of methods helped to tackle a 
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context where fear of secret investigation and opportunistic research can be 
catalysts of suspicion and distress. A relatively open approach seemed to be the 
most effective means to release tension and work towards access. 
While ethno-anthropological strategies emerged as very apt for the 
research context of difficult access, they may appear not in tune with present 
preferences and even anachronistic to some. Recent studies have usually been 
based on in-depth interviews, but overall participant observation may be absent, 
and researchers may want to avoid situations where they have the opportunity to 
build trust and interaction across the many layers of the community. In some 
cases snowballing is produced from one single community organisation, with the 
risk of reproducing a hegemonic point of view that claims to be widely 
representative. Doctoral students might be more fortunate as their status allows 
them to interact with the community over at least a two-year period, but these 
issues need to be taken seriously by funding bodies as already indicated by 
Gilliat-Ray (2005: 29). The time and the level of closeness with respondents helps 
informants to give reliable accounts as the rapport with the researcher ideally does 
not end in the formal interview, but lingers and repeats itself on a number of 
occasions. The high degree of personal involvement of ethno-anthropological 
strategies helped to facilitate the development of an understanding of the material 
offered by interviews and participant observation that surveys and quantitative 
methodology might struggle with, given their degree of detachment (Lee 
1993: 119). The reliability of the data also lies in the personal rapport between 
researcher and respondents, while participant observation offers a means of 
triangulation of what is expressed in formal interviews when respondents are 
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likely to portray certain views influenced by the surrounding political context and 
its understanding of Islam. 
Ethno-anthropological methods were significant to this research especially 
as far as deconstructing the essentialised `Muslim community' was concerned. 
`Accessing all areas' (in terms of environments and groups of individuals) and 
stock-taking to prevent a self-appointed (and not necessarily representative) 
highly politicised sample, seemed the keys to challenging the monolithic public 
discourse about `the Muslim community'. This could be considered an ethical 
issue of representation as, especially post 7th July 2005; the idea of a `Muslim 
community' has provided grounds for inaccurate generalisation and consequently 
grievances amongst Muslims. The issue of adequate representation, especially as 
a sampling concern, is a political problem that puts the burden of political 
responsibility on the researcher. 
13.3 A `Community Criminology' 
Perhaps there is a general tendency for sociologists of complex societies to study 
formal control and anthropologists to study informal control (Krase and Sagarin 
1980: 211). For example, research in the British Pakistani setting of Edinburgh 
narrowed its focus down to `the community's social institutions (or agencies of 
social control) [that] promote order and regulate behaviour through the social 
bonding of members/participants to its moral and social order' (Wardak 2000: 16), 
instead of the community evaluation of formal institutions. In the present research 
we have explored a general pluralistic discourse that considered a combination of 
formal and informal structures as the most effective social control repertoire. 
While some respondents looked at formal social control systems as more efficient 
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and fairer ('if you want to have justice, you've got to call the police', FG1A), the 
government may look at informal cultural means such as faith communities to 
enhance crime prevention. This, however, may create controversies, as Tahir 
described when criticising those who see mosques as infrastructure but do not help 
them financially as they would other institutions with the same function: 
In terms of the comments this person made, `these people do not 
have any moral teachings in the mosque', I would say it... (... ) you 
have an emotional response and say 'no moral teaching is going on', 
but this is not the case, because the nature of these imams, (... ) if 
you maybe hold a conference and present this statement to maybe 
30 maulanas, they will jump up and down and say, 'look, we are 
doing the best we are doing', yes? Now, with regards to the question 
whether they go to learn the Quran, the mosque is providing that 
service and this is what parents expect. So parents haven't said 'do 
something else as well' (... ) so there is a contract and the contract is 
being fulfilled and again if you only pay one pound to the mosque to 
do this service you shouldn't expect the high quality education, 
because they can't provide it. The reason I am saying it is a very, 
very complex issue, is... for example if we want to do shopping we 
are going to Tesco or Asda, or maybe other stores, you tell me there 
is a good store there, I will try that, but why don't we do it for our 
own kids? Who are our future, and city's future, and country's 
future, we don't pay them serious [money].... and when we ask the 
mosques to do that, they can't do this because they don't have 
resources. We are very keen to jump and criticize mosques, and 
churches, gurdwaras, mandirs, but we don't give them funding to 
provide that work. Why do these educational institutions exist? 
Because the mainstream education is not catering for the children 
need, then government is not supporting them financially, council is 
not providing any resources, so what do you expect? (... )[They live 
on] donations, so every Friday, I think mosques are very concerned 
about getting 4/500 pounds a week and that will go for bills, 
maintenance, everything. And if you go to a mosque and you smell 
a disgusting smell, you know that the money is not being spent, but 
we are very quick to make legislation, saying these maulana are 
coming from that country ... (Tahir) 
Other respondents saw a solution in a partnership between. mosques and police 
where part of the deal would be some drug awareness training delivered in 
mosques, through mosques, by officers (as for instance the Armley Muslim 
Chaplain is doing in Batley): 
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Like going in and explain it. When these attacks [shootings] 
happened I said to a police officer, a sergeant, `go into the 
community, go into the mosque and deliver a speech or give a 
presentation, this is what happened and we want people to come 
forward'. I haven't seen that. (Adam) 
The present thesis argues that the emic analysis of criminological discourses has 
highlighted the presence of a variety of approaches within the same community. 
However, in comparison to previous research it appears that the sense of bridging 
between different resources within one's locality is generally considered to be the 
most effective approach and that this may have led to a different construction of 
the idea of community at this stage of the post-settlement in Bradford: community 
is no longer only biraderi but is an ensemble which includes even those local 
institutional bodies which are inclusive. 
The emic analysis of criminological discourses has highlighted the 
presence of a variety of approaches within the same community. The initial 
question of whether in Bradford there is cohesive community criminology with 
reference to the Pakistani community has been problematic in the sense that the 
views across generations and occupational groups were very varied. The terms in 
which the function of family was described, for instance, fluctuated from 
positions where the traditional structure was blamed (as inconsistent, not apt, and 
therefore counterproductive to the necessities of British life, see 9.1), to views 
according to which the erosion of that very system had led to the drift towards 
crime (see 9.2). On the other hand, more coherence was to be found in the process 
of delineating which agents would hold the potential to make a difference in this 
respect: families, mosques, public institutions and the police. Some of the more 
critical views about the `original' culture of the majority of the community were 
paralleled by a belief that where such culture failed, there should have been a 
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different and more assertive intervention from what used to be the host society. If 
many families failed for some time, for instance, to see British formal education 
as a way to improve oneself, the educational system, social services and even the 
Government should have paid more attention to that problem, preventing it 
persisting. 
In comparison to previous researches it appears that the sense of bridging 
between different resources within one's locality was quite generally considered 
to be the most effective approach, and this may have led to a different 
construction of the idea of community at this stage of the post-settlement period 
in Bradford: community is not only biraderi (see 6.2 and 6.2.1) any more, but is 
an ensemble which includes even institutional bodies that are operating in one's 
locality. 
While there is a tendency of seeing Muslim as the ultimate others 
(Alexander 2000: 6), the dimension of the combination of traditions in diaspora 
has somehow become lost or under-valued in the analysis. This thesis has shown 
how formal and informal, or British and `traditional' Pakistani, can be combined 
and are no longer separable in the dynamics of social control. 
The emic of cultural agency can be said to legitimise the term `community 
criminology', but not in the sense that Bradford Pakistanis possess exclusive 
criminological discourses, labelling, preventive strategies and rehabilitation 
practices. Rather, they engage with mainstream criminological and policy 
discourses in a way that might well be considered a kind of reflection 
representative of the position of their diaspora: community for them does not only 
include their traditional structures but all the intra-communal and inter-communal 
relations that are meaningful to them, both as resources and constraints. 
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The term `community' in Bradford in relation to the stage of settlement 
may be better understood by comparison to another Pakistani transnational 
setting. In December 2005 I attended a public meeting with the small Pakistani 
community of Desenzano del Garda, Northern Italy. The members of the 
community present at the public event were male apart from two teenage girls; in 
the meeting there was one interpreter who described the ten years' history of the 
migration to the Brescia county. He had to translate all which was said that 
evening for his countrymen who did not speak Italian. The choice of words was 
particularly interesting as he decided to translate the word community (`comunitit' 
in Italian) as `biraderi'. He also introduced a `rappresentante della comunitä' 
('community representative') who declared himself as the only link between the 
local `Pakistani biraderi' (sic) and Italian society. At a very early stage of 
migration, where families have not been reunited, mosques have not been built 
and community relations are organised on the basis of self-appointed 
representation, the term used to describe community is biraderi, or brotherhood, 
extended family, closed blood cunt caste unit. This definition is now far from the 
Bradford Pakistani one. In the latter context, the term `community' covers family, 
specific cultural and religious institutions (mosques), but also public services and 
police. This definition helps us to understand the difference between a positive 
connotation of `community' and a negative connotation of `biraderi' as it has been 
illustrated above. 
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Appendix 1 
Leaflet for sample recruitments 
AGAINST CRIME 
How do Bradford Pakistanis react to Bradford 
criminality? 
I 
i 
This research sponsored by Leeds University aims at collecting ideas 
on how criminality is impacting on the Pakistani community of 
Bradford. 
Bradford, being characterised by a substantial drug market, often 
appears in the media as badly affected by criminality in general. 
The research aim is to assess how much this impacts on the Pakistani 
community. It will therefore be crucial to give voice to as many 
members as possible from the Pakistani community (parents, 
teenagers, community workers, teachers, etc. ) in order to ascertain 
their fears concerning the city and their ideas about crime. 
The research will include people who have been the victims of crime, 
people who are worried about crime, people who have witnessed 
crime, or work in contact with it, and also people who have had 
experiences with the criminal justice system or have acquaintances 
with such experience. 
This project intends to counter the stereotype of `Asian criminality' 
that has so often appeared in the national press, and intends to collect 
stories and examples of Pakistanis who are actually fighting crime and 
are positively engaged in a project for a better Bradford. 
For more information or to contribute to the research please contact 
splmb@leeds. ac. uk or phone 07771878146. 
`Deviance is everywhere and leaves traces 
everywhere. It marks those who report it, those who 
attempt to control it, those who gain from it, those 
who suffer from it, those who imaginatively 
describe it, and the contexts in which it is 
accomplished' (Downes and Rock 2003: 43) 
I This leaflet was unsuccessfully used in order to recruit research participants. 
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Appendix 3 
Questionnaire' 
I 
This questionnaire intends to guide a discussion between the researcher and 
Bradford Pakistani parents in order to gather their ideas on widespread concerns 
about bringing up children in Bradford. While the council and other institutions 
tend to rely on the opinions of well-known members of the community, or 
`community leaders', this research aims at collecting the thoughts and ideas of 
those parents who are not normally involved in the process of decision making. 
The questions below are grouped into four subheadings: worries, responsibilities, 
community and solutions. 
`WORRIES' 
Are parents worried about the environment where their kids are growing up? 
What are the main concerns? 
Has Bradford changed in the last 20 years? How? 
Who are the ones more at risk of being `led astray'? 
Who are the characters considered to be more likely to `lead astray'? 
Are there better or worse areas in Bradford where to raise children? 
`RESPONSIBILITES' 
Who is more responsible in the upbringing of Pakistani children? (Parents, 
mosques, community, council, schools, police, youth workers, etc. ) 
What role does religion play in the upbringing of children? 
Are parents normally `equipped' with the knowledge of the surrounding 
environment so they can understand the risks their children may encounter? 
`COMMUNITY 
How does the community react to criminal or deviant acts? 
Have there been any changes in how the community see illegal activities? (i. e. a 
way of surviving in spite of racism, a consequence of living in a corrupted 
society... ) 
Is the community really aware of all the illegal activities that take place in the 
inner city, for example? 
Who or what is generally blamed for the increase in criminal activities in the 
Pakistani community? 
Are people scared by the recent events like shootings, drug raids, riots, etc.? 
`SOLUTIONS' 
What can be done in terms of crime prevention? 
Who should be considered the main agent of social control? 
Is there anything the council could do? 
Is there anything the mosque/madrasa can do? 
What can the parents do? 
1 This is the sample questionnaire passed onto people who wanted to have a clearer idea of what 
the research was about before the interview. 
For further information about the larch please contact Marta on 0113 
3434681 (office), 07901738962 (mobile) or by email: splmb@leeds. ac. uk 
Appendix 2 
List of Free Nodes for N-Vivo analysisl 
1 against capitalism 
2 against deprivationism 
3 alcohol 
4 "all communities are the same" 
5 Asian police officers 
6 bad communication 
7 bad parenting 
8 benefits and allowances 
9 "best of both cultures" 
10 besti 
11 bilingualism 
12 biraderi 
13 boredom 
14 boundaries of acceptable transgression 
15 boycott 
16 Bradford image 
17 Bradford Twelve 
18 Chachchis 
19 changes in Bradford 
20 character, question of 
21 "chilling" 
22 choice of entering the police 
23 clothing 
24 coming out of prison 
25 commtting crime inside and outside the community 
26 communitarianism 
27 community break-down 
28 community centres 
29 "community of suffering" 
30 community sanctions 
31 community spokespeople 
32 council restrictions 
33 crime stats in Bradford 
34 deprivation 
35 "dirty linen" 
36 divorce 
37 domestic violence 
38 "double life" 
39 drug dealing 
40 drug market in Bradford 
41 drug taking 
42 drugs and businesses 
43 drugs and prostitution 
44 drugs in Pakistan 
45 Edge of the city (documentary) 
1 This is the complete list of the themes emerged during fieldwork. 
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46 education 
47 E. activities2 
48 emancipation from passivity 
49 family adaptation 
50 family as shock absorbent 
51 family break-down 
52 family up-bringing 
53 fear for safety 
54 fear of drugs 
55 fights 
56 forgiveness 
57 gang 
58 generational gap 
59 getting used to crime 
60 gossip 
61 government intervention 
62 graffiti 
63 greed 
64 gun crime 
65 hanging out 
66 haram-halal 
67 here to stay 
68 hiding prison sentences 
69 home made rehabilitation 
70 honour killings 
71 hrami 
72 identity crisis 
73 individualism 
74 interventions aimed for the Asians 
75 Islam and moral teachings 
76 izzat 
77 kameti 
78 lafanga 
79 language 
80 lazyiness 
81 Leeds Road 
82 Lumb Lane 
83 madrasa 
84 mafia mentality 
85 Manningham 
86 maulvis 
87 mediation 
88 men's freedom 
89 Mirpur 
90 Mirpuris 
91 mistrust in research 
92 mosques 
93 mothers 
2 E. is one cultural circle engaging with Muslim youth. 
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94 Muslim identity 
95 myth of return 
96 National Front 
97 need 
98 NIMBYSM 
99 not facing the problems 
100 omerta'3 
101 Opportunity Theory 
102 Pakistani `peculiarity' in dealing with crime 
103 parents' expectations 
104 parents' lack of knowledge 
105 passivity 
106 Pathan 
107 patronage 
108 pedagogy 
109 peer pressure 
110 `poisoning the community' 
111 Police and community 
112 Police discrimination 
113 Police intervention 
114 Police turning a blind eye 
115 preaching in Mosques 
116 prejudice 
117 purpose in life 
118 `putting things back in the community' 
119 racism 
120 rebellious kids 
121 rehabilitation and prevention through religion 
122 relational proximity 
123 religion and Culture 
124 revenge 
125 riots 1995 
126 riots 2001 
127 role models 
128 safety 
129 segregation 
130 self-defence 
131 `sense of invincibility' 
132 shootings 
133 Sikhs 
134 snooker centres 
135 socialisation of the West 
136 socio-economic variable 
137 sporadic crime activities 
138 sport 
139 stability 
140 status competittion 
141 stop and search 
3 This is an Italian term used to express the refusal to speak about crime in Mafioso contexts for 
fear of repraisals. 
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142 strength and respect 
143 survival argument 
144 Tableegh Jamaat 
145 taweez 
146 terrorism 
147 the `marriage cure' 
148 `trapped in two cultures' 
149 travel of knowledge 
150 'treat the parents' 
151 understanding of Islam 
152 unemployment 
153 village mentality 
154 `village rehab' 
155 welfare state 
156 Western `pollution' 
157 women and drugs 
158 women and Islam 
159 women involved in crime 
160 zat 
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Appendix 4 
Lecture about Crime and Focus Group' 
Assalamaleikum, 
Thank you for accepting to work with me this morning. 
I am a PhD student at Leeds University and I am 
researching issues of crime, deviance and social 
control in the Pakistani community of Bradford. 
While I will have the chance to explain the details of 
my research when we meet, I would like to point out 
from now that the reason I have chosen to research this 
ethnic group is not because I believe they are more 
`deviant' than others, but because I feel that there is 
a generally profound lack of understanding of the 
dynamics of this community (and because for personal 
reasons I have a special affection towards Pakistanis 
and Bradford! ). 
I hope you will help me to discuss a few issues I am 
interested in, or even suggest what I should 
investigate during my research. 
This morning we will work in two separate sessions. 
In the first session I will explain to you what my 
research is about and how it is connected with what you 
are studying for your A-levels (I will briefly outline 
the methods of sociological inquiry I employ in my 
research, and then we will touch upon definitions of 
crime, social control, power; we will also discuss the 
different points of view about the causes of crime and 
the arguments about its social distributions according 
to age, gender, social class, ethnicity and locality; 
we will define the concept of `moral panic' and analyse 
its relation to mass media). 
In the second session we will organize a `focus group'. 
Here I would like to listen to your opinion about 
issues of crime and social control in Bradford. We will 
together jot down notes about the discussion. 
This will help me immensely with my research and I 
regard your views as very precious because they are 
representative of what young people in Bradford think. 
So, please, be honest, open to hear your mates' views, 
and, above all, don't be shy. I will ask you to sign a 
consent form so that in my thesis I can write about 
1 This material relates to the work carried out in a local school. The focus groups were preceded by 
a lecture where the researcher and the participants developed an understanding of their 
`vocabulary' in the field of deviance. 
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what you have said in the focus group. I will guarantee 
your anonymity. 
Thanks again for participating in this project, 
Marta 
FOCUS GROUP CONSENT FORM 
This consent form outlines my rights as a participant 
in the study of `The emic of cultural agency in 
relation to crime among Bradford Pakistanis' conducted 
by Miss Marta Bolognani, Department of Sociology and 
Social Policy, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, Tel. 
0113 3434681, Email: splmb@leeds. ac. uk 
The focus group will explore students' views about 
crime and social control in Bradford. 
it will take approximately 50 minutes. 
I understand that: 
1. It is my right to decline to answer any question 
that I am asked. 
2. My name and identity will remain confidential in 
any publications or discussions. 
I HAVE READ THIS CONSENT FORM. I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO 
ASK QUESTIONS CONCERNING ANY AREAS THAT I DID NOT 
UNDERSTAND. 
Signature of Focus Group member Printed 
name of Focus Group Member 
/ /2005 
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Session 1 
Bringing the Syllabus to Bradford... 
1)EXPLANATIONS OF CRIME AND DEVIANCE 
The first part of my research is about 
investigating what are the popular explanations 
of Crime and Deviance in the Pakistani 
Community of Bradford. 
Some classical views about crime and deviance 
are: 
1. Deviance as individual or biological 
difference (Lombroso 1870): deviance is 
what is implemented by individuals who are 
born with certain features. 
2. The legal basis (Tappan 1947): crime is 
what is defined as such by the legal 
definition (so is it law that is actually 
the cause of crime? ) 
3. Deviance as Social harm (Sutherland 1949): 
the essential characteristic of crime is 
its legal description as an act which is 
socially harmful (so are social problems 
like the family breakdown criminal acts? ) 
4. Deviance as Social Construct (Becker 1963): 
deviance is what is labelled as such in a 
specific society in a specific moment (so 
can we really consider the law as 
objective? ). 
In the focus group I will ask you to discuss 
what is considered to be criminal/deviant in 
the Pakistani community of Bradford. 
2)SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, SOCIAL CONTROL AND POWER 
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If we consider crime as something which is 
socially constructed (as opposed to socially 
produced), we have to acknowledge who 
constructs the notion of crime and where the 
power to do it is mustered. 
Foucault is a contemporary philosopher and 
sociologist whose major work is about power and 
social control. Foucault argues that western 
society lives in the illusion of freedom as 
institutions like through mass communication 
and psychoanalysis end up reproducing models of 
social control that are likely to exclude the 
ones who do not conform. 
In the focus group I will ask you to discuss 
who generates the social construction of crime 
and deviance in the Pakistani Community of 
Bradford. Also, who you believe are the main 
institutions that are largely believed to deal 
with social control? 
3)THE CAUSES OF CRIME 
When we speak about crime as social 
construction and social production, we are 
essentially dividing the theories about the 
cause of crimes in two groups. 
Theories connected to social production regard 
crime as a deterministic consequence of 
historical or economic processes (e. g. 
deprivation as the main factor leading to 
criminality). 
Theories connected with social construction are 
keener on analysing cultural factors that may 
concur in crime raise. 
Here you find two examples: 
Opportunity theory (Merton 1947): 
individuals who lack the opportunities to 
achieve what society depict as desirable 
(i. e. expensive car, designer clothes, 
etc. ) will try to achieve the same goals 
('aspirational frame') by illegal means. 
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" Anomie (Durkheim 1893,1897) or 
Disorganizational theory: in societies in 
rapid change people may no longer feel 
subject to social discipline and `go 
astray'. 
In the focus group I will ask you to discuss 
your ideas about the causes of crime in the 
Pakistani community of Bradford. 
4)THE SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF CRIME 
Most sociologists agree that age, social class, 
ethnicity, gender and locality are important 
variables for the analysis of crime. 
Age: young people are considered to be more 
likely to be involved in criminal activities, 
but they are likely to `wear it out' when thy 
get older (the Home Office statistics show that 
the peak age of offenders is 18 years for men 
and 15 for women). Some statistics disagree 
with this statement as young people are only 
more likely to be reported for getting into 
trouble as they are controlled by a range of 
institutions. 
Social class: links between social class and 
crime are well established in the 
criminological literature and most offenders in 
prison classify themselves as working class. 
Some argue that social status is actually 
something that is influential at the stage of 
deciding whether or not to prosecute. White 
collar crime, fraud, tax evasion might also be 
more difficult to prosecute. 
Ethnicity: while black people are 
disproportionately represented in the crime 
statistics, some sociologists have argued that 
discrimination make black people more likely to 
be stopped and searched arrested, etc. (Coleman 
and Moynihan 1996). 
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Gender: Pollack (1961) argued that the `dark 
figure of crime' regards women as they are less 
likely to be detected and arrested as 
perpetrators of crime. On the other hand, 
certain offences relate only to women (only 
mothers can be charged with infanticide and 
prostitution related offences). 
Locality: since the Chicago School when the 
`zone of transition' was regarded as the area 
with higher rate of deviance, different 
localities have been considered more likely or 
less likely to be crime settings. One view 
about localities and crime depicts urban spaces 
as more likely settings for criminal activities 
than rural. ones. 
In the focus group I will ask you to discuss 
how these variables are seen by the Pakistani 
Community of Bradford. 
5)MORAL PANICS 
The concept of moral panics explains public 
anxiety and official reactions to increases in 
certain types of crime. To call something 
`moral panic' suggests the scale of the 
response is disproportionately greater than the 
scale of the issue. 
This concept became famous firstly with Stanley 
Cohen. In 1973 he wrote about the moral panic 
generated by the media about `Mods and Rockers'; 
a single event happened in 1964 had triggered 
off diffuse anxiety about this subculture. 
Nowadays, the notion of moral panic has been 
applied to family morality, asylum seekers, 
terrorism and paedophilia. 
In the focus group I would like you to discuss 
whether moral panics are present in the 
Pakistani community of Bradford. 
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Session 2 
Focus Group 
Please discuss the following questions: 
1. What is considered to be criminal/deviant 
in the Pakistani community of Bradford? 
2. Who generates the social construction of 
crime and deviance in the Pakistani 
Community of Bradford? Also, who you 
believe are the main institutions that are 
largely believed to deal with social 
control? 
3. Discuss your ideas about the causes of 
crime in the Pakistani community of 
Bradford. 
4. How are variables such as age, gender, 
social class, ethnicity and locality are 
seen by the Pakistani Community of 
Bradford? 
5. Are moral panics present in the Pakistani 
community of Bradford? 
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Appendix 5 
Glossary 
ASA Association of Social Anthropologists 
BCCI Bradford Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
TUC Trade Unions Congress 
WYP West Yorkshire Police 
BNP British National Party 
NF National Front 
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